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Abstract 
This thesis is about the relationship between human bodies and 
instrumental technologies that can be use to measure them. It adopts the 
position that instruments are technological structures that evoke and manifest 
particular phenomena of embodied Ufe. However, through their history of 
association and use in the sciences and scientific medicine, instruments tend to 
be attached to a particular ontology, that of mechanical objectivity. 
Embarking from research into the artistic uses of physiological sensor 
technology in creative practices such as performance and installation art, this 
thesis asks whether it is possible to use instruments in a way that departs from 
their association with scientific objectivity. Drawing on philosophers who have 
developed an understanding of the relationship of instrumental technologies 
and human bodies as co-constructive, it explores how this model of con-
construction might be understood to offer an alternative ontology for 
understanding the use of instruments in practices outside of science and 
scientific medicine. The project is therefore suggestive of degrees of freedom 
and flexibility that are open to exploitation by creative practices in the realm of 
instrumentation as an alternative to orthodox rationalisations of the value of 
scientific equipment as authentic, revealing and objective. 
The major contribution of the thesis is that transfers and synthesises 
arguments and evidence from the history and philosophy of sciences that serve 
to demonstrate how the instrumental measurement of human bodies can be 
considered to be a form of creative practice. It assembles a position based on 
the work of thinkers from a number of disciplines, particularly philosophy of 
science, technology, and the medical humanities. These offer examples of 
ontological frameworks within which the difference between the realm of the 
instrumental, material, biological, and the objective, and the phenomenal, 
meaningful and subjective, might be collapsed. Doing this, the thesis sheds 
light on how physical devices might enter into the interplay of making, 
mattering and objectifying the immaterial, a realm that it might be considered 
the role of artists to manifest. 
Drawing on contemporary, and secondary, accounts of the 
development of empirical testing in the medical sciences, the thesis agues for 
the recovery of a romantic account of human physiology, in which the 
imagination and meaning are active and embodied. It therefore offers to link 
the bodily and the instrumental through an extended-materialist account in 
which the physiological, rather than the psychological, is central. Developing a 
response to constructionist models of the body and instrumentation, the thesis 
concludes that a model of the poetic may be adopted as a method for 
understanding the opportunities and imperatives inherent in the avoidance of 
deterministic approaches to biosignaUing technologies. 
In doing this, the thesis contributes particularly to the creative arts and 
technology research practices concerned with the use of body sensor 
technologies in humanistic applications. It complements the existing works by 
artists in this area that make use of instruments by assembling a number of 
theoretical readings and interpretations of how instruments work - among 
them the thermometer, lie detector, and automatograph — which illustrate the 
argument that that is possible to operate from a theoretical position within 
which instruments are both material, performative and symbolic. 
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Preface 
At the outset of the research that led to the writing of this thesis, I 
envisaged that its final product would be primarily technical. My research topic 
was biosignaUing' technology and its use in producing human body 
visualisations.^ My research question regarded an investigation of the 
possibility of generating visualisations that were non-reductive.^ 
I embarked upon the project from my existing knowledge base, in the 
visual arts and computing, and began practice-based research. My early work 
explored the use of biosignal visualisation and sonification'* in visual arts and 
performance.^ Immediately, certain questions began to arise, most particularly 
1 Biosignalling refers to a range of usually electrical devices that are used to measure 
human body states. Most familiar are the electrophysiological sensors used to measure 
bioelectrical phenomena such as the signals from the heart, brain and muscular tissue. 
Typical body states measured are muscle tension, heart rate and blood pressure. In 
addition to electrophysiological devices, there are other sensor types such as 
mechanical, chemical and electrical sensors. (Cacioppo et al. 2007). This range of 
sensor technologies, as well as having clinical uses for patient monitoring, are also 
used in disciplines such as psychophysiology and biofeedback therapy. 
2 Visualisation is the practice of designing new ways in which to visually represent 
abstract data, usually using computer based graphic synthesis and interaction. (Ware, 
2004: Chen, 2006). 
3 Biosignal measurement as a practice identifies a number of distinct functions of the 
body, which are measured using electrical, mechanical and sometimes chemical 
sensors. Prior to computerisation, signals would have been recorded as graphic traces 
on smoked glass or paper rolls. Contemporary sensor systems often incorporate 
digital sampling at varying degrees of resolution. 
^ Sonification is the auditory equivalent of visualisation, representing data as sound in 
order to aids its interpretation. 
5 This research led to workshop and conference presentations of biosignal based 
visual and sound based collaborative artworks at ICMC 2008, eNTERFACE'07 and 
NIME 2008 reported in collaborative papers An Interactive Bio-Music Improvisation System 
(Tahiroglu, K., et al. 2007) znd Audiovisual content generation controlled by physiological signals 
for clinical and artistic applications (Benovoy et al. 2007). However, this work is not 
commented on in any detail in the following because the methodologies used to create 
these works do not illustrate in any useful fashion the theoretical approach proposed 
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regarding the nature of instrumentation itself, and what it meant for me, as an 
arts practitioner, to be using it. Was it necessary for my use of instruments to 
be rationalised by technical methods borrowed from scientifically established 
protocols? In what sense could my work approach the relationship between 
psychological states that could be measvired by observing the state of the body 
and the realm of the experiential? Can a relationship between the bodily and 
the psychological be articulated, without being reduced or mechanised? Was 
the relationship between instrumentation and scientific reality fundamental; 
could there be an instrumentation of arts? Many of these questions can be seen 
to remain linked to the following thesis, but have evolved with it. In particular 
the context for this project being an original preoccupation with the use of 
sensing technology in the arts may be seen as having had an influence on the 
research process. I note this here in the preface because this particular problem 
is not one that is central to the thesis' discussion, but can, in retrospect, be 
seen to have had a stake in what has emerged from it. 
The exploration of body sensing in the arts, whilst, by some, stiU 
currendy perceived as 'high tech' is by no means novel. Artists have explored 
electrophysiological sensing, particularly brainwaves, and signal analysis in 
musical performance and art since the 1960's. Alvin Lucier's Music for Solo 
Performer (1965) used percussion instruments that were resonated in response 
by the thesis. Only one early performance, (un)controlled experiment (2007) (described in 
Audiovisual content generation controlled by physiological signals for clinical and artistic applications) 
explored, to some extent, my preoccupation with instrumental reduction and the 
limits of representation. 
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to the performer's brainwaves. Richard Teitelbaum's Spacecraft (1967) featured 
E E G (electroencephalogram — brain) and E K G (electrocardiogram — heart) 
control of synthesizers (Miranda and Brouse, 1995). 
More complex models of feedback response, where performers became 
part of a feedback loop, as emerging from early biofeedback"^ methodology, 
were used in performances. David Rosenboom's On being invisible and On Being 
Invisible II (1994-95) described in his Monograph Exfended Musical Interface with 
the Human Nervous System (1997) employed neurofeedback^ using a system 
designed to recognise and respond to measurable neural aspects of music 
perception.* 
^ Biofeedback, or 'applied psychophysiology' (Schwartz et al. 1995, p.xix) is the 
practice of using biosignalling technologies to train human subjects to exert voluntary 
control over physiological functions. Subjects are asked to observe graphic or auditory 
representations of those functions that are measured in real-time using biosignal 
sensing devices. CKnical biofeedback is the application of this method in a medical 
setting to help train patients to self regulate a range of dysfunctions of the body. 
Amongst these are the use of biofeedback to treat Reynaud's syndrome, hypotension, 
ADHD, urinary and fecal incontinence, muscular disorders, bruxism and on 
(Schwartz et al. 1995). 
'' Neurofeedback is a form of biofeedback specifically concerned with the 
measurement of electrical signals from the human brain, known as 
electroencephalography. This measurement is achieved using electrodes (sometimes 
large arrays) attached to the scalp. The electrical activity of the brain in different 
regions can be inferred by comparing the electrical differentials of electrodes in 
different positions. Changes in voltages can be interpreted as certain frequencies 
referred to as 'brainwaves'. 
* At different times, Rosenboom has created performances using systems designed to 
respond to changes in brainwave frequencies associated with different conscious 
states. This area of research into the use of electroencephalography (EEG) for musical 
control continues to, the present in the work of researchers such as Eduardo Miranda 
(Miranda, 2010) at ICCMR at Plymouth University. Other researchers are also 
involved with the use of EEG alongside other forms of biosignal, using physiological 
measures of heart (electrocardiogram), eye (electroculogram) and muscle 
(electromyogram) for example. This 'multimodal' approach has been pioneered by 
Biocontrol System's 'Biomuse' system originally developed at Stanford University 
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Currently there are numerous artists working with a variety of sensor 
types. George Phookin Khut 's interactive artworks, Cardiomorphologies v. 1 and 
v,2, and ns'onance-bodj [-box] incorporating electrocardiography (heart) and 
respiration sensing (Khut, 2006) exploit the biofeedback model of the way that 
conscious awareness of physiological state can aid its voluntary alteration. 
Khut describes his artworks using body-sensing as encouraging "audiences to 
observe and reflect on aspects of their own psychophysiology, using the 
technologies of biofeedback interaction as a way of situating the participant's 
subjectivity and bodily experiences within each other as reciprocal 
phenomena" (Khut, 2006, front matter). 
In the majority of artworks that use biosignalHng, data is analysed and 
used to generate visual or sonic representations in real-time.' This is quite 
different to how the majority of scientists or physicians use measured 
physiological data, which is recorded and analysed for the traces of known 
diseases or changes responding to particular stimuli, as will be discussed in the 
following chapters. There are of course exceptions to this, in a number of 
medical and cUnical practices where real-time representation of signals are 
used; for example biofeedback therapy, a cUnical application of real-time 
biosignalling, treats patients by making them aware of physiological changes of 
(Lusted and Knapp, 1988; Knapp and Lusted, 1990) used by Atau Tanaka for 
interactive music performances. 
'^  In a sense, real-time signals experienced by an audience might be better considered 
as physiological media, rather than scientific data. 
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which they would not usually be conscious and medical monitoring for surgery 
or nursing. 
Developing robust systems which can collect, analyse and display data 
in real-time is a technical challenge that has meant that this area of artistic 
research has been somewhat under the influence of the development of cheap 
computing power and the development of robust and easy to deploy sensors, 
and data transfer methods. This means that there is stiU work going on which 
uses similar methodologies to those pioneered by artists Uke Rosenboom 
decades ago (Brouse, undated). The hardware and software now allows real-
time performance of complex forms of data analysis, researchers have been 
able to use analysis techniques to identify emotional states in theatrical 
performers, for example by collecting and analysing multiple sensor types 
simultaneously (Benovoy et al., 2007). Many artists, including myself, have used 
biofeedback instrumentation to explore the use of physiological signals in 
artistic or performance contexts, because of its cheapness and multimodaUty."' 
Because it is intended for a clinical market, biofeedback equipment is also sold 
1° Example units of these type are those from the Thought Technology 'Infiniti' 
product line (littp://www.rhoughttechnology.com/) and Mind Media's 'Nexus' units 
(http: / /www.rnindmedia.nl/) both of which can be used with a flexible range of 
sensors. Hardware systems developed for use in the arts include ICubeX and 
Biocontrol sensors have also been used by artists and musicians. Many biofeedback 
units have a range of sensors, making them suitable for some forms of 
electroencephalography, as well as electrocardiography, electromyography, skin 
resistance, respiration and temperature measures. This range of sensors, and their 
cross-reference is referred to as 'multimodal analysis'. 
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as a convenient 'black-boxed' product ' ' and therefore suitable for users who 
are not biomedical engineers. 
There are certain reasons that the biofeedback paradigm lends itself to 
repurposing as a structure for interactive artworks and performances. It 
demands the real-time presence of the subject, attached to the machinery of 
sensors. This confirms the relationship of their person to the output of the 
system and also imparts meaning to the visualisation. The logic of biofeedback 
is that through their presence, attention to, and experience of the visualisation, 
the audience of a biofeedback artwork is cognitively influenced by their own 
bodily phenomena, which are manipulated by the technological and aesthetic 
decisions taken by the artist over how to represent these phenomena. This 
complex interaction between spectator, artist and technology, is explored by 
Brigitta Zics' doctoral thesis Transparency, Cognition and Interactivity: 
Toward a New Aesthetic for Media Art (2008) and work on her project Mind 
Cupola (2008). Zics' work is concerned with generating an aesthetic paradigm 
for understanding artworks that use technologies such as eye-tracking and 
thermal imaging to measure audience-participants. In these kinds of artworks 
the subject is kept whole by default, even when the signals being collected by 
the systems and represented might refer to a reductive set of phenomena of 
the body. 
'1 'Black box' is a term with roots in electrical engineering where it was used to refer 
to a part of an electrical system that has a known input and output, but could be 
deployed in the design of a system without knowledge being needed of the workings 
of the component or how it functioned. Bmno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1979, 
p.150) and Vilem Flusser (2000, p.16) both use this term to refer more generally to 
technologies which are used without knowledge of their workings. 
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The knowledge and methodologies of scientific and medical disciplines, 
such as clinical biofeedback and psychophysiology'^ allow artists to create 
interactive artworks and performances that, using sensor instrumentation, 
respond to, and interact with, the psychophysiology of the human body. Using 
a combination of somatic bodywork theory, phenomenology and biofeedback 
methodology informed by cybernetic principles, artists Uke Khut and 
Rosenboom have developed arts practices which offer technologically 
mediated experiences of physical subjectivity, both amplifying and influencing 
audience/performer's physiologies and rendering the physical subjectivity of 
the body palpable. Khut's work builds upon an understanding of 'the body as a 
subjectivity' (Khut, 2006, p.6) a position shared by my own work and that of 
the philosophers I draw on in my first chapter. 
Real-time display is a compelling way in which to experience the body 
as mediated by technology. In addition to this, adoption of the biofeedback 
paradigm by artists also has certain philosophical advantages. In particular 
problems relating to how the 'subject', whose body is being measured is 
understood to relate to the data collected. This relationship, using the 
biofeedback paradigm, is cybernetic. It explains the interrelation of subject 
(audience or performer), instrument and visualisation, as inherentiy and 
naturally linked. However, this paradigm appears to preclude an articulation of 
the meaning of bodies and their relationships with instruments as part of a 
'2 Psychophysiology is the "scientific study of social, psychological, and behavioural 
phenomena as related to and revealed through physiological principles and events in 
functional organisms" (Cacioppo et al 2007, p.4). 
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discursive or symbolic realm of meaning. Using the biofeedback paradigm 
(judiciously) avoids raising questions regarding the relationship between 
meaning and embodiment, perception and symbol that the thesis (imprudently) 
instead attempts to unearth. It is for this reason that the thesis is concerned 
with a discussion of the placebo effect, an effect that is complicated when 
knowledge, meaning and symbol are incorporated into a model of biologically 
active forces that are instrumentaUy accessible. 
The biofeedback paradigm has become associated with a number of 
tropes regarding instrumentation and technologised bodies. The role of 
technology as mediator between the body and the subject varies, and is at 
times a force disconnecting from the body/world, and, at others, reconnecting 
(in particular in the use of cUnical biofeedback). This idea wiU be discussed in 
more detail in the first chapter of this thesis, the notion that biofeedback 
(particularly electrophysiological) technologies offer an objective measurement 
of the body, and can make apparent to users aspects of physiology that they 
may otherwise neglect. It is the aim of biofeedback training to train humans to 
have access to voluntary bodily control that they always lacked, or have lost. 
When artists make use of the biofeedback paradigm in their work, they often 
explain the rationale of the practice as one that reconnects the bodily and the 
subjective, as Khut (2006) puts it, making visible the 'reciprocal' nature of 
psychophysiological phenomena. 
Where my project diverges from, and hopefully contributes to, this 
approach is that it critically engages with how sensor technology itself is 
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understood, particvdarly in scientific epistemology. As a methodology it offers 
the potential for a particular type of aesthetic experience to be produced. 
However, the danger of accepting biosignaUing instruments without 
examination of their accompanying explanatory frameworks is that doing so 
may encourage a determinist view of these technologies. It passively accepts 
the convenient positivist tropes often attached to them, such as the popular 
biofeedback concept of Unking to an authentic bodily experience, which may 
have been forgotten, or 'disemburdened''^, or providing a cyborgian 
enhancement of body perception. 
My project can therefore be seen to run alongside the investigations 
made by artists of the way in which technologies can be used to mediate and 
enhance bodily experience. The aim is to create a discussion of instrumentation 
that complements these works by interrogating the notion of instrumental 
technologies as representations. Instead it offers them as embedded within, co-
extensive and co-defining of bodily ontology representing, knowing, 
describing, and creating are all coUapsed.''' 
Those artists currently working with biofeedback technologies, 
biosignaUing and brainwaves to create music, performance or interactive 
'^  Peter-Paul Veerbeek (2002) discusses this idea in Borgmann's philosophy on human 
experience and the negative effects of technology upon it. See also Drayson (2009) 
(included in the appendix) for a brief discussion of this idea in reference to 
physiological instrumentation. 
'"• Ontology is the philosophical study of 'being' - or 'what is', the philosophical 
exploration of aspects of the world, rather than the philosophical investigation of how 
that world is known - epistemology. Karen Barad (2007) has offered the term onto-
epistemolo^ to describe the relationship of what is known and how it is known to what 
is. 
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artworks are not themselves committed to the natural dualisms that have 
historically accompanied discussions of sensor technologies. This thesis is 
concerned with extending an alternate philosophical framework within which 
these practices might be understood, particularly the way in which instrumental 
practices interact with the human body, in as Khut puts it a 'reciprocal' 
fashion, but further to this, a formative fashion. This thesis will show the 
occasions where taking a closer look at instruments could provide important 
insights into the use of instruments which does not take them as tools, but 
offers a framework in which to understand their relationship with the 
symbolic. 
For this reason this thesis includes an examination of how instrumental 
technologies have been traditionally conceptualised in the philosophy of 
science. Most particularly with how aspects of creativity might be wound into 
an account of its use that would serve those concerned not just with the 
surface of the technology, and its existing use, but the interrogation of what 
degrees of freedom and flexibility might be open to exploitation by creative 
practices. The thesis attempts to show how an account of instruments that are 
material, performative and symbolic might inform a use of them in creative 
practices. 
It has been my aim to create an account of how the instrumental 
measurement of human bodies can be considered to be essentially creative, and 
to offer an augmentation of the biofeedback paradigm illustrated pardy by 
reflection on the discourses surrounding the 'placebo effect'. By denying any 
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ontological difference between the realms of the instrumental, material, 
biological and objective, and the phenomenal, meaningful, and subjective, the 
thesis sheds Ught on how physical devices enter into the interplay of making, 
mattering, and objectifying the immaterial, a realm that it might be considered 
the role of artists to render manifest. 
This thesis presents one of many paths that can be taken through this 
philosophical territory. It can only offer a partial account of the breadth of 
what exists, because of the diverse literatures that it draws on. However, while 
they might forgive the brevity with so much ground is covered, readers should 
benefit from its small addition to a discourse that maps wider, transdisciplinary 
concerns with technology, ontology and the body. I would Uke also to hope it 
might offer the reader an indication of some of the stranger possibilities that 
lurk in the spaces between the philosophies of the human body, and practices 
using measurement instrumentation. 
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Introduction. Gestalt Biometrics and their Applications 
One way to explain this thesis relatively simply is to refer to one way of 
understanding the difference between the arts and the sciences. The ideas that 
began this investigation related to how we might understand the use of 
technologies developed for scientific use in medicine as tools for artists. The 
apparent difference between these realms can be seen in the idea that the 
sciences measure and explain, and the arts create. However, this thesis is based 
upon a well-developed scholarship that argues that there are other ways of 
understanding scientific practices and technologies. 
Rather than conceptualising scientific practices using measuring 
instrumentation as essentially revealing, their role being the rendering visible of 
an authentic reality, the process of measurement one developed to make use of 
certain technologies for the measurement and recording of this reaUty, this 
thesis draws in a conceptual framework that considers scientific practices as 
constructive. The literatures of the philosophy of science, history of science, 
philosophy of technology and the sociology of science and medicine, in 
different places, offer an increasing range of insights into the ways that we 
might think about this constructive nature of scientific practices with reference 
to instrumentation and instrumental measurement. 
The thesis aims to develop our understanding of these ideas with 
reference to a particular use of instrumentation, to measvire the human body. 
To do this it contributes a transdiscipUnary synthesis of the history and 
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philosophy of science and technology relevant to a particular subject area, 
human body instrumentation, taking into account a number of contemporary 
scholars and disciplines, as well as a range of examples of different types of 
technology, to explain and explore these ideas. 
The thesis deals with the quite familiar territory of scientific objectivity, 
and the importance of mechanical registration using instruments to the idea of 
objective measurement. A reassessment of the role of instruments in the 
context of their interaction with the human body is a discussion that might at 
first appear rife with dualisms. The themes that emerge from these dualisms 
are dealt with in the early chapters of the thesis. The notion of instruments as 
essentially objective, operating in contrast to, or on a different level to the 
quotidian world of bodily experience, led me to examine the philosophy and 
history of science through the work of scholars like Lorraine Daston and Ian 
Hacking. The work of these scholars is important because it clarifies the 
relationship between objectivity and instrumentation, where it can be retained, 
and where it is misleading. 
Central to this discussion is the thesis' account of the placebo effect, an 
instrumental artefact manifested by controlled testing, which is both held as 
one example of the way in which instrumentation is used to structure the 
world in order clarify the effects of certain variables on certain physical 
outcomes, and at the same time, the effect demonstrates the way in which the 
meaning of measurements and structuring activities carried out on the body 
essentially modify it, and finally, as the discussion moves to the lie detector, a 
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devices that uses the placebo effect this clarifies the way in which instruments 
may even be understood to make use of meaning and symbol to evoke and 
structure aspects of the body. 
These observations may seem trite when examined, in fact it makes 
sense to understand physiological instruments in this way, for instance, the 
manner in which the blood pressure cuff tightens around the arm is one 
example of the obvious way in which instruments are not passive observers, 
measurers, but that they actively create certain laboratory conditions'. This 
knowledge has been part of the philosophy of science for centuries, as 
articulated by thinkers such as Francis Bacon, as we wiU see in Chapter 2. The 
philosophy and social sciences have made much ground, following in the 
footsteps of thinkers like Michel Foucault, in uncovering the ways in which 
scientific structures, such as forms of medical diagnosis, give human 
individuals particular theories and understandings of their own embodiment 
and subjectivity, so scientific meaning and structures shape human Uves. 
Instrumental measures, be they made using devices, or structures of 
measurement, such as questionnaires, therefore modify their objects. It is in 
this observation that the thesis proposes its contribution, and articulation of 
the impact of the role of meaning within instrumental practices which is highly 
useful if artists are to use scientific devices of measurement in their work — 
particularly interactive artworks. Finally, it is important to deal with devices 
and physiology because this area seems less contested, also the way in which 
artists innovate using computer technologies often impacts upon the way in 
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which those technologies are innovated upon and appear in consumer devices, 
therefore the structuring effects of these instruments, and the fact that they do 
not offer an authentic body, one that is unfettered even by conscious thought 
or knowledge is an oversight. It invites a particular way of considering the 
body, as an object that can be acted upon, managed and modified. While there 
may be benefits to this approach, if this way of thinking about the body is 
normalised, becoming part of day-to-day life, it closes other possibilities. When 
making a measurement, decisions are made about what is relevant, and what it 
is below the instrument, those decisions shape what is. This is both a creative 
invitation and a caution. 
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Biometrics as a research topic 
The goal of the research project that gave shape to this thesis was to 
propose a 'gestalt' human measurement technology, a project that demands a 
response to the question of how those aspects of human beings that have 
traditionally been excluded from bodily materiality by classical philosophy can 
be understood as technologically accessible. The focus of this thesis is upon a 
particular type of instrumental technology — 'biometrics' — devices used for 
measuring human bodies. However, it is not concerned with the application of 
biometrics for the identification of individual human beings. Instead the thesis 
is an exploration of the general understanding of what 'measuring biology', 
'hiomefms'might refer to in how the human body is made sense of within the 
practices that use these types of devices. 
To this end, the thesis mobilises a broad definition of biometrics - as 
technologies used for the monitoring and representation of changes in human 
bodies over time. Evidence of this broad focus is the variety of different 
devices that appear within the text. The discussion wiU include, if only in short; 
methods for human pulse measurement, stethoscopes, thermometers, 
polygraphs, randomised controlled trials, the sphygmograph, x-ray, ultrasound 
machines and a finally, a somewhat obscure turn-of-the-last-century 
psychological measuring apparatus named an 'automatograph'. While it 
contains some lengthy discussions of instruments as things and as theories, the 
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thesis does not provide a taxonomy of biometric instrumentation or a history 
of it, aside from those histories it provides in order to illustrate its argument. 
For aU the apparent variety in this Ust, what brings these instruments 
together in the thesis is their relationship with scientific objectivity, the way in 
which they are used in scientific methodology and offered as an answer to 
particular epistemological challenges. The thesis will discuss some of the ideas 
that shape how we understand mechanical data registering devices, and their 
use, as practices of the rationalised and automatic, having a special relationship 
with physical matter a relationship also renders instruments problematic when 
we consider instruments in contact with the human body. 
Physicalism and psychophysiology 
Part of what concerns this thesis is the changing notion of what aspects 
of human beings might be considered 'instrumentally accessible' within 
research practices such as psychophysiology. As the thesis will show, the idea 
of what constitutes a measurable aspect of a human body or human experience 
is one that has, and will continue, to fluctuate. The thesis proposes that 
instruments have a role in changing notions of what constitutes human 
experience, human existence, and concurrent understandings of the materiality 
of that experience. 
The practice of using instrumentation to measure psychological states 
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emerged as a science in the mid-to-late 19* century'^, and was accompanied by 
considerable debate regarding the efficacy and the moral significance of 
identifying human conscious experiences as observable, causal and possibly 
mechanical bodily processes. As Daston (1978) identifies, in Britain, an 
emerging 'scientific psychology' found itself in a difficult position between the 
'reductionist', 'mechanistic' tendencies of Victorian science and the imperatives 
of moral philosophy (p. 192). Reductionist models and laboratory experiments 
threatened to reduce hviman volition to reflexes and destroy both the capacity 
for ethical conduct and the moral necessity of free will (p. 194). 
While the thesis is not intended to offer a history of instrumentation 
associated with any particular historical period, it draws on a number of 
histories to illustrate its discussion of the use and understanding of 
instrumentation in different contexts. The scientific discipline of 
psychophysiology, which arose in the 19th century, took as its project the 
quantification of phenomenal experience."^ To track the relationships between 
the psychological with the physiological, by positing (as Wilhelm Wundt did) 
that the mental was simply the obverse of the physical, rather than as it was 
previously considered, following Rene Descartes, an ontologically separate 
realm altogether (and therefore accessible only to philosophical introspection 
and not quantification) (Daston, pp.196-197). 
15 The first psychological laboratory was opened between 1976 and 1929 by Wilhelm 
Wundt in Leipzig, Germany (Cattell, 1928). 
^^' In Wundt's laboratory in Leipzig the psychology of vision as well as the sense of 
movement and time perception were studied (Cattell, 1928). 
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Proponents of the new psychophysiology found themselves having to 
deal both with philosophical and methodological problems regarding how the 
relationship between mind and body might be formulated and quantified. But 
at the same time their project was beleaguered by the moral philosophical fears 
raised by claims that 'mental contents' might be accessible to physical 
instrumentation." 
Within the prevailing physicalist ontology that informs the majority of 
scientific disciplines in the 21" century, there are no longer aspects of human 
beings that are not 'instrumentally accessible'. The popxolarity of scientific trials 
which use MRI scanning to map the relationship of different parts of the brain 
to certain types of psychological tendencies or events might appear to render 
further discussion moot. The doctrine of physicalism appears to mean that 
instrumentation can be understood to have access to the 'inner', the 
phenomenological landscape of the human mind, and that a dispute between 
mind-body philosophies is resolved. 
To consider examples of those things that in a traditional philosophical 
account might be described as mental, but in the sciences are the focus of 
instrumental measures, we could refer a number of key concepts that can be 
found in literature of psychophysiology; for example, the concept of stress, as a 
'^  Daston's (1978) paper on this subject tells us that one response to the ferocity of 
these debates was the development of the concept of 'will' within psychology. This 
enabled this aspect of human beings to be dealt with and maintained as a part of the 
scientific discourse. However, the concept gradually faded through the 1930s and 
following decades as religious imperatives became less influential and scientific trends 
led scientists to compartmentalise their understandings of the relationships between 
day-to-day life and the objects of their study (p.207). 
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biological response by individuals to their environments and experience. An 
understanding of the notion of stress caused by what might be considered as 
'non-physical factors' on human health; have existed in Western medicine since 
the 17* century (Cooper and Dewe, 2004, p.2). Since then it has served as an 
adjunct to the understanding of the role of physical and biological factors that 
cause disease and led to the development of detailed physiological accounts of 
stress associated with mental states and perception of different situations 
(Kaltsas and Chrousos, 1992). 
Emotion research is another related area of contemporary 
psychophysiology. Researchers in fields such as Human Computer Interface 
(HCI) design have for some time been working towards robust algorithms that 
can be used identify differing emotional states in human subjects from 
electrophysiological sensors measuring a variety of physiological signals 
(Levenson, 1992; Picard, et al., 2001; Lisetti and Nasoz, 2004. pp.1-16; 
Benovoy et al, 2008). 
It is important to explain here that this thesis does not claim that 
activities that use body measurement always take a reductive approach to the 
body, or that mental categories are always excluded from the categories of 
accessible bodily phenomena. In fact the early pioneers of psychophysiology — 
figures like Ernst Weber (1795-1878)'^ Gustav Fechner (1801-1899)''' and 
"* Weber discovered a lawful relationship between the incremental change in weight 
held in a subjects left and right hand, and their perceptual awareness of this change, 
allowing him to formulate Weber's Law, which reflected the sensitivity of the 
perceptual system to change (Benjamin, 2007, pp.31-3). 
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Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), - were concerned particularly with the 
measurement of perception, through introspective self report of subjects, an 
idea that went out of fashion in favor of more objective and behaviourist 
tendencies of their students. James Cattell (1928) who studied under Wundt is 
a good example of this. Noting that whist a student he failed to make a 
successful study of his assigned topic — reaction to changes in colovired Ught — 
because of his professor's requirement for students to make use of 
introspective measurements. Cattel notes that he grew frustrated with the 
'limitations of introspection' (1928, no page number), a frustration that 
eventually led him to carry out a number of his own experimental 
investigations in his boarding rooms. While introspection as a scientific 
method went out of fashion, it remains clear that the philosophical categories 
which might have once been correlated with mental and physical are not 
adhered to by contemporary scientific disciplines of psychophysiology. 
However, as wiU be discussed in the following, these ideas have maintained a 
presence through a scientific epistemology connected with these distinctions, 
which has influenced the way in which scientific instrumentation has been 
thought about since the mid-eighteenth century. 
1'^  Heidelberger's (2004) work on Fechner's philosophy of science shows that Fechner 
was pursuing a science that incorporated conscious experience as entirely measurable 
and accessible through instrumental measurement. 
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Subjects and Objects 
The thesis is based upon an underlying philosophical premise regarding 
the nature of human beings as embodied subjects. It takes physical bodies as 
having a fundamental and embedded subjectivity that inhabits the same 
ontological stratum as the instruments that measure them. This understanding 
of subjectivity, as an essential part of the flesh that walks and speaks and sees, 
is one which has been explored in philosophy at length and argued for 
convincingly. A number of scholars, such as Richard Rorty (1980) and 
Elizabeth Grosz (1994) have surveyed, supported and developed this position 
are introduced in the first chapter of the thesis. The discussion of their work 
provides an underlying rationale and confirmation of the thesis' approach to 
understanding the body. It is one aim of the thesis to attempt to understand 
how this subjectivity, immanent to human beings, and human bodies, can be 
articulated as an attribute open to measurement by physiological 
instrumentation. 
In addition to philosophies of the body, the thesis also responds to 
literature that has emerged from the philosophy of technology and sociology 
of science, which critiques how the 'sight' afforded by instrumentation, is 
understood to relate to reaUty. Much of this discourse also revisits other 
problems raised by subject/object distinctions and understanding the ontology 
within which instrumental science operates. Therefore, in untangling this 
relationship, it references various problems regarding how human experience. 
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phenomenology and meaning may be understood in reference to instruments 
intended for the measurement and representation of human physiological 
function. 
Many scholars ia the philosophy of technology and science studies have 
proposed a different set of conditions than those that gave rise to 
philosophical questions Uke those that surround the mind-body problem. The 
distinction between mind and physical matter that is the result of a discussion 
of instrumental measurement of the body. Alternatively, a different set of 
problems comes from the question of how instruments bring certain aspects of 
the bodily into being, rather than an illuminating practice, bringing to light 
what is already there, it proposes that instruments are a materialising force. 
What the thesis is concerned with drawing out of this literature is that these 
sciences are creative themselves and that the devices that they use might be 
considered as such also, in particular ways that afford particular interventions 
by artists. It is not the case that the possibilities for these interventions - as wiU 
be discussed in the case of the Ue detector - are not already being explored and 
exploited by users of instrumental devices, however, what the thesis aims to 
make clear is the implications of these uses to the way in which instruments are 
conceptualised by their users. 
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Contribution of the thesis 
The major part of the thesis' contribution is the exploration of a 
particular approach to understanding scientific measurement in the specific 
case of human body instrumentation. This approach was developed in the 
philosophy of science by thinkers like Gaston Bachelard and Neils Bohr.^° As 
Bachelard and Bohr (and many who have followed them) have held, the 
practice of measurement should not be understood as one that simply makes 
available accurate data about the state of the world. This realist understanding 
of the role of instruments can be rejected. In its place can be developed an 
understanding of instrumentation as one of many methods by which human 
beings make sense of reality, by developing structures, and physical systems 
that interact with matter in certain ways. However, there is a further, and 
fundamental, coda to this idea; that by making forms for understanding, the 
objects of study themselves are modified, influenced, materialised. 
In the case of human body instrumentation this idea is one that 
appears to be particularly important, not least because of the authoritative role 
that diagnostic technology currently holds in medical practice. The thesis 
marshals responses to the problem of understanding human measurement 
from many disciplines, maintaining that they all have a converging awareness 
of particular problems regarding how human beings are understood as 
^'^ I wiU engage with the work of Bohr in the thesis through Karen Barad's (2007) 
development of his ideas regarding measurement in the sciences and her linking of 
this to the sociological literature that explores medical imaging practices such as fetal 
ultrasound. 
36 
products of instrumental practices. For example, drawing on medical 
anthropology offers the thesis access to existing (and long running) discussions 
of problems in the application of scientific ideas such as those that rationalise 
the use of instrumental technologies in a humanistic domain, medicine. 
Some of scholars drawn upon in the following have started to offer 
work that explores this territory. For instance, Karen Barad (2007) has drawn 
on sociological studies of ultrasound scanning to explore the implications of 
her position regarding measurement as a materialising practice in the context 
of the human body. As Barad points out, there is an existing scholarly history 
of technologies of bodily management, which builds on the work of Michel 
Foucault, and on some thinkers from feminist scholarship, such as Judith 
Buder. The thesis can be seen to link to a lineage of scholarship that seeks to 
understand the role of technologies, as structures for describing human 
existence, and therefore shaping human life and experience. 
One might argue that this research is necessary because we live in an 
increasingly technologised context. In many societies, human beings are 
subject to an increasing number of technologies for automatic surveillance, 
measurement and categorisation. As Irma van der Ploeg (2003) notes in her 
essay on biometric identification technologies;'[...] in various domains of 
society and spheres of activity, tanging from work, health care, and law 
enforcement, to consumption, travel and leisure, [...] the generation, 
collection, and processing of body data is increasing' (p.58). 
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Electrophysiological and other biosignal sensing is one area influenced 
the effect of the increasing ubiquity of computerised media. Innovation in 
biosignalling research and the dissemination of consumer technologies which 
incorporate these technologies is driven by a number of range of applications 
for novel forms of computer hardware inputs; use in relaxation, rehabilitation, 
or other biofeedback therapies, as peripherals for home computing, games and 
creative applications, as computer interfaces for those with a variety of physical 
disabilities, such as paralysis and in health and fitness monitoring. The present 
popularity of concepts like mobile and ubiquitous computing are opening up 
an increasing availability and diffusion of computing resources (necessary for 
auto-recognition of body states, data storage etc.) which can be put towards 
the use of body sensor enabled devices in day to day contexts, and also offer 
applications for further research in affective (emotion aware) computing. 
For all this apparendy novel development, it is also the case that 
understanding how instrumental technologies shape human bodies and 
experience is an ongoing problem that has a long lineage. As will be discussed 
in chapter 5, the adoption of metaphors of medical and instrumental concepts 
of the body into everyday Ufe, and the influence of these types of description 
on Uved experience are not novel. For example nosological (disease) categories 
have often been associated with instruments of measurement, such as the 
thermometer. The application of medical types of body sensing have long been 
envisaged as an outcome for diffusion and remain the goal of current research 
in fields such as ambulatory and telemedicine. At least since the Enlightenment 
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there has been a tendency for thinkers and physicians to apply technological 
metaphor to understanding human bodies and psychological mechanisms (my 
use of the term 'mechanism' in this context is an apt example).^' 
The idea that technological progress and novelty should motivate 
research in body sensors is however not really central to the thesis' motivation. 
Approaching these technologies as essentially novel as a standpoint from 
which to think about their adoption in the arts and can too easily accept the 
form that they take, leading to attempts to find uses for them as they are 
offered. Instead the thesis attempts to assemble the ground, much of which is 
already in place (or nascent in other disciplines and discourses), for 
understanding the way in which the use of sensor technologies can be 
understood as a creative activity. The thesis aims to respond to the issues that 
have been identified in other fields in response to measurement and 
instrumentation, such as anthropology and philosophy of science, in order to 
demonstrate that accepting these devices as having a straightforward, reaUst 
relationship to the body neglects a form of creative practice that might 
otherwise emerge. For this reason the thesis aims to develop an account that 
looks at instrumental measurement as creative and productive of human 
bodies. 
2> Julien Offray de la Mettrie's 'L'homme Machine (1748) famously conceived of man as a 
machine, building on (and critiquing) Descartes' use of this metaphor. 
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The use of examples in the thesis 
The thesis discusses a number of examples that are considered as 
contentious: the placebo effect, the Ue detector test, and the automatograph. 
One reason for these choices is that these contentious examples are situated in 
the discourse where most free-play is available. As Bruno Latour (1987) 
maintains of his own methods in the analysis of technologies, it is where 
alliances and theories have not been reified, where there is stiU controversy, 
that there is still space to question what they have or could become, and the 
assumptions about the world that they incorporate, that interventions and 
reassessment of technological systems may be made. 
The examples discussed are not intended to clarify a particular 
technical aspect of biometric practice, but instead to reveal how instrumental 
measurement systems are sometimes used to detach and reattach human 
bodies from human subjectivities. It does this in order to offer a way of 
understanding the application of a "gestalt biometrics" in the arts, an 
understanding of instrumentation that includes its symboUc and meaningful 
functions. The example of the placebo effect makes it clear that the biologically 
active properties of symbol and meaning are a problem in some practices, such 
as medical testing. However, these same problems may be useful if 
reincorporated into other practices. 
The thesis articulates a modified relationship between instruments and 
bodies. It suggests that an account of human bodies and their relations with 
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instruments which does not neglect to consider the way in which knowledge is 
constructed, and how bodies respond to meaning might result in a different 
understanding of instruments and their use. Instead of the orthodox 
conception of instrumentation as offering objective representations of reaUty 
through a particular and privileged material relationship with the world, 
instrumentation may be better considered as a collaborator, and an active and 
creative tool. 
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Overview of the structure of the thesis 
In chapter 1, the thesis begins by offering an account of the body which 
is, as Wittgenstein described it in his later works, something through which the 
interior is expressed, a thing which is behaves as and is experienced as 
'suffused with meaning, thought, passion and will' (Hacker, 2007, p.5). This 
body as 'suffused with meaning' is the 'gestalt' body of the thesis' tide. In order 
to clarify this concept of the body, chapter 1 introduces the notion of 
'extended materialism' recognisable in a number of philosophical accounts of 
the human body as well as the concept of a 'flat ontology'. 
When appHed to a concept of the body, extended materialism recognizes 
the inherent nature of the physiological and symbolic as manifested by the 
body (as well as technology, language, culture, and environment). By 
understanding the body in this way, the thesis intends to suggest that in fields 
where reductive forms of measurement are not so crucial, such as the arts, a 
range of subjective and internal states could be, and are, produced by biometric 
technologies. 
Drawing on explanations of extended materialism devised by a number 
of scholars, the chapter makes clear how this form of philosophical 
materialism differs from the position usually associated with the term. By 
maintaining an understanding of the physical world that it is non-reductive, 
and an awareness of the changing nature of scientific definitions of how 
material reality may be constituted, is developed. 
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The following chapter, Chapter 2, examines the orthodox relationship 
of instrumentation to scientific epistemology and the concept of scientific 
objectivity. It shows that there are certain aspects of the way in which 
instrumentation can be used that are considered 'objective' which are useful, 
but that a number of other concepts of objectivity should be discarded. This is 
because they confuse an understanding the relationship of instruments to 
material reality as well as the human body by conflating mechanical registration 
of data with access to a pre-existing and objective physical reaUty, and the 
ability to represent that reality in a straightforward and unreconstructed way. 
Chapter 3 extends this analysis of objective measurement using 
instrumentation to a discussion of medical technologies. It shows how human 
body measurement technologies tend to be associated with discourses of 
objectivity and a simultaneous denial of subjectivity by historians of medicine. 
From this starting point the chapter sets out to provide an adequate account of 
the more general effects of a move away from dualist epistemologies in the 
understanding of scientific instrumentation. Informed by the contemporary 
literature, it gives an account of how instruments are understood to be a 
integral part of the production of phenomena, and analyses the medical 
humanities literature which describes current theory on the way in which 
medical activities and instrumentation in particular shape the body through the 
process of representation. 
In chapter 4, the thesis draws upon the philosophical literature that 
concerns itself with an exposition of instrumentation, mainly in the sciences. 
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This allows the thesis to show how it is possible to set aside the traditional 
epistemological project of knowing the world 'as it is' or the 'things 
themselves'. Instead the practice of using instruments is re-modeUed, as the 
practice of verifiably setting up a relation of effects and causes, creating 
'instrumental' relations that describe entities; the use of an instrument is to 
isolate one form of thing from all others and to link it to a trace. What this 
description of instruments also establishes is that it is not linked to materiality 
or any particular kind of physical composition in the classical sense. To 
provide this account of instrumentation the thesis follows the arguments of 
Gaston Bachelard (1984) and Karen Barad (2007) that instruments are more 
usefiaUy described as ways in which the world is produced from within, rather 
than devices that give an authentic access to or iUuminate an existing, but 
inaccessible, reality. In this revised view, instruments do not represent a pre-
existing world (and neither do scientific illustrations and data, theories or 
models) but are a form of intervention upon that world. The multitude of 
different instrumental interactions that can be made on the world represent the 
many ways of assigning and measviring different attributes of that world, many 
forms of description/interaction. 
The discussion in chapter 5 of the production of disease categories 
through a range of medical practices is intended to show that in practice, 
bodily phenomena are untidy and pragmatic, they are produced for different 
pvirposes and often cross boundaries. This discussion demonstrates that bodily 
phenomena such as different types of disease can be understood as historically. 
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culturally and instrumentally contingent. The chapter discusses examples of 
disease categories which have been shown to be historically and culturally 
contingent and in some cases, contingent upon the invention of particular 
measuring technologies. The chapter discusses the way in which certain 
apparatuses have given rise to the possibility of diagnosis of certain 
pathologies, and introduces a the concept of an 'expectant cUnic' from Michel 
Foucault's The Birth of (he Clinic (2003). 
Chapter 6 discusses the 'placebo effect, and 'meaning response' as 
products of the invention of the controlled trial, an instrumental structure used 
for testing the efficacy of medical treatments. Dealing with the historical 
conditions and concerns of the pioneers of this controlled testing in early-
nineteenth century medicine, the chapter examines the way in which a concept 
of the imagination was produced and dealt with by two different trials carried 
out to test the medical claims of mesmerism. These concepts of the 
imagination are not held to be consistent, but are held demonstrate an 
important aspect of instrumental set-ups; the way in which they can be used as 
arguments that establish certain aspects of human life or meaning to be 
important or unimportant within the wider context of medical scientific 
practices. 
Chapter 7's discussion of the 'Ue detector test' and its final reflection 
on the 'automatograph' appUes the account of instrumentation produced by 
the thesis. It also extends the previous chapter's development of instrumental 
accounts of apparatus that produce meaningful phenomena. It introduces and 
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extends Geoffrey Bunn's argument that Ue detector testing is a form of 
performance; and further, argues that this performative dimension might be 
validly considered an active part of instrumental practices, not one that should 
be subtracted from our overall understanding of what instruments are, or how 
they operate on a symbolic dimension. 
Chapter 8 turns toward a speculative discussion based on the writings 
of Richard Rorty. Based on Rorty's development of the concept of the poetic 
as a pragmatic response to the creative construction of meaning, it suggests 
that there may be an alternative, poetic strategy, for thinking about 
instrumental practices outside of the sciences, particularly in the arts and 
creative practices. By reminding human users of the technology of language 
that they are engaged in a practice of 'world-making', the constructive aspects 
of language, as an expression of the bodily and subjective are explored in a 
discussion of the doctrine of poetics. This finally delivers a method, already 
central to artistic practices, for reconceptualising the possible roles that 
instruments might play in creative practices. 
Terminology used in the thesis 
This section defines a range of terms that appear throughout the text. 
For some it provides only a starting point for ideas that are progressively 
modified through the argument of the thesis. Foremost amongst these are 
instrument, instrumentation and instrumental. The thesis is primarily 
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concerned with instruments as tools that measure.^ It is not concerned with 
instruments used as tools for manipulating bodies, such as scalpels, or musical 
instruments used for making sounds. The thesis embarks from a similar notion 
of instruments to that used by Latour and Woolgar in laboratory Ufe (1979, 
p.51-2). Here they describe instruments as inscription devices, which produce 
scientific inscriptions by interacting with matter and therefore produce 
correspondences between particular phenomena and marks. Chapter 4 
explores and extends this idea. 
Within the thesis, the term apparatus is used to refer to assemblies of 
instruments. The two terms, instrument and apparatus are to an extent 
interchangeable. As defined by Latour and Woolgar, both words are concerned 
with the production of an inscription and an instrumental connection, 
between phenomena and mark; they "transform pieces of matter into written 
documents" (1986, p.51). An apparatus might have a longer number of actions, 
stages or devices, between its object and final inscribed outcome, but is still 
intended to maintain the same claim as simpler instruments. Both instrument 
and apparatus operate to link the material world with a representation or 
recording of it. 
It is worth commenting on the relationship of the category of devices 
that we refer to as instruments with a notion of the instrumental. Within the 
thesis, this term does not refer to Dewyan instrumentalism in the philosophy of 
22 Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary (1995, p.619) describes an instrument as 'a 
device that measures speed, distance, etc or records information about the operation 
of sth, e.g. an engine'. 
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science. Instead it refers to a notion of instrumental rationality, as it is 
understood as a method of enquiry in the physical sciences. This rational 
enquiry links logical and mathematical reason with physical instrumentation (in 
philosophy this term can also refer to the ethical rationale that is used to justify 
action). As measuring instruments are generally understood to be structures 
that allow the measurement of an aspect of the physical world. They are 
understood to do this by producing logical and rational relations between 
physical phenomena and information about those phenomena.^ When 
something is said to be instrunjentalit is understood to have a causal and 
possibly mechanical relationship with an effect. 
Some measuring instruments are used to make automatic recordings 
and graphs, digital numerical logs, or photographs, such as the 
electrocardiogram. Some instruments, such as the microscope, are used to aid 
observations made by human observers. Chapter 2 will discuss the apparent 
differences between these types of instrument, and the concept of mechanical 
23 Ian Hacking, (1983, p.187-208) argues that the relations between phenomena and 
scientific observation are more often than not established via through observation and 
use, rather than logical, theoretical descriptions of instrumental devices. He uses the 
example of the microscope to show that while our theoretical descriptions of the 
instrument are highly inaccurate, it is still understood to work because it enables a 
verifiable interaction with matter that can be confirmed at the level or normal human 
vision. Hacking, like Kuhn (1961, p.162-7) suggests that there is a 'text book' view of 
instrumental measurement which is informed by the way science is taught which 
encourages a particular reading of instruments and their relations to and descriptions 
through scientific theory. 
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objectivitj^, which informed mid-nineteenth century scientific 'best practice' 
as modelled on machines used for automatic data registration. 
Objectivity itself is a recurring theme and dealt with in depth in 
chapter 2. The term refers to a mixtvire of philosophical ideas (Daston and 
GaUson, 2007) that require clarification and dissection. One of these, is that it 
is possible to provide an account of physical reality on its own terms, which in 
turn informs the idea that there are distinct 'objective' and 'subjective' 
positions from which to know the world and forms of knowledge about 
human bodies. 
The thesis attempts to avoid providing anything more than a loose and 
provisional description of subjectivity, and this is dealt with in chapter 1. This 
is because, as wiU be shown, the notion of the subjective as an antonym of the 
objective produces it as an interior essentially separate from the rest of the 
world. The effect of this is a philosophical position where the interior of the 
subject becomes inaccessible to the material; the material (and real) becomes 
unknowable to the individual. Chapters 2 and 3 aim to explore the complexity 
of this dialectic; the discussion relates both to early scientific empiricism and 
the adoption of scientific methodology in medicine as well as its relationship to 
philosophical understandings of human knowledge and the human body and 
subjectivity and meaning as integral to the body. 
^'^ The term 'mechanical objectivity' is adopted from Daston and GaHson's Objectivity 
(2009), where they also discuss other epistemological principles manifest in the history 
of scientific adases, 'truth to nature' and 'trained judgement'. Porter (1996, p.3-4) also 
identifies 'mechanical objectivity' similarly, as machine-like, rigorous and restrained, 
alongside other forms of objectivity, 'absolute' and 'disciplinary' objectivity. 
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The primary concern of the thesis is with a discussion of instruments 
that are used to measure the human body. Chapter 1 goes into some detail 
regarding the exact ontological properties of the body that the thesis is 
concerned with. This clarification of the body as an 'extended material' entity 
which combines mental and physical within a non-dualistic framework, a 
'gestalt' body, is central to the thesis argument regarding the way in which 
instruments can depict, interact, shape and materialise the human body. 
The term materialism in its philosophical context can be understood 
as referring to the notion that that the physical sciences can account for the 
totality of what exists. However, an awareness of historical changes in scientific 
knowledge will alert us to the fact that the context in which 'material' is 
defined is constantly shifting. As the Oxford Companion to the Mind (1987) 
notes: 'The word 'materialism' sometimes misleads. The materialist is not 
committed to a Newtonian 'billiard-ball' account of matter' (p.490). 
Materialism instead is linked to the physical theories of its day.^^ Because of 
this 'relativity' to physics, philosophical materialism is also sometimes referred 
to as 'physicalism'.^*^ This serves to distance the position from its 
entanglement with now dated science and historical contexts, such as the move 
^' In the 18* century for example, being a materialist would meant a commitment a 
definition of matter as "an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and 
motion do actually subsist" (Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, par. 9). 
'^' As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains; ".. .while physicalism is 
certainly unusual among metaphysical doctrines in being associated with a 
commitment both to the sciences and to a particular branch of science, namely 
physics, it is not clear that this is a good reason for calling it 'physicalism' rather than 
'materialism.' For one thing, many contemporary physicalists do in fact use the word 
'materialism' to describe their doctrine[...]" 
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away from vitalist theories.^^ Within the thesis, physicalism and materialism 
may be considered as broadly interchangeable terms. However, it should be 
understood that the materialist position that the thesis takes is a particular one, 
of extended materialism. The thesis adopts this from Ronald Schleifer 
(2009) and Elizabeth Grosz (1994) and its particular implications wiU be 
explored in chapter 1. 
The theme of materialisation is also important. This term refers to 
the appearance of something, becoming material, and therefore perceptible. 
Karen Barad's (2007) work, discussed in chapter's 4 and 5, develops a notion 
of'mattering' (p. 141) in terms of the production or 'materialisation' of 
phenomena by instrumentation. The thermometer, for example, makes the 
phenomena of temperature materialise in a particular way. The use of the 
thermometer in particular circumstances leads to the temperature 'mattering'. 
Temperature becomes palpable, comparable, measurable, and also important 
(as noted in the short history of the thermometer in chapter 3, the ability to 
measure temperature led to a modification of, and increased importance for, 
the diagnostic category of fever). Barad's play on words reminds us that 
drawing human attention to something, making it detectable and perceptible 
through measurement makes it 'matter' in both senses of the term, raising its 
importance, and its material and objective qualities. 
2'' Taking the view that human and animal life did not require anything 'more' than the 
same components and structures of organisations that are present in inorganic matter 
in order to be living, hence Rene Descartes' likening of human and animal bodies to 
machines, (p.491). 
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Meaning, and the symbolic are both terms that I have adopted from 
Daniel Moerman's discussion of the 'meaning response'. Moerman's work 
responds to a paradigmatic lack of recognition regarding the role of 
"experiencing knowledge, symbol and meaning" (2002, p.4) as factors 
influencing human biology in the field of medical science, and in the scientific 
testing of medicine.^* Like the 'subjective', these terms remain somewhat in 
flux throughout the thesis, as they refer to a broad collection of phenomena 
that vary from one context to another, and are often contingendy identified. 
My concern is not particularly with providing an account of what might be 
called consciousness, phenomenal experience, imagination, qualia, or 
subjective experience. This is because all of these are aspects of the human 
gestalt that is central to the thesis' understanding of what human beings are, 
and therefore fit into the account of an extended materialist body. Past the 
early discussions of this gestalt, the thesis gains little from further defining 
them when they appear as an embedded and assumed part of the human body. 
The time when this is not the case is when these terms are used to refer to 
something that is manifested — or denied — by instrumental apparatus, such as 
the role of meaning and subjective experience in lie detection, or the 
construction of the imagination as either crucial or dismissible in the 
discussion of the placebo effect. 
28 Latour (1993b, 2005) critiques the 'symbolic and subjective' as worthwhile concepts 
for discussion, defence, and reintroduction into sociology, maintaining that by 
referring to these concepts, a false dichotomy is maintained. 
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The term 'gestalt', from the German for 'form' or 'shape', is used in 
English to denote 'wholeness' or 'holism'. In the context of the thesis this term 
is used to refer to the totality of human bodies and minds that the extended 
materialist account of human bodies describes in chapter 1. As a term it creates 
a tension with the concept of instrumentation, the role of which is to divide 
and to define, and therefore to describe. 
An analogy I have often returned to which helps to think about 
gestalts, language, reality and instruments is that of cutting a cake. The cake, 
as a whole, is our gestalt, there are endless different planes and forms into 
which it can be sliced, (the pragmatic, and in English culture normal, way to do 
this is to cut what is known in mathematics as a 'circular sector', a slice). 
However we decide to cut the cake renders different parts of the cake distinct 
from one another, open to different discourses of contrast and distinction. The 
thesis proceeds from the understanding that reality is undefined until 
perceivers or instruments make a 'cut'^^ and that any cut made is, rather than 
29 Barad (2007) has substantially developed a notion of cutting with reference to a 
posthuman concept of bodily reality prior to ontological boundary distinctions such as 
nature-culture (See Barad's discussion with reference to Pickering and Haraway on 
p.136). She uses the term 'cut' to refer to the way in which measuring instrumentation 
'performs cuts', 'every measurement involves a particular choice of apparatus, 
providing the conditions necessary to give meaning to a particular set of variables, at 
the exclusion of other essential variables, thereby placing a particular embodied cut 
delineating the object from the agencies of observation' [my emphasis] (p.115). Her 
concept of'agential cuts' focuses on the work of instrumentation as nonhuman actors 
that produce phenomena through these processes of inclusion and exclusion (p.l72-
175). Incorporating a concept of technological agency situates Barad's reading of Bohr 
in posthumanist scholarship (p.32). Barad's thesis might be extended to human beings 
in an instrumental analysis of the human perceptual apparatus, which responds for 
example, to certain frequencies of light and sound, but excludes others. Through 
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being arbitrary in a relativist sense, a process by which meaning is imposed 
upon the world.^° 
The term b iomedicine is often used to denote the contemporary 
practices of 'western' medicine, which is considered to be, and presents itself as 
being, based on scientific principles of evidence, rationality and objectivity. 
However, to propose that within the Western medical system that there is a 
general concept of the body, or a way to rationalise various systems and 
medical specialisms that produce a variety of bodies in different settings would 
be to assume hegemony that does not exist. As Anne-Marie Mol (2002) notes 
in the introduction to her book The Body Multiple, the notion that Western, 
Cosmopolitan, M o d e m or Allopathic medicine has any unity is a trope 
which 1970's Sociology of Medicine might be accused of perpetrating, but 
even then only in the Ught of that scholarship's preoccupation being with 
establishing other claims against 'medicine' (Mol, 2002, p.3-4). Mol's 
anthropological work strongly suggests that biomedical bodies are more 
pragmatically divided into different areas of expertise, by hospital workers and 
particular material configurations of the body, these frequencies take on difference 
resonances within the body. 
"^ This formulation is clearly highly indebted to Barad's work, but earlier in the 
research process to Richard Rorty's work, which in its critical analysis of the 
philosophical notion of truth, makes comparable similar arguments about the 
relationship of language to reality. (Rorty and Engel, 2007; Rorty 2009) Both are 
committed to what has been observed to be a 'antirepresentationaUst' position which 
rejects the idea that there is 'true' or optimal way to relate language to reality (Rorty, 
2009, p.xv) and that there is a 'separation between words and things' that it is the role 
of epistemology to correctiy configure (Barad, 2007, p.137). Finally, I set out on this 
trail after reading (and perhaps misinterpreting) the words of Gaston Bachelard (1984) 
on scientific instrumentation, that 'science projects' rather than makes the world 
visible. 
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communities, between different technologies used to measure or treat. The 
sociological critique of biomedicine's neglect of the subject can pardy be 
attributed to the way in which the body is refracted and fragmented across 
multiple lines of distinction between needed and unneeded information 
(p.51).'^ 
Despite its theoretical commitment to scientific values, the 
methodological complexity of biomedicine means that a hoUstic body concept 
that could be understood to guide medical interventions should be seen as an 
unlikely goal. The biomedical body appears to have clear boundaries in the way 
that it is taught, if not in the way that Mol and others have observed it to be 
practiced. Textbooks and anatomical atlases provide clear boundaries and 
maps of the territory of the body. This territory begins and ends with the skin. 
Bodies can appear, when depicted in this way, as clearly defined objects, but 
this reaUty is beUed by the question of ownership of body parts removed 
during surgical procedure, cultured cells, the permeable membrane between 
'^ As is the case in the sciences, it makes more sense to consider the different 
institutions that do medical research and perform medical treatment, as delineated by 
numerous fields of expertise and interest. Each of these take widely different bodily 
systems and functions as their objects, often they are further differentiated by the 
technologies that they use. Take for instance the range of hospital departments, 
opthamology, pediatrics, midwifery, neurosurgery, chemotherapy, occupational health, 
maxillofacial, medical imaging, musculoskeletal, oncology, immunology, the range of 
departments are many, their connections and flows multiple. Specialisms may divide 
the body by organ system, other departments specialize in diseases that may not be 
fixed by bodily locality, in areas where diagnostic decisions need to be made, or 
surgery carried out, physicians and surgeons often need a high level of familiarity with 
the part of the body that is being treated. Mol's work (discussed further in Chapter 5) 
has made these multiplicities visible by following a particular disease through a 
hospital, where it could be observed transformed by numerous sites. 
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bodily part and waste matter, peeling skin, faeces, blood, all of which might 
flip-flop in and out of the context of comfortable inclusion and disgusting 
'abject'.^' 
So while it is inaccurate to discuss 'biomedicine' as an entity or 
movement, there ate certain philosophical tendencies within these allied 
practices that in a general sense can be set in distinction to the concept of the 
body that is used by this thesis. Daniel Moerman has observed that American 
medical education is 'rich in a particvilar kind of science'. He points out that the 
'Medical College Admission Test' includes a section on 'physical sciences' 
including 'levers', 'inclined planes' and other 'simpler' science that is more 
typical of 'seventeenth century' physics than the complexities of medicine or 
even contemporary physics (Moerman, 2002, p.13). Moerman suggests that 
this emphasis on the simplistic and mechanical may have some part to play in 
the criticism that physicians have attracted for their 'attempt[s] to manage all 
diseases by means of engineering interventions' (lUich, 1975; p.53), and that 'it 
often seems to bother doctors enormously that the fact of receiving medical 
treatment (rather than the content of medical treatment) can initiate a healing 
process' (Moerman, 2002, pl3). There is a tendency following this type of 
training to overly rationalise bodily processes and to discard information about 
the circumstances of patient's lives, narratives or subjective experiences as 
peripheral to the information gathering necessary to produce an effective 
52 The abject is a theoretical concept of the bodily other developed by Julia Kristeva 
(1982) drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
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diagnosis or treatment (Good, 1994). However, it could be argued that an 
underlying lack of appreciation for complexity and ambiguity, and an overly 
reductionist view of phenomena could be considered a beneficial approach to 
the performance of medicine when quick, pragmatic and confident decisions 
are necessary. 
Finally, phenomenon is a term that has a variety of meanings and may 
be taken by some readers to refer its philosophical meaning as it relates to the 
phenomenological qualities of perception. As Ian Hacking (1984) reminds us, 
phenomena as defined by Kant are the way in which things appear to the 
perceiver, defined in distinction to noumena — 'things in themselves' of which 
an account cannot be made, for they cannot be known except through the 
phenomenal world (Hacking, 1983, p.98). 
Hacking (1983) and Barad (2007) use the term as it is understood in the 
sciences, to refer to the observed objects of scientific study. Hacking (1983, 
p.220-232) points out that the term is a 'philosopher's minefield' coming as it 
does from the Greek for a 'thing, event or process that can be seen' (p.220) 
and therefore being immediately implicated in philosophical discussions 
regarding the relationship between 'appearance and reaUty' (ibid). He observes 
however that the word has: 
[...] a fairly definite sense in the common writings of scientists. A 
phenomenon is noteworthy. A phenomenon is discernible. A phenomenon 
is commonly an event or process of a certain type that occurs regularly 
under definite circumstances. The word can also denote a unique event 
that we single out as particularly important (p.221). 
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Similarly, in Barad's work, the concept of phenomena that she adopts 
from Neils Bohr's philosophy is based on its use common use in the sciences 
to refer to 'that which is observed, that which we take to be real' (Barad, 2007, 
p.412). Barad, Hacking, and this thesis, therefore begin by using the term as it 
is understood in a scientific context, as aspects of the world that are repeated, 
reliable, important. However, it then goes on, as does Barad's work, to develop 
a notion of phenomena as fundamentally presupposed by some form of 
perceptual act, be that of an instrument, or a human observer. We might take 
them to be real, but phenomena are 'observed entities'. The phenomenological 
philosophical tradition therefore is reconnected with the instrumental and 
scientific. 
Many of these terms and concepts, such as phenomena, the variety of 
forms of objectivity, and instrumentation, which have been introduced 
above, will continue to be developed throughout the text as the thesis explores 
how they might be and have been re-described in order to make its argument. 
Finally, a few other terminologies, such as poetics, will be introduced in 
footnotes or described in the main body of the text at the first point that they 
are used in the thesis. 
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Chapter 1. The human body as the 'stuff of subjectivity' 
The body is a most peculiar 'thing,' for it is never qviite reducible to 
being merely a thing; nor does it ever quite manage to rise above the 
status of a thing. Thus it is both a thing and a nonthing, an object, but 
an object which somehow contains and coexists with an interiority, an 
object able to take itself and others as subjects, a unique kind of object 
not reducible to other objects. Human bodies, indeed all animate 
bodies, stretch and extend the notion of physicality that dominates the 
physical sciences, for animate bodies are objects necessarily different 
from other objects; they are materialities that are uncontainable in 
physicalist terms alone. If bodies are objects and things, they are Uke 
no others, for they are the centers of perspective, insight, reflection, 
desire, agency. They require quite different intellectual models than 
those that have been used thus far to represent and understand them. 
I am not suggesting that medical, biological, even chemical analyses of 
bodies are 'wrong' or 'inappropriate'; my claim is the simpler one that 
the guiding assumptions and prevailing methods used by these 
disciplines (indeed, by any disciplines) have tangible effects on the 
bodies studied. Bodies are not inert; they function interactively and 
productively. They act and react. They generate what is new, 
surprising, unpredictable (Grosz, 1994, p.xi). 
In this excerpt from Volatile Bodies (1994) Elizabeth Grosz draws our 
attention to what she sees as two aspects of the human body, both of which 
have an important role in the thesis. The first is that bodies are more than 
'material' in a traditional sense; they are animate. Second, this animation is 
reflexive; human bodies are knowing and aware. Because of this, Grosz 
(drawing on a number of other scholars whose approaches she synthesises) 
argues that creating forms of representation of the body ('medical, biological 
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and even chemical analyses') also operate to produce it.'^ As a consequence the 
way in which the body is understood affects and shapes its physical expression. 
It is the aim of the thesis to understand these two observations with 
reference to biometric instrumentation (measuring devices that make particular 
observations of the body possible). The thesis is concerned with how devices 
of this kind can be understood as productive of bodies, and to extend this 
notion of production to ask in what sense practices using instrumentation 
might be considered creative. This chapter establishes a number of points and 
definitions to clarify how the body is understood to relate to subjectivity, 
meaning, and materiality. 
One aim is to describe an underlying philosophical understanding of the 
material constitution of the body that supports the thesis' exploration of 
instruments as productive in this sense. To do this it will offer a clarification of 
Grosz's first observation, that classical explanations of the material are 
'stretched' and 'extended' by human bodies. It wiU do this partly by showing 
how classical philosophical models of the material and its relation to mind as 
essentially separate or different have been rejected. This discussion will serve 
to clarify that the subjective or mental are neither ontologicaUy, nor 
epistemologicaUy separable from bodily materiaHty. By doing this, the first part 
33 This way of approaching the human body, as something produced, or at least 
radically transformed, by discourse extends across a number of disciplines, 
anthropology, medical history, psychoanalysis, philosophy and feminist theory. It can 
be seen more as a general approach to understanding human embodiment than as a 
specific episode or movement in the scholarship. It will be returned to in more detail 
in Chapter 5, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to offer as complete an account 
as the one that Grosz's work synthesises. 
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of the chapter will justify the adoption of an alterative position to dualistic 
models of the body. 
While they may tend to appear self explanatory, and perhaps 
fundamental, to a philosophical discussion of human bodies, the categories of 
mental and physical have been systematically analysed and rejected by some 
contemporary philosophers. In order to clarify what this means, and how it 
relates to scientific instrumentation, the following discussion wiU introduce 
Richard Rorty's (1980) work on the mind-body problem. Rorty's work 
responds to, and builds on, what he observes to be a turn in philosophy against 
particular and entrenched models of man's ability to perceive the world and 
arrive at true knowledge. In making this analysis, Rorty demonstrates that the 
mental-physical distinction, so familiar in Western Philosophy, is the product 
of a particular philosophical and historical context. 
Mind-body might appear a traditional and natural distinction to draw 
between the various aspects of human beings that we might discuss 
philosophically, or study scientifically. Rorty's account provides an alternate 
reading. That the body-mind distinction may more accurately be understood as 
the product of the development (particularly in the work of Immanuel Kant 
and Rene Descartes) of a philosophical discipline that maintained a realm of 
enquiry separate from the emerging physical sciences (Rorty, 1980, p.165-8). 
Building on an initial rejection of a mind-body distinction, the second 
part of the chapter discusses its alternatives - accounts of the material body 
that do not contain what philosophers might think of as 'private', and 
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'personal' 'sense-data'. There are a number of scholars who have made it their 
project to move beyond these categories and explore an 'extended 
materialism'^'* of the body. The chapter does this by drawing on some 
examples of philosophical investigations that have begun by positioning the 
materiality of the human body as, (as Grosz, [1994] puts it), a centre 'of 
perspective, insight, reflection, desire, agency' (p.xi). The later parts of the 
chapter draw on the work of a number of scholars. Grosz (mentioned above) 
and Ronald Schleifer (1999) both provide accounts of bodily materiality and 
manifestations of subjectivity that transcend the classical materialist account of 
the human body. 
The understanding of the body developed by this chapter is not 
prescriptive or final, being in part characterised by its common rejection of 
differences between mental and physical. However, the ideas it surveys share a 
common project, to (i) explore notions of an expanded materialism or 
physicaUsm and (ii) show how a philosophical account of the body may 
incorporate an understanding of the material embodiment of subjectivity. A 
result of these accounts which resist classical philosophy's 'ontological divide' 
is to generate what we might call a 'flat ontology' (Delanda, 2005, p.58; also 
attributed to Bruno Latour, 1993, by Harman, 2008; and Harris, 2005) of the 
body, the effects and possible drawbacks of this approach wiU also be 
^^ This is not the 'extended materialism' first proposed by John Smythies in 1956 and 
explained in his 2009 paper. Brain and Consciousness: The Ghost in the Machines. Here he 
proposes a 'new form of substance duaUsm' and suggests that our materialistic 
concept of mind is 'extended' by 'phenomenal space' as two 'planes' or 'branes' of 
'higher dimensional space' (Smythies, 2009, p.37). 
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examined in more detail in the following discussion.^^ 
Finally the chapter can also be seen to relate one part of a story that links 
the mind-body problem with the history of the philosophy of science. The 
historical developments in philosophical epistemology that produced mind-
body oppositions in turn affected the way in which the sciences understood 
themselves. Scientific studies which neglected certain aspects of human beings 
as 'unknowable' responded to discussions of what was a legitimate concern for 
scientific study, leaving some attributes of human beings to philosophy, often 
forgotten (later denied even by some philosophers^*^) as epiphenomena. As 
Hacking observes; 
Hellenistic writers contrasted phenomena to noumena, the things as they 
are in themselves. Kant transferred this to modem philosophy, and made 
the noumena unknowable. All natural science became a science of 
phenomena. Then came the cockcrow of positivism. The unknowable 
may be discounted, as if it did not exist. 'Phenomena' came to denote, 
for some empiricist philosophers, sense-data — private, personal, 
sensations (Hacking, 1983, p.221). 
The concept of an 'unknowable' aspect of human beings, estranged from 
the physical world, has come to inform the scientific epistemology that often 
35 The thesis will refer to Graham Harman's (2008) interpretation (and partial critique) 
of Delanda's term, particularly as it has been applied to Bruno Latour's philosophy in 
his work and others (Harris, 2005). 
'f' Both Daniel Dennet (2004) and Paul Churchland (1981) have at different times put 
forward the thesis that internal and subjective experiences are epiphenomena, and 
perhaps iUusionary, and that, most importandy, the question of whether they should 
be included in a discussion of science is moot as they have no influence or impact on 
materiality, the basis of their philosophy. This is what Richard Rorty (1980, p.l8) 
would describe as a 'neo-dualist' position, because while all that falls into the category 
of the mental is discarded, the category remains as an alternative to the material 'real'. 
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used to explain why instrumental sensors, with their attributes of objectivity, 
and physical, mechanical functions, are useful. These ideas will be further 
developed in chapter 2, where an exploration of the origins of the concept of 
scientific objectivity, and its influence on how scientific and medical practices 
of body measurement are understood will be described. 
What this chapter does not do is identify a number of aspects of the 
mental world and make a claim that they are instrumentaUy accessible. Instead, 
it describes a materialist concept of the human body that can act as foundation 
to a philosophical account of the body's relationship with instrumentation 
which can account for aspects of human experience that are not usually 
considered to be materially, objectively or instrumentally accessible. 
Introducing a notion of an expanded materialism that acknowledges the 
subjective as an attribute of the physical body allows the thesis to explore the 
creative potential of biometric instrumentation as a form of representation and 
bodily co-construction. 
The mind-body problem 
As discussed above, the following section will look at Richard Rorty's 
(1980) work on the mind-body problem, its relation to scientific epistemology, 
and the notion of an 'ontological gap' between the mental and the physical 
(p.lB). It does this partly to draw attention to circularity in the relationship 
between philosophy of the human body, scientific method, and the scientific 
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epistemology that explains why instrumental sensing is useful. It also serves to 
clarify that the interaction between physiological instrumentation and human 
subjects (and subjectivity) cannot be seen as clearly delineated by mind-body 
distinctions. 
The mind-body problem is philosophical problem regarding how the 
relationship between mental and physical aspects of human beings is 
understood. Many strands of the Western philosophical tradition are 
characterised by a dualistic approach to describing the mental and physical, 
usually linked back to Descartes' mind-body dualism (Blackburn, 1994, p.245). 
The idea that form and matter can be separated dates back to antiquity,^^ and is 
a dichotomy which recurs through history; to Christian tradition, the European 
enlightenment, and into 20* century philosophy, and which still influences 
present day epistemologies (Grosz, 1994, p.5). Questions about the ontological 
status of certain characteristics of human bodily phenomena, such as those 
things which we might describe as mental aspects are relevant to the thesis 
because of the way they might be thought to interface — or not — with 
instrumental measurement technologies. 
There are a number of different philosophical positions that have been 
formulated in response to the mind-body problem, primarily: monism, 
dualism, idealism and materialism (Gregory, 1987, p.490). The following 
3^  The concept of a body {somd) as the home or receptacle for a perfect mind, reason 
or soul can be traced then from Plato, to his adoption by Aristode, who proposed the 
conception of a hylomorphic body; one in which the relations between form and 
matter are brought together (Grosz, 1994, p.5). 
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discussion is not concerned with an exploration of these different positions. 
The thesis offers as an alternative a discussion of the roots of the mind-body 
problem in the history of philosophy, and shows how an ontological 
distinction between mental and physical has been rejected as well as an 
epistemological distinction. To do this, this chapter discusses in detail the 
argument regarding the historical contingency of the mind-body problem made 
by Richard Rorty in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature [PMN\ (1980). P M N is 
a broad critique of a model that informs the western philosophical tradition, a 
model of philosophy as a practice concerned with the judgment of the 
accuracy of representations of other disciplines, and the veracity of their claims 
to knowledge (p. 163-4). 
As part of his attack on the problems generated by Descartes and 
Kant's'^ work to reform philosophy, Rorty uses his training as an analytical 
philosopher to synthesise a critique and rejection of the mind-body problem. 
He shows how the problem is generated by a wider discourse in philosophy, 
the idea of philosophy as a form of 'metacriticism of the special disciplines' 
(p. 166) related to scepticism about scientific and philosophical knowledge. 
He draws on a number of continental and pragmatic philosophers who 
have, instead of trying to solve 'perennial problems' (p.3) of Western 
Philosophy, reject them, and the terminology (and therefore premises) on 
^^ As he describes it, "Ever since Descartes's attempt to make the world safe for clear 
and distinct ideas and Kant's to make it safe for synthetic a priori truths, ontology had 
been dominated by epistemology. So the 'naturalization' of epistemology by 
psychology [at the end of the the 19* century] suggested that a simple and relaxed 
physicalism might be the only sort of ontological view needed" (Rorty, 1980, p.165). 
This was clearly a problem as it apparendy made philosophy redundant. 
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which they are based / ' Rorty's work dismisses the existing approaches that 
attempt to resolve the relationship between physical and mental. These include 
proposing that one aspect is primary to the other, (as in classical materialism or 
idealism), theorising the mental and physical as two essentially different 
substances (this thesis is known as 'substance' or 'mind-body 
duaUsm')(Gregory, 1987, p.l lO) or discussing the relationship between these 
two aspects as being related to different epistemological positions (as in 
identity theory). Rorty's approach instead takes the categories of physical and 
mental as constructions that may be refused as unproductive. 
Of particular importance is the way that Rorty tracks the history of the 
mind-body problem as presented in the Western Philosophical tradition*, and 
the way it is dismissed by a number of philosophers, Niet2sche and 
Wittgenstein among them. He argues that the idea that there is a mind-body 
problem in contemporary philosophy is only attributable to a 'common-
sensical and intuitive' (p. 17) notion that pervades philosophical debates. This 
notion is that it is possible to make a division between the physical and the 
mental: 
^' Particular amongst these is Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose ahernative approach to 
understanding human beings will be returned to later in this chapter. Alongside him, 
Rorty names, and refers to Dewey, Quine, Sellars and Bergson amongst others, who 
undermined various aspects of Kant's notion of'knowledge as accuracy of 
representations' and 'truth as correspondences' (Rorty, 1980, p.166). 
'^ Throughout all of his work, Rorty historicises the philosophical problems that he 
therefore recognizing and charting the historical contingency of his subject, in 
contrast to the Cartesian-Kantian philosophy he critiques, describing it as; 'an attempt 
to escape from history—an attempt to find non-historical conditions of any possible 
historical development' (Rorty, 1980, p.9). 
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We seem to have no doubt that pains, moods, images, and sentences 
which 'flash before the mind,' dreams, hallucinations, beliefs, attitudes, 
desires and intentions all count as 'mental' whereas the contractions of 
the stomach which cause the pain, the neural processes which 
accompany it, and everything else which can be given a firm location 
within the body count as nonmental. Our unhesitating classification 
suggests that not only have we a clear intuition of what 'mentality' is, but 
that it is has something to do with non-spatiaUty... Even if we discard 
the notion of 'mind-stuff,' even if we drop the notion of res cogitans as a 
subject of predication, we seem able to distinguish mind from body 
nonetheless, and to do so in a more or less Cartesian way (Rorty, 1980, 
p.l7). 
Rorty therefore suggests that it is the influence of a persistent account, 
and a related set of 'intuitions' regarding human beings, that separates the 
mental from the physical, and leads to the making of Cartesian 'mental-
physical' distinctions, rather than technical or scientific evidence. He suggests 
instead that the mind-body problem can be better understood in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein's terms, as a form of 'language game', a 'pattern of activities and 
practices associated with some particular family of linguistic expressions' 
(Gregory, 1987, p.211). The mind-body problem is a discourse that generates 
the meaning of the terms that are used within it, terms which might not have 
any priority or usefulness in other contexts to describe their referent. Even 
now, when contemporary philosophical and scientific culture has rejected the 
notion of 'mind-stuff or 'mental substance' that was incorporated in 
traditional substance duaUsm, Rorty argues that this language game causes a 
68 
persistent tendency to think of the mental and physical as separable in a 
straightforward fashion (p.17).'*' 
Responses to the problem 
Rorty surveys a number of philosophical responses to the mind-body 
problem. These tend to take what he argues is an untenable 'neo-duaUst' (1980, 
p. 18) position. In this the categories of mental and physical remain 
unquestioned and what resvilts is a collection of unaccounted for 'mental 
phenomena' which must be placed on one side or another of an 'ontological 
gap' (p. 19). Some phenomena can be incorporated into accounts of the 
attributes of material organisms. As an example he refers to Gilbert Ryle's 
philosophy, in which 'beliefs, desires, attitudes and intentions' all become 'ways 
of talking about organisms' (p. 18). However, other aspects of the mental, such 
as 'experiences, pains and thoughts' (ibid) because of the their phenomenal 
•" Stoljar's (2009) introduction to Ignorance and Imagination points out that, unlike 
the problem of consciousness (liis own target) the mind-body problem is no longer an 
issue for the majoriur of disciplines, even contemporary analytic philosophy, which 
now follows the 'post-positivistic stance' (lldrt)', 1980, p,12) of Wittgenstein. 
However, Rorty's thesis, like my own, is concerned with providing an historical 
context for understanding the historical effects of a philosophical tradition concerned 
with accurate representation of the world as it influences both discourses in medicine, 
through a persistent legacy of mind-body dualism and also in scientific 
instrumentation, in its influence on the understanding of the epistemological role and 
ontological status of instruments (particularly when applied medically). The 
combination of these two aspects of the thesis' interest make it necessar)' to include a 
discussion of the territory, even while contemporary philosophers may now consider 
it a closed debate. This aside, Rort)''s observation that the language of the mind-body 
problem persists in discourse stUl stands (ibid). 
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character, seem to remain resistant to a material account, incommensurable 
with the physical aspects of the organism. 
In some contemporary philosophical thought and in sciences like 
neuroscience and psychophysiology, a common response to the mind-body 
problem is identity theory, which is sometimes considered to be the same as 
physicalism (Blackburn, 1987, p.185). Identity theory posits that mental and 
physical aspects of humans can be thought of as two aspects of the same 
phenomena, the same thing observed from different perspectives."*^ This can 
be thought of as a contrast between subjective and objective viewpoints, to 
describe it, analogies such as the two sides of a coin are often used, one side 
mental, the other physical, but both essentially one thing. 
There is a long history of philosophical objections and problems with 
the way in which identity theory is used (such as how different phenomena 
might be divided up from one another). However, Rorty rejects this solution 
primarily because it maintains a definition of the two categories of mental and 
physical (Rorty, 1980, p. l9). These two aspects remain locked away from one 
another, their difference being that of alternate perspectives. The 'mental' is 
still inaccessible to the material world, even while it accompanies it as a 
••^  There are a number of technical variations on how this relation is figured, type-type 
identity theory claims that mental states can be reduced to particular physical states, 
type-token that they correspond to certain types of states, but cannot be mapped onto 
the same neural material with each iteration. McCauley and Bechtel (2001) propose a 
'heuristic identity theory' which holds that the proposition of identities between 
psychological and neuroscientific states is ultimately useful to scientific practices — 
both in psychology and neurosciences, and that as a heuristic which accepts pluralism 
the construction of these notions allows the development of correspondence between 
different states. 
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mirrored counterpart. In this formulation, inaccessibility is no longer 
ontological, but is a matter of epistemology; the mental is objectively 
unknowable. 
Identity theory solves the highly problematic ontological questions 
raised by traditional substance dualism, such as how body-mind interaction is 
possible. However one of the main problems produced by Descartes' 
formulation of material and mental as differing substance remains unsolved, 
the 'problem of other minds', that it is not possible to know or verify the 
content of another mind (Blackburn, 1987, p. 100), even to verify that other 
minds exist. Mental contents remain scientifically inscrutable except through 
their problematic correlation with bodily phenomena, unless they are 
substantially reformulated. 
Further to this, McCauley and Bechtel (2001) observe that identity 
theory leads to a dispute over the reduction of aspects of psychological 
phenomena to neurological, observed phenomena. If these two aspects are at 
basis identical, then in disputes where reductionist and anti-reductionist 
philosophers oppose one another, the question is whether or not it is 
meaningful to discard the psychological realm as a source of information. Anti-
reductionists argue that the psychological realm's 'complexity' 'uniqueness' and 
'irreductable' nature (p.739) prevent an 'intertheoretic' mapping. While holistic 
in spirit, this approach preserves an essentially duaUstic model of the human 
subject. 
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The mind-body problem and the 'epistemological turn' 
As discussed at the start of this chapter, the mind-body problem does 
not only impact on the thesis because of its influence on how we think about 
the human body and how it is conceptualised by practices using instrumental 
measurement. As wiU be explored in Chapter 2, the mind-body problem is a 
symptom of a philosophical heritage that impacts equally as strongly on the 
way in which the philosophy of science conceptualises and validates the use of 
instrumentation. By creating a distinction between human experience and the 
material world, a distinction reinforced by epistemological scepticism, 
philosophy, as described by Rorty (1980) and Hacking (1983) created a realm 
of mental 'phenomena' that is off Umits to the physical sciences. This physical 
world is the one that is understood to relate to a notion of objectivity, separate 
from the mental sphere. 
Reflecting this, Rorty's interest in the mind-body problem is only one 
part of a wider project to question the 'perennial' concerns of western 
philosophy since Kant. It is his argument that in the philosophy of this 
historical period, an over-riding concern with epistemology has generated a 
number of 'pseudo problems'. The apparent problem of understanding the 
relations between mind and body as they are understood in classical 
philosophy is one of these pseudo problems. 
Rorty maintains that the 'epistemological turn' responsible for 
generating issues like the mind-body problem in philosophy was motivated by 
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a need to preserve philosophy as a discipline from its continiung erosion by the 
success of the natural sciences. H e traces the development of mind-body 
problem in philosophy to Descartes, Kant and Locke's attempts to establish 
philosophy as an investigation of the seat of knowledge from a prion ptmciples. 
In Rorty's account, the need to establish claims to knowledge in the face of a 
highly sceptical philosophical position led to the emergence of a number of 
philosophy's traditional, apparendy eternal, problems; the distinction between 
the mental and physical, the essential distance between mind and world, and 
finally, the establishment of a philosophy primarily concerned with 
epistemological questions related to knowledge, truth and representation. 
Rorty traces a sequence of evolutions of the notion of mind'*^ that reflect 
philosopher's concerns with giving an account of how clear knowledge might 
be arrived at. The starting point for this history is Descartes' 'cogito' (pp.l7-
69). Descartes' '^ philosophy employed a highly reductive form of scepticism, 
his arguments in his Meditations on First Philosophy question all aspects of his 
perception in the most stringent fashion. His commitment to this sceptical 
''^  Similar to those charted by Daston and GaUson (2007) in their study of 'objectivity' 
and its antonym 'subjectivity' which will be discussed further in chapter 2. 
^ Descartes' highly influential thought is often mentioned by writers on alternative 
medicine (Goldberg and Anderson, 2002, p.334) a practice where holistic views of the 
body are valued. He is considered generally to be the philosopher who 'divided mind 
from body'. This is a very limited view of Descartes' thought and, like this thesis, 
neglects much of the subtiety and interesting debate regarding why Descartes devised 
the philosophical system that he did. The idea that Descartes was a 'substance duaUst' 
— in that he denied a possible causality between the physical and the mental — has been 
questioned in historical scholarship. A more nuanced view of Descartes' approach to 
the body and medicine can is highly recommended in Shapin (2000); on emotion and 
embodiment James (1999); and, for a discussion of some of the political and religious 
pressures on his work and an excellent biography, GrayUng (2005). 
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approach is such that he suggests that his (and the reader's) experiences might 
be the work of an 'evil genius' (Descartes, 1929, p.l6). 
In the same volume, Descartes' performs an analysis of matter. He uses 
the example of a piece of wax, 'recendy taken from a beehive' and 'placed near 
the fire' where it melts, loosing its smell, taste, sound when struck, and shape 
etc. (p.91). Descartes concludes that the only aspect of the wax that is constant 
is its material 'extension'. The wax, like the body, contains many attributes, but 
the only reliable one, the one that does not change over time and is therefore 
eternal, for Descartes, is the fact of its physical extension. The only aspect of 
the world that can be reliably considered to be material and knowable, the only 
thing that remains is its physical extension - its 'body'; aU other attributes are 
mutable. 
What, then, was it I knew with so much distinctness in the piece of wax? 
Assuredly, it could be nothing of all that I observed by means of the 
senses, since all the things that fell under taste, smell, sight, touch, and 
hearing are changed, and yet the same wax remains. It was perhaps what 
I now think viz., that this was neither the sweetness of honey, the 
pleasant odour of flowers, the whiteness, the figure, nor the sound, but 
only a body what a little before appeared to me conspicuous under those 
forms, and which is now perceived under others (Descartes, 1929, p.90-
3). 
Descartes' example of the wax allows him to propose a highly reductive 
approach to the possibility of knowledge about the external world. He 
comments that 'I feel gready astonished when I observe [the weakness of my 
mind, and] its proneness to error' (authors inclusion) (p.92). His, and by 
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extension, all, human perception is thus rendered questionable by this 'error' of 
the senses, and also of the language with which he describes his observations 
(p.92). However, he proposes a manner in which his philosophical observation 
might continue, by observing what is left of the wax after the 'common sense' 
has been discarded. 
[...] what did I observe which any animal might not have perceived? But 
when I distinguish the wax from its exterior forms, and when, as if I had 
stripped it of its vestments, I consider it quite naked, its is certain, 
although some error may still be found in my judgement, that I cannot, 
nevertheless, thus apprehend it without possessing a human mind (p.93). 
It is this 'human mind' that Descartes then sets out to establish as a 
viable realm for the perception of the 'intellect' (p.94), this is the realm by 
which that highly reduced and 'distinct' aspects of the world's extension might 
be observed. Above this however, he argues that it is the nature of the mind 
itself that is the most Ukely to be righdy apprehended, and provide distinct 
knowledge. 
Descartes therefore questions the role of human perception and its value 
in knowing the world, essentially shutting off the mind from physical reality. In 
Descartes' philosophy, the cogito provides a realm in which 'clear and distinct' 
contents of thought might be formed and manipulated, and into which only 
very carefully observed aspects of the material world might be recorded. The 
cogito, in its immateriality, clarity and rationality, becomes the foundation for 
philosophical knowledge. A foundation, that because of Descartes' sceptical 
analysis of perception, the material world only offers in a limited fashion. 
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The development of the cogito is only the first part"*^  of the development 
of the concept of mind that we would recognize in contemporary philosophy. 
The cogito was later adopted and developed by other philosophers, Emmanuel 
Kant and John Locke. Kant and Locke fiirther modified the concept to include 
a range of attributes of what are now considered to be mental, that previously 
were not combined, bringing them together under the general definition of 
'mental processes' (Rorty, 1980, p.4). 
As Daston and Galison (2008) observe, Kant's philosophy was 
concerned with providing a rational underpinning to knowledge, what he 
introduced was a brand of thought which called into question empirical 
knowledge. He revisited the terms subjective and objective in order to bring 
them into Une with his own thought — radically changing their meaning from 
their original use in mid-seventeenth century Scholasticism (Daston and 
GaUson, 2008, p.206). Following Kant, the term 'objective' came not to mean 
as it originally had - "a representation of the mind" (ibid), but the opposite, as 
referring to external, independent reality. However, these terms were subject to 
an amount of slippage, and; 
[...] the boundaries between the objective and the subjective [were drawn] in 
starkly contrasting ways: between the mind and the world, the certain and the 
uncertain, the necessary and the contingent, the individual and the collective, 
the a priori and the a posteriori, the rational and the empirical (Daston and 
GaUson, 2008, p.207). 
^^ Shapin (2004) and James' (1999) work both clearly show that Descartes had not 
entirely generated the concept of mind that is familiar to us today, emotions, for 
example, what he called xhc passions wete. considered to be bodily. 
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Rorty's, and Daston, and Galison's philosophical histories show that 
philosophy, particvilarly under Kant, was recast as the custodian and arbiter of 
claims to knowledge - from any field - including science. This functioned not 
only to preserve the discipline of philosophy, but also to create an artificial 
hierarchy with philosophy at the top, sovereign over aU others. Cartesian 
'mental-physical' distinctions were invoked in order to solve the problem 
posed by scepticism that led to the concern that philosophy has with 
representations — especially those taking place in the mind. As Rorty (1980) 
summarises; 
The notion that there is a problem about mind and body originated in 
the seventeenth century's attempt to make 'the mind' a self-contained 
sphere of enquiry. The idea was to offer a para-mechanical account of 
mental processes which, somehow, would underwrite some claims to 
knowledge and disallow other claims. The paradigm of the 
'epistemological turn' taken by philosophy in the seventeenth century 
was what Kant called 'the physiology of the human understanding of the 
celebrated Mr. Locke'— a causal account of mental processes which is 
supposed to criticize and justify knowledge claims (p.126). 
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'Mind' as a conglomerate of concepts 
This discussion brings to Ught the relationship between ontological 
categories (created in order to explain the relationship of different things to 
one another) and epistemology. Understanding how the development of the 
concept of mind and the development of the notion of objectivity (as an 
antonym to subjectivity) relate is useful for the thesis, as it shows us the way in 
which these ideas about accessibiUty and materiality are combined. Rorty 
shows us that the relationship between the set of aspects that are gathered 
within the notion of the 'mental' have been brought together to achieve certain 
ends, and are a construction that might be rejected, or modified in favour of a 
more useful concept. Rorty's writing on the mind-body problem shows the 
importance of an awareness of the historical conditions of the production of 
ontological concepts, his deconstruction of the historical conditions that made 
'the invention of the mind' possible further supports his claim that 'nothing 
whatever hangs on the distinction between mind and body' (p.68). 
As well as allowing Rorty to argue that a certain need in philosophy led 
to the production of a concept of 'mind', the histories which chart the 
development of these concepts show how they can be better understood as a 
conglomerate of different, quite dissimilar aspects of human experience, 
behaviour and perception. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (PMN) 
(1980) Rorty offers a further critique of the Cartesian 'intuition' that mind and 
body fall into distinct categories, by analysing what attributes, such as 
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intentionality, or spatiality, cause aspects of body and mind to be considered 
distinct. His analysis shows that these divisions are inconsistent and 
tautological. His allegation is that the apparent problem with mental-physical 
distinctions is not the result of an ontological divide that is intuited by 
philosophers (and confirmed by instrumentation) but the effects of the 
historical establishments of a philosophical-technical jargon that persists to this 
day. This jargon leads us to make distinctions which are arbitrary, in that they 
are not supported by ontological differences, regarding their relationship to 
materiality — and are also only defined epistemologicaUy if a certain form of 
scepticism is invoked. 
Even with the success of materialist, physicaUst and behaviourist 
accounts of human beings in twentieth century sciences, Rorty argues that the 
persistence of intuitions about the 'mental-physical' divide cause problems for 
philosophical accounts of human beings that wish to avoid either duaUsm or 
reductionism. He also rejects the various attempts that have been made in 
philosophy to resolve mind-body distinctions. Based on the historical 
contingency of the problem, and the inconsistency of the ideas that it invokes, 
his conclusion is that discarding the problem entirely is the only sufficient 
answer. He concludes his argument by observing that the apparent problem 
presented by the 'private', subjective, or conscious experience, as inaccessible 
to other minds, is not an ontological issue at all, merely a problem of what he 
refers to as 'privileged access' (Rorty 1980, p.35). In Rorty's view there is 
nothing special about the 'private' aspects of the mind at all. 
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While the mind-body problem is a philosophical problem - the 
discussions in chapters 1 and 2 show the way in which philosophy of mind and 
scientific epistemology are closely interrelated. The strategy of using 
instrumentation, and our understanding of how human beings know and exist 
in the world are both related to underlying ideas of what human beings are, 
how they relate to reality, in particular how reality can be known. One example 
of this is that the estrangement of the knowing human mind from physical 
reality and the concept of the fallibility of perception, resulting in a particular 
form of epistemological scepticism, which is often used as a philosophical 
argument for the viability of mechanised measurement apparatus. Thus 
instrumentation is not simply a pragmatic device, but can be unpacked more 
fully, to open up a creative space of ambiguity about its relations to humans 
and to the world. 
Non-reductive materialism 
Rorty's response to the mind-body problem of critiquing and finally 
discarding the premise on which it is based, is informed by a broad survey of 
previous philosophy (in particular pragmatist), and the continental tradition 
that has rejected the traditional concerns of Western Philosophy. In his 
discussion of the body, Rorty draws particularly upon Ludwig Wittgenstein's 
behaviourist analysis of the way in which different aspects of internal states 
may be observed and attributed to the human body. Wittgenstein brings our 
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attention to, and challenges the idea that certain terms belong to a set of 
entities that belong in the 'unobservable' camp - the immaterial. It is because 
they appear unobservable, that they might not be considered as viable 
inclusions in the practice of instrumental sensing. 
Wittgenstein, like Rorty, considered philosophical problems Uke the 
'essence of the self, the nature of mind, the possibility of self-knowledge, the 
relation of mind and body, and the possibility of knowledge of other minds' 
(Hacker, 2007, p.5) as productions of the kinds of philosophical assumptions 
in mind-body philosophy discussed in earUer sections of this chapter. 
Wittgenstein's tactic, later applied by Rorty, was to refuse to attempt to answer 
these questions, but to instead dissolve them, and reject the terminology and 
premises upon which they were based. 
Wittgenstein's work on the concept of a philosophical psychology and 
his later works about the manifestation of the interior in the human body have 
been highly influential. His Philosophical Investigations (1953) along with various 
notebooks that he used in his teaching were published posthumously.'"' The 
primary contribution of his later works was the notion of 'language games', in 
'^ Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus (1921) was the only book Wittgenstein published in 
his lifetime, {PhilosophicalInvestigations -fizs published 2 years after his death). The 
Tractatus was intended to end philosophy, and once it was finished Wittgenstein took 
up a career as a schoolteacher. Philosophy survived — or continued at least — and the 
Vienna Circle, which formed around the time of its publication, was gready inspired 
by the Tractatus. The book itself is a series of numbered statements intended to 
investigate what can be said logically, and therefore lay out the limits of philosophy as 
set by language. It opens thus; "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in 
silence." His later work, published posthumously as the Philosophical Investigations, 
is a radical departure from the self-assured analysis of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein's 
later work is far less grandiose, more nuanced, and untidy. It was criticised by his tutor 
Russell as being not philosophy, only linguistic analysis. 
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this view of human communication and logic; he eschews the traditional role 
of the philosopher as epistemological gatekeeper, and instead claims that aU of 
human discourse is self-generating, reflexive and evolving. 
What the next part of this chapter discusses is Wittgenstein's concept of 
the hviman, one that is entirely at odds with the Cartesian, empiricist and 
behaviourist traditions that operate in reference to the dualist mind-body 
ontology critiqued above. Like Rorty, he denies that humans have some 
psychological properties in the form of spiritual substance or that the mental is 
an inner realm. What is useful to the thesis about Wittgenstein's way of 
thinking is that he described a way of understanding human beings that is an 
alternative to the Cartesian model, but is neither reductive (and rejects 
psychological reality as useful) or dualistic, in that it claims that the 
psychological realm is real, but incommensurable with the material body. 
P.M.S Hacker (2007) explains his position thus; 'Wittgenstein conceived 
of the mental as essentially manifest in the forms of human behaviour which 
give expression to "the inner'" (p.4. Hacker). Not only did Wittgenstein's 
writing deny that this inner realm was private in some essential way and that 
behaviour is the only outwardly observable and knowable aspect of human 
inner life - he 'emphasised that human behaviour is, and is experienced as 
being, suffused with meaning, thought, passion and wiU' (p.5. Hacker, 2007). 
Wittgenstein's view of the body was that it's very material being could be 
considered to be the expression of this 'inner'. This formulation of the body 
offers the thesis a model of the relationship between the subjective and the 
82 
physical that is not only not divided along ontological lines, but that 
epistemologically speaking it is also not a problem. Making clear what this 
means to an understanding of the body in the context of the thesis is the 
function of the rest of this chapter. It will do this by discussing the work of 
two scholars who have worked along similar Unes to Wittgenstein, and 
extended and situated a notion of extended materialism: Elizabeth Grosz, 
mentioned above, and Ronald Schleifer. Particular to the approach of these 
scholars is their use of a form of philosophical materialism as grounding for 
their approach; however, the kind of materialism that they are concerned with 
is very different to the traditional notions of materialism as discussed in the 
introduction. 
Materialism as a philosophical position 
The philosophical position known as materialism - as it is traditionally 
understood — has historically posed an epistemological problem for 
instrumental sciences that have taken an interest in the human mind, as is 
shown in the history of experimental psychology, a discipline that sought to 
measure subjective states (Daston, 1978). As it is usually understood, 
materialism is often associated with reductionism, and the tactic of its 
proponents is often to subsume categories Uke the subjective or the mental 
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into an underlying and primary notion of the world as physical, treating them 
as epiphenomena'*^ - and denying them as non-existent or unimportant. 
What the materialist positions discussed below have in common is their 
rejection of this tactic; instead they hold that a reduced and simplified account 
of the way in which the physical world constitutes entities and interacts with 
meaning is insufficient. The form of materialism that will be discussed below is 
not one that makes any major commitment to scientific theory, even present 
day. However it is concerned with sustaining a historical awareness of the 
necessary and inevitable flux that accompanies scientific theory. 
Non-reductive materialism is less concerned with defining the mental 
and physical, and instead rejects the incommensurability of these out of hand -
instead, it is a philosophical project concerned with the innovation of strategies 
for understanding and describing the materiality of phenomena that would 
traditionally be associated with mental experience.''* The goal is to move 
'*'' An epiphenomenon is a secondary phenomenon that is caused by another, but 
cannot itself have causal effects. In the philosophy of mind 'epiphenomenaUsm' is the 
position that mental states are caused by physical phenomena but cannot have effects 
themselves (Gregory, 1987, p.298). 
''*' Traditionally in reference to the body-mind problem, there is a broad division 
regarding how a commitment to materialism might be reconciled with a non-reductive 
concept of mind. The choice can be summarized as being between the 'peripheralist' 
and 'centralist' view of where 'mind' is situated. A peripheralist account is often 
referred to as behaviourist. In the philosophy of mind, behaviourism is the view that 
'the possession of a mind is constituted by nothing more than the engaging in of 
especially sophisticated types of overt behaviour, or being disposed to engage in such 
behaviour in suitable circumstances.' (Gregory, 1987, p.491) This view is not the same 
as the psychological methodology that denies that observation of internal and 
subjective states can be considered as valid scientific evidence {ibid). Wittgenstein's 
approach can be considered as behaviourist, however it is methodologically so, rather 
than ontologically. It does not deny the existence or relevance of the inner to scientific 
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towards an understanding of the body as a physical, material expression of the 
subjective. The concern of the thesis is with understanding and clarifying what 
such a move taken by this scholarship might signify for how the particular 
practices of instrumental body sensing are understood. 
Traditions of the body in continental philosophy 
Continental philosophy, when taken as a tradition can be seen to have a 
particular approach to the body which offers a useful alternative to the 
Cartesian condition that encourages an epistemological doubt regarding 
embodied knowledge and experience. Many contemporary continental 
philosophers have rejected the idea that there is an essential world that might 
be found to correspond more or less accurately to the inner representations of 
the perceiver, language, or scientific representations. The accuracy of human 
perception or other forms of representation can stiU be questioned, but the 
underlying assumption that there is an essential something to which these 
perceptions or representations should be accurate too is questioned. The 
problems posed by epistemology are therefore no longer an issue, and different 
models of human interactions with the physical world are posed. Key to these 
ideas for the thesis, is not only the notion that there is a reciprocity between 
representations and physical matter, but that the symbolic is itself part of the 
same ontology as physical matter. 
or philosophical study, and in fact argues that they are immanent to the physical 
nature of the body. 
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There are a number of 'key factors' that Schroeder (1998) identifies in 
the continental tradition's treatment of the body that wiU be visible in the 
discussions of the philosophers who feature in this chapter. Key to 
understanding the continental tradition's approach to the body is its analysis of 
the body as 'a system of habits, desires or volitions' (Schroeder, 1998, p.620). 
Scholars in the continental tradition have sought to generate an account of 
'human existence generally, rather than just the mind or intellect'; where 
humans are situated in nature, comprised of 'systems', 'emotions', 'institutions', 
'habits', 'the psyche', 'practical' and 'temporal' aspects, aspects which 
contribute to the complexity of this account of the body, the challenge of 
which is related to 'the interactions among these central factors' (p.619-620). 
The body does not exist prior to these different interactions, but is generated 
and modified by them. 
These other aspects of the body that the continental philosophers refuse 
to let go are central to understanding what a 'gestalt' body might refer to in the 
context of the thesis. Rather than take the body as object, as a set of organ 
systems described in an anatomical adas, or the fleshy extension of the human, 
or even something that might be understood both as object, and as person, as 
a thing with phenomenal experience and characteristics, the body within the 
thesis, is radically constituted by those aspects which might have once been 
separated out into the realm of the mind, emotion, or other states of being or 
experience which are interior rather than exterior. 
This distinction is important, because of its relevance to how a 'gestalt 
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biometrics' might be understood. A project to design a system that measures a 
'whole' must define the limits of that 'wholeness' and how those limits are 
produced (and in this case, are malleable). One might attach every sensor 
available (and the author has) to the body and attempt to infer the state of the 
whole from the data (and its cross reference), but what 'whole' does the data 
represent? Not the whole of the body, but the whole of methods, of 
techniques of knowing the body. And what of non-physical instruments, used 
to measure the qualities of experience, meaning and narrative, or the 
experimental techniques developed by early psychophysiologists to measure 
variations and norms in human perceptual apparatus. These three approaches 
describe a taxonomy of techniques that appear to delineate knowledge 
attainable in different ways, but how can these epistemologies be reconciled? 
A wholeness of measuring can exist only in reference to a clearly 
delineated model of what is measured, it must always name what is excluded or 
instead make the mistake of assuming that its objects have edges, clarity and 
identity that are fixed and easy to negotiate. Instruments, like senses, evolve 
and emerge in response to the world and to the way in which humans shape 
the world. 
In order to incorporate a sense of holism, which moves away from any 
inner/outer distinction the task is of not only 'dissolving' the language with 
which this contrast is reinforced; providing an alternative understanding of 
what subjectivity is as material is necessary. The thesis therefore draws on the 
work of those who have rejected the concept of 'mind' and its terminologies. 
87 
Instead, its approach is materialist in the extreme, except that the material of 
which it speaks is one made unfamiliar by its mutation into something utterly 
suffused with, constitutive of and responsive to meaning. 
The discussion of instrumentation and its relationship with this different 
conception of the body leads to a more complex consideration of the effects 
of the way we make knowledge and how human beings understand themselves 
as producers and products of knowledge. This self making aspect of the body 
that Grosz describes in the opening quote of this chapter, the body as 'an 
object, but an object which somehow contains and coexists with an interiority', 
'the very stuff of subjectivity' which functions 'interactively and productively' is 
central to a non-reductive materialist account of the body. 
The 'stuff of subjectivity' 
In Volatile Bodies (1998), Grosz provides a survey of philosophies from 
the continental tradition that incorporate a notion of embodied subjectivity.'*' 
The target of her analysis is a general account of non-physicaUst materialism 
that can be appUed to understanding the embodiment of female corporeality, 'a 
refiguring of the body so that it moves from the periphery to the centre of 
''^  Grosz's survey of philosophies that reject dualisms and offer insights for a feminist 
analysis of sexuality includes both Freud and Lacan's psychoanalytic work, Merleau-
Ponty's phenomenology, in particular his writing on the 'chiasm' which collapses 
subjectivity and objectivity in the space of perception (Grosz, 1994, p.96), Nietzsche, 
Delueze and Guattari and Foucault. Within each she works to move the site of 
enquiry to the body, which is often found at the edge of the study, or implicit in the 
ideas of the author (Grosz, 1998). 
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analysis' (Grosz, 1998, p.ix). 
Grosz argues that the prevailing tendency in feminism and in wider 
culture is to accept the existing dichotomies that prevent a satisfactory 
understanding of the female body as both a natural and cultural product 
(Grosz, 1998, p.x). In orientating the relationship of her work to a definition of 
materialism, she is careful to specify that her project is 'not part of a 
reductionist endeavour' (Grosz, 1998, p.viii) and that it does not 'involve the 
abandonment of the terms associated with the subject's psyche or interior'. 
(Grosz, 1998, p.viii) Instead, against the dichotomies that are implicit in our 
'intellectual heritage' and the terminologies that are available — she suggests 
that 'some kind of understanding of embodied suhjectivity, oipsychical corporeality, 
needs to be developed' (author's emphasis)(Grosz, 1998, p.22). She describes 
her position thus: 
It does not claim that notions such as agency, reflection, consciousness — 
indeed, all the categories of interiority — are unnecessary, useless or 
wrong or that these terms are capable of ready transcription into other 
terms. Rather, they can be re-mapped, refigured, in terms of models and 
paradigms which conceive of subjectivity in terms of the primacy of 
corporeality, which regard subjectivity on the model not of latency or 
depth but of surface... I have sought out models and conceptions of 
corporeality that, while nonduaUst as well as nonreductionist, remain 
committed to both a broad, nonphysicaUst materialism and an 
acknowledgement of sexual difference (Grosz, 1994, p.viii). 
Her reference to a 'nonphysicaUst materialism' (Grosz, 1998, p.viii) 
ensures our awareness that the concept of the body that she is committed to is 
89 
not a primarily scientific one. While she does not reject the various accounts of 
the body that biomedicine and other scientific practices inspire, these are not 
considered sufficient to explain their own effect upon the bodies that they 
represent. It is for this reason that Grosz rejects the attachment of scientific 
physics to her concept of materialism that is suggested by the term 
'physicaUsm'. 
Ronald Schleifer similarly writes about a 'materialism beyond 
physicaUsm' but from the perspective of semiotics and its relationship with the 
body (2009, p.H). Schleifer's project is to provide a materialist account of 
human language that reincorporates its neglected materiality and in the author's 
words: 'create an account of language and discourse that avoids the opposition 
between matter and spirit' (p.xix). His proposal is to create an account of 
language 'as a whole' (p.xxii). This exploration of wholeness is intended in a 
very similar way to Grosz's, to open up: 
[...] ways of imagining phenomenology to be part of aU these [material] things, 
to be, despite its seeming experiential subjectivity — or precisely in its seeming 
experiential subjectivity - a material phenomenon itself (p.xxiii). 
Interior, phenomenal experience, language, speech, are all here collapsed 
into the material body, accepted as not only a real, but a pervasive aspect of 
physical and material human Ufe. 
Schleifer's work provides a number of examples to suggest that meaning 
and language can be seen as physical and material articulations. He weaves rich 
descriptions of bodUy phenomena - which resist a fixed categorization into 
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natural (bodily, reflexive, organic) or cultural (cognitive, intentional, rational) in 
an exploration of certain points of contact between the body and meaning. 
The result is a set of signposts and evidence that demonstrate the inextricably 
material nature of meaning. Schleifer's materialism is conceived through the 
evidence posed by the structured analysis of the world, through law-Uke 
scientific structures such as the periodic table, which has enabled the 
prediction of certain aspects of the world, such as new elements, from the 
existing structures of observation that are in place (p.ll). These models, which 
describe the world, structure our understanding of the material world and 
constitute knowledge of its states and forms, however, they do not refer to 
particular instances of the world, but are instead knowledge which is situated 
'at one remove' (p.ll). He draws on Russell's The Analysis of Matter to suggest, 
as Russell does, that 'matter is best conceived as an "event" rather than as 
substance' (p.ll). This is what Schleifer calls an 'unvisuali2able materialism' the 
'external psychic' (p.12). 
To contextuaUse his notion of a materialism that can incorporate 
embodied meaning, Schleifer argues for the necessity of a 'non-reductive 
materialism'. He argues that the intangibility of a phenomenon does not 
preclude its material manifestation. His aim is to: 
[...] situate all the activities of literary attention - its sensuousness, its constant 
recognition of our situation in the world, and its creation and instantiation of 
layers of meaning for cognition and experience — within a materialist 
understanding of the world and of experience and to provide sense of the ways 
that the activities of literature can clarify and perhaps expand what we mean by 
materialism (Schleifer, 2009, p.xix). 
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Schleifer also uses Tourette's syndrome as an example^'' of a disorder in 
which 'the materialities and meaning of discourse are bound together' (p.81) — 
partway between 'meaningless jerks and noises' and 'meaningful utterances' 
(p.81) - and which demonstrates the 'very materiality of language'. Schleifer 
establishes this materiality is established in distinction with the Cartesian 
notion of language as the evidence of a logical cogito. His account introduces 
evidence from evolutionary neuroscience, clinical cases like those reported by 
OUver Sachs and structural semiotics, to stress the relationship between 
emotional, haptic utterances and spoken language. 
Schleifer refers to Oliver Sach's essays about Tourette's patients where 
he has discussed the melodic and rhyming qualities of verbal tics which 
Tourette's patients suffer, with which he draws a comparison with the way in 
which poetry uses 'rhymes', 'alliteration', 'melody' as a 'resource'. What 
Tourette's syndrome renders visible 'is the continuity it presents between 
motor and verbal activity' (p.80). These continuities are exploited by poetry, 
what Schleifer describes as the 'primitive resources of language' (p.84). He 
draws attention to research which argues that there are 'tight connections 
between motor activity and language skills' (p.81) and quotes F.A. Middleton 
and P.L. Strick's arguments which favour a revision of the popular view that 
the 'cerebellum and basal ganglia' are 'purely motor structures,' instead arguing 
^ Here it would be prudent to reiterate Schliefer's instance that his account is not 
intended to 'romanticize'(p.90) Tourette syndrome, and his reminder that it is a 
serious and distressing illness (p.74). 
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that they are involved in 'cognitive processes'. 
Schleifer (2009) is clear that his account stands against the Cartesian 
model in which language is the capacity and privilege of the rational subject, 
the expression of an immaterial and logical mind (p.86). His claim, based on 
Greimas' account of poetry through evolutionary theory and semiotics (p.84-
5), is that poetic language is not only first order articulation that can be thought 
of as 'primal cries'^' — as a material signifier - but at the same time this material 
signifier points at what he calls 'an immaterial signifier constituting an 
irreducible whole', 'a kind of intangible material substance, like gesture, 
pointing towards something' (p.87). 
The meaning response 
In chapter 6 the thesis will use the example of a phenomenon known as 
the 'placebo effect'. It wiU examine some episodes in the early history of 
medical experimentation, these offer a context in which to explore the way in 
which the notion of the 'imagination' as a biologically active force has been 
divorced from the practice of medicine by the design of an instrumental test. 
5' He adopts the term 'primal cry' from Nietzsche's account of tragic poetry (1993), 
alongside this, he also cites evidence from evolutionary neuroscience and 
neuroscientific studies which demonstrate that Tourette tics are not limited to frontal 
lobe activity associated with language, and that it is in fact 'midbrain and limbic 
structures' (evolutionarily speaking older parts of the brain) that are associated with 
swearing and emotional outbursts, the 'obscene' offering a between a highly material 
and evolutionarily fundamental part of the human organism, and the meaningful 
nature of obscene utterances (p.91). 
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the controlled trial. 
The placebo effect has been of interest to scholars in medical 
anthropology. Daniel Moerman (2002) suggests that the effect is an example of 
the interplay of two realms, biology and culture, that are often separated across 
disciplinary boundaries. The discourse of doubt regarding the reality of the 
placebo effect, that meaning might have genuine biological effects, and the 
idea that it is a medical paradox, is an example of the way in which the 
symbolic and meaningful are habitually discounted as being potentially 
biologically active. Medical anthropology's interest in other medical cultures 
offer numerous examples of people using unproven medical methods, 
witchcraft, and systems of understanding the body that are at odds with 
western allopathic medicine, and which contemporary anthropologists attempt 
to account for without dismissing them as ignorant or superstitious.^^ 
Concerned with offering an account of the other on its own terms, 
anthropologists have become have developed more holistic accounts of what 
symbolic human actions — especially those that have medical intentions — 
might mean in practical terms. The example provided by the placebo effect is 
particularly useful as it shows what the symboUc has come to mean in 
orthodox contemporary medical science, the science that informs the use of 
instrumental interventions on the body. It highlights the persistence of a 
52 This theme will be returned to in the final chapter of the thesis which aims to 
discuss instrumental poetics, where the notion of 'instrumental pluralism' will be 
discussed, as an issue which has arisen for anthropology in its understanding of other 
cultures apparendy instrumentally intended actions - such as healing rituals. 
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history of enlightenment materialism, and a mechanistic account of the body 
which when reconstructed as a frame for the effects of placebo, reconstitutes 
an apparendy palliative and harmless cure into a misunderstood paradox. 
Moerman's survey discusses the placebo effect as it manifests in a variety 
of contexts, both in controlled tests and in a range of medical treatments — 
some intentional shams - such as 'placebo surgery', and some involving the 
long efficacy and use of treatments which appear to have Uttie causal 
relationship with their effects, such as the use of nitroglycerine to treat angina 
(p.55-66). 
In chapter 6 of the thesis, this history of the placebo effect will be 
discussed in more detail, in the particular context of the controlled medical trial 
and the way in which the healing responses of placebo groups in these trials 
has been understood and described. Within these trials, many factors may 
cause improvement in patients, regression to the mean, bias, etc. These are 
what might be thought of as the 'discarded causes' of changes in the body, be 
they positive healing effects (placebo) or negative (nocebo). Within this group 
of coincident, and very difficult to separate phenomena, are those aspects of 
placebo that Moerman refers to as 'the meaning response'. An example of this 
is the response to the color and form of treatments such as tablets, de Craen et 
al. (1996) reviewed a number of placebo trials to test the effects of different 
coloured tablets on test subjects in placebo groups in clinical trials. They found 
that there was pronounced dispositions to associate particular color with 
particular effects and for changes in physiology to foUow these effects. 
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Moerman defines as this broader concept of a 'meaning response' as 
'The psychological and physiological effects of meaning in the treatment of 
illness' (p.14). He is careful to clarify its relation to, and distinction from the 
placebo effect known from clinical trials: 
The meaning response includes most of the things which have traditionally 
been called the placebo effect [...] it [also] includes many things that are not 
part of the placebo effect as traditionally understood (p.14-15). 
Drawing on anthropological, sociological and medical studies, Moerman 
(2002) collates numerous other known examples of the human body's 
response to meaning found outside of the medical context. He cites an 
example of functional blindness experienced by Cambodian women. These 
women, who have lost the power of sight without any medically observable 
physical damage to their visual system, were forced to watch the torture of 
their families by the Khmer Rouge and were described as having 'cried until 
they could not see' (p. 133-4). Another study, of people of Chinese descent and 
traditional beliefs living in California (p78-9), showed a correlation between 
their likelihood to die of certain causes depending on the nature of their bitth 
planet (determined by time and year of birth) and their level of belief in these 
traditional systems. 
Anthropology and the 'meaning response' 
There are many other examples of these kinds of culturally inflected, but 
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bodily phenomena, which have been recorded by anthropologists. One weU-
known example is that of the experience and symptoms of menopause 
observed by Margaret Lock. Lock's (1993) quantitative, and comparative study 
of North American and Japanese women's experience of menopause led her to 
argue that: 
Without question similar endocrinologicaP changes are implicated in both 
cases, [both cultures] yet these changes are sufficiendy unlike so as to 
substantially influence subjective experience. Thus differing accounts of 
biological aging are not simply the result of culturally shaped experiences of a 
universal physical experience but the products, in Japan and North America 
alike, of an ongoing dialectic between biology and culture in which both are 
contingent (Lock, 1993, p.xx-xxi). 
Like Moerman, Lock is concerned with the; 
[...] interdisciplinary struggle over the signifying process itself, in that the units 
used for analysis — how the body is classified, framed, measured, or segmented 
in order to explain it — generate debate and argument [...] 
In the context of the body this struggle is divided between biomedical 
science, psychology, and psychiatry and subsections of sociology and 
anthropology all of which have 'objective methods' but differing models of the 
body (Lock, 1993, p.xxH). 
[...] knowledge produced in one discipline is virtually ignored in others, which 
selectively plunder, ignore, or actively dismiss subjective accounts as invalid. 
This situation becomes infinitely more complex in geographical settings where 
the Western scientific tradition has been imported and grafted onto local 
knowledge, scientific and popular as well (Lock, 1993, p.xxii). 
53 Endocrinology is the study of hormonal change and regulation in the body. 
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As we have seen placebo responses in controlled trials are constituted by 
a range of phenomena and can be understood to be the effects of a number of 
interrelated influences upon the process of medical consultation, examination 
and treatment. In addition to the phenomena attached to controlled testing, 
there appears to be a group of determinants that Moerman has included within 
his anthropologically based notion of the meaning response. These he 
characterizes as the patient's response to meaning and symbol, expressed 
through biology. 
The body in a 'flat ontology' 
Bruno Latour (1999) has pointed out that 'matter is not a given but a 
recent historical creation' (p.207). It is this that he refers to as 'the symbolic' 
(p.xiii) the realm that Schleifer's project works to give back its materiality. 
Latour argues that it is a legacy of modernism that the 'complex genealogy' of 
matter, which is not 'primitive, immutable or ahistorical' but instead a 'package 
of former crossovers between social and natural elements' (p.xiii) is so often 
disregarded. The understanding that the material world cannot be considered 
as primitive, immutable, or prior to human knowledge has been investigated by 
many scholarly disciplines, as the discussion of Grosz and Schleifer's projects 
above suggests. Sociologists of Science, Anthropologists and Feminist scholars, 
have often, following the continental traditions of thought discussed earlier in 
the chapter, resisted in different ways the modernist tendencies that Latour 
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describes above. The body in particular has served as a site of resistance in 
these discourses, particularly feminism, which stresses the dual cultural and 
biological production of the body. 
What Latour describes might be termed a 'flat ontology', and offers an 
alternative structure in which to think about the body. This ontology is one in 
which, as Graham Harman puts it 'atoms have no more reality that grain 
markets or sports franchises' (Harman, 2008, p.370). In a 'flat ontology', the 
understanding of instruments as depicting, measuring or representing states of 
human bodies which might usually be considered internal or subjective can no 
longer be considered as constrained by ontological limitations, only 
methodological ones. Thus the thesis takes a materialist position, but one that 
is non-reductive. By describing bodies and instruments in this way, the thesis is 
then able to investigate the possibilities of this approach for a creative concept 
of instrumentation. 
The concept of a flat ontology offers a transformative break away from 
the previous scepticism that pervades models of perception, knowledge, the 
establishment of truth. It offers a philosophy that is based in the world and 
does not include a scepticism relating to knowledge of that world. As Harman 
describes it, this 'Philosophy is not concerned with human access to the world, 
but the world itself (Harman, 2008, p370). Following Harman's lead, we are 
no longer, like Rorty or Wittgenstein, worried about how accurate our 
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descriptions of the world are, we are worried about how 'good' they are^'', and 
because a description might serve many purposes, and because of its leanings 
and tendencies, describe and delineate many different things, how 'good' a 
description may be, and essentially, what it is of, is a constantiy moving target. 
Summary; A 'flat ontology' of bodies and instrumentation 
This chapter has established a number of points and definitions 
regarding the relationship between subjectivity, meaning and the material body. 
It has also begun to show how this discussion links to a consideration of the 
scientific epistemologies that explain why instrumental sensors are useful, a 
discussion that will be further extended in the next chapter. 
The gestalt notion of the body that underlies the argument of the thesis 
has now been clarified. The chapter has given examples of a range of 
scholarship that has developed a notion of a subjectivity that pervades human 
bodies. The concept of subjectivity that this chapter discusses is not one of 
specific consciousness but the notion of the individuated and personal subject 
as the internal meaning of a physical body, the discursive and symbolic 
dimension of the body. The borders of this subjectivity, unlike that of Kantian 
subjective consciousness, are permeable and unbounded; they can flow and be 
broken, as meaning moves from one place to another. 
The various accounts of the body found in the work of the philosophers 
5'' The question of how to assess the 'goodness' of descriptions, features strongly in 
Rorty's philosophy that (through an extension of Dewey and Quine), produces what 
Rorty calls 'neopragmatism' (Rorty, 1980). 
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discussed in this chapter describe how embodied aspects of emotion, feeling, 
experience, perception, cognition and consciousness might aU be considered as 
materially manifest in the body. It does this so that the air is cleared to examine 
the notion of instrumental measurement of new aspects of the body. It does 
not do this because it appears to be something easy, clearly many things that 
are thought of a 'mental' are amorphous, they may be as Schleifer suggests, not 
substances, but events. Other aspects of the 'private or interior' are however, 
so patendy obvious (as Wittgenstein points out) there is no reason to consider 
them as mental attributes inaccessible to material instrumentation. 
The human body, taken as a whole, as a gestalt human being, is not 
something that can be conceived of to sit inertiy beneath a device, be that one 
human body, or the larger concept of the human which scientific measurement 
contributes to. Self awareness, and a definition of that self, reinforced, 
represented and explored through devices, is central to understanding how 
instruments can be elements in any creative project, that they can be used not 
in the terms with which they come ready equipped, but that they can be used 
as a practice. 
The chapter, through its discussion of Rorty's rejection of the mind-
body problem and an overview of the formation of the concept of a distinct 
mental realm alongside Wittgenstein, Grosz and Schleifer's revisions of what is 
considered materially manifest as aspects of the subjective body gives the thesis 
a basis for its account of the human body. In this it is intended to give a sense 
of how the body may be held to be a material manifestation of the experiential 
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and the material, and how this account offers an alternative to a dualistic or 
reductive approach to the traditionally immaterial aspects of human subjective 
experience, meaning, and as Latour would describe it, the symbolic. This 
account of the body is intended to underpin the thesis' discussion of the way in 
which the body can be understood to interact with sensing technology. 
The question is not about what is physical or mental, but about what 
technological structures might be invented that could evoke certain aspects of 
embodied life. One of the aims of this chapter was to break down some of the 
existing categories that tend to invade discussions of what is materially 
manifest. It shows the philosophical histories that have given rise to these 
concepts, as well as fleshes out accounts of the body that might give a sense of 
the alternatives to the effects of a persistent, if faded, Cartesian ontology. 
The thesis wiU now go on to introduce and historicise a concept of 
instrumentation, in its classical formulation in philosophy of science as an 
epistemological apparatus. Historically, the rationale of scientific epistemology 
(which was also adopted by supporters of instrumental technologies in 
medicine) has considered instrumentation to be a way in which to 
countermand the troublesome effects of individual subjectivity on the pursuit 
of scientific truth. In order to understand this concept of instrumentation's 
privileged link with physical reality. Chapter 2 will embark on a discussion of 
scientific and mechanical objectivity. It will extend Chapter 1 by offering a 
complementary perspective on the dualistic way in which scientific 
instrumentation is understood as an epistemological tool, serving to complete 
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the thesis' account of the initial problem regarding the relationship between 
'objective instruments' and 'gestalt bodies'. 
103 
Chapter 2. Mechanical Objectivity 
Chapter 2 wiU explore the theme of scientific epistemology, scepticism 
and the role of instrumentation in more detail. It wiU focus particularly on 
historical explanations of the way in which instrumental measurement 
interfaces with reality. Chapter 1 gave an overview of the way in which a 
tradition of mind-body philosophy has influenced how the ontology of the 
human body is conceptualised. The history of the mind-body problem was 
introduced in the context of Richard Rorty's philosophical critique. His 
argument is that the problem is the contingent product of a form of 
'epistemological scepticism' that questions human access to the physical world 
(and hence knowledge of its objects). Chapter 2 retains this theme of 
epistemological scepticism, and charts the influence of this idea on how 
scientific instrumentation is understood. In doing this, the chapter extends the 
themes of Chapter 1 but with an alternate emphasis on uncovering a history of 
experimental science. 
Chapter 2 aims to show how certain philosophical discourses regarding 
the nature of the human mind and of physical reality have impacted upon 
scientific epistemology. These accounts can be seen to support a particular way 
of understanding instrumentation as an epistemologically privileged way of 
interacting with the 'real'. The discussion is introduced by a key text in the 
history of experimental science, Francis Bacon's Novum Orgamn (1900 [1620]) 
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and also makes significant reference to the work of Lorraine Daston and Peter 
GaHson (2007) on the history of the development of scientific objectivity in 
the 17* and 18* centuries. Drawing on these sources allows Chapter 2 to 
embark on a discussion of the concept of objectivity and its historical Unk with 
instrumentation. It describes the way in which instrumentation has been 
conceptualised as a scientific tool that enables the overcoming of certain 
epistemological hurdles. As wiU be seen, these are pardy posed by problems 
relating to human perception and knowledge, and for the purposes of the 
following discussion, exemplified by Francis Bacon's 'idols' (1900). 
By returning to early and influential philosophical ideas like Bacon's this 
chapter clarifies how the thesis departs from previous discourse on the nature 
of instrumentation, to develop a notion of instrumentation as productive. The 
discussion picks up on some of the themes that were touched on in the closing 
sections of Chapter 1. For example, this chapter argues that the problems 
relating to scepticism about what can be reliably known are sometimes linked 
to a problematic assumption about the world, or 'the real' as a pre-existing and 
fixed entity that can be accurately depicted (this concept of representation is 
one that is critiqued in Rorty's PMN). To show how this problem relates to 
instruments this chapter uncovers the historicity of the notion of an authentic 
and fixed 'objective' world and its attachment to mechanised instrumentation 
technologies; it offers a deconstruction of the relationship between machines 
and the physically authentic, and prepares for the discussion in chapter 3 of the 
variety of concepts of objectivity which may relate to knowledge of bodies and 
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medical practices. 
Instruments and objectivity 
In response to the ideas discussed above, one purpose of this chapter is 
to unpack the idea that instruments are associated with the abiUty to access a 
particular 'truth' or reality which is inaccessible to, or clouded by, human 
senses. As wiU be discussed, instrumental measurement, from the use of 
guiding tools such as rvilers, to a range of automatic data registration 
technologies, is understood as a tactic that allows scientists to overcome 
certain epistemological obstacles. One of these obstacles is the faulty nature of 
the human senses, and as science has become a collaborative activity, another 
has been posed by a related problem — that of intersubjectivity^^. What this 
section aims to highUght is that the notion of faulty human senses is partiy 
dependent to a particular notion of authentic 'objective' reaUty that is 
55 Understanding how information can be reliably transferred between two minds — 
hence — inter-subjectively has historically offered problems for medical instruction. At 
different times in history, medical diagnosis has been reliant on the perception and 
categorisation of body states by physicians. At times in history taste, smell, sound 
(auscultation), touch (pulse taking, palpation and temperature taking) as well as visible 
clues have all been important 'objective' clues for physicians (Porter, 1999; Reiser, 
1993). Kuriyama (1999) notes the problems with pulse diagnosis and the accurate 
description of 'haptic knowledge' presented by pulse feeling was particularly 
considered as particularly problematic by European physicians of the mid-eighteenth 
century. When faced with the prospect of teaching pulse taking, physicians observed 
the problems of how to communicate accurately to their smdents the correct 
interpretations of the sensations at their fingertips (p.67). Kuriyama's study reflects on 
a difference in epistemological concerns, dating back to Greek thought and the 
separation of perception from objective reality, to the lack of a similar problem for 
contemporaneous scholars in China, practicing a comparable diagnostic form, feeling 
the 'mo', but in a philosophical climate where the relationship of experience to reality 
was not traditionally problematic (p.78-103). 
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ahistorical and acultural, which it is the apparent goal of scientific 
measurement to uncover. 
The following section of the chapter will set out this discussion with 
reference to Francis Bacon's philosophy of scientific experiment, serving to 
highlight some traditional problems of scientific epistemology which 
instrumentation and other scientific methods have been enUsted^'' to address. 
This discussion serves to reveal the conditions in which certain problems in 
scientific practice are linked to particular philosophical ideas. It shows that 
within these discourses the notion of objectivity has come to stand for a 
multitude of solutions in scientific methodology, and to stand in for a number 
of different values, which if left unexamined could serve to complicate and 
confuse the discussion of measuring instruments in the later parts of the thesis. 
Bacon's discussion of the idols has arguably come to be a 'common 
sense' view of how scientific experiment operates, and what the role of 
experiment, instrument, and mechanisation might be. While the idols offer 
what appears to be a clear analysis of the problems of scientific study. Bacon's 
arguments invoke a form of epistemological scepticism. His concern is with 
the untrustworthiness of human perception in the making of scientific 
5fi Here one might also say 'invented' rather than 'enlisted', although innovated may be 
the most appropriate term. In many cases scientists have adopted and adapted the 
technologies around them for the purposes of making scientific investigations. One 
example of this is James Joule's 1850 experiments on the relationship between friction 
and heat for which he used a number of techniques borrowed from the brewing 
industry (where malts must be heated carefully) (Sibum, 1995). 
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observations.'^ While the development of automatic measuring technologies 
did not take place until much later in the history, it, and a number of other 
methodologies, some of which wiU be the focus of discussion in the thesis, can 
be related back to the set of problems which Bacon's discussion defined, and 
the logic of their development (alongside the changing notions of objectivity 
and subjectivity which wiU be discussed below) might be seen signalled in his 
work. 
The Novum Organon: Bacon's identification of the 'Idols' 
Philosopher-scientist Francis Bacon's'" Novum Organon or New Instrument 
'" It is worth noting that the concept of clear perception is a complex one and space is 
lacking for a full exposition of this idea. Readers might refer to Steven Shapin's (1988 ; 
2010) histories of scientific experiment in mid 18''^  century Europe which show that 
the abilit\' to make a taistworthy and accurate scientific obsei-^^ation which would be 
accepted by the scientitlc communit)' was at one time more based upon social class 
than on practical experimental skill (2010, 59-89). See for example his work on Robert 
Hooke of the Royal Societ)''s role as an engineer and employee rather than a 
gendeman - and therefore not an experimental philosopher, despite his considerable 
experimental skiU (his contributions to experimental science were often attributed to 
his employer, Robert Boyle) (2010, p.182-211). It is reasonable to assume, that for 
Bacon, the Unk between social position and perceptual acuit}' and judgment was an 
issue of common sense. 
5** Bacon is considered to be the forefather of experimental science and is credited 
with the development of'experimental' method and the invention of scientific 
induction. During his lifetime Bacon was a politician (at one point he held the office 
of High Chancellor of England), philosopher, author (allegedly of Shakespeare's 
works amongst many others), and law '^er. Bacon's unfinished New Atlands is 
considered the first science fiction tale, a Utopian story of a voyage to an imaginary 
cit3' state where the unnamed narrator encounters a communit)' centered around a 
scientific research centre, Solomon's Flouse. I-fis rendering of this Utopian societ}' is 
held to have been an influence on the formation of the Invisible College, which in 
1662 became the Royal Societ)' (Abrahams, 2000, p.1548). Late into the 17''^  CenUiry 
Bacon's ideas were held in high esteem by the Royal Society; the members (and 
employees) of which put Bacon's loft)' experimental ideals into practice by developing 
their own range of laboratory instruments. These both included those intended for 
measurement and obser\'ation, such as the rnicroscope, but also those which allowed 
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(1860 [1620]) offers a frame for a discussion of how instrumental technologies 
have been developed by scientists in response to a range of epistemological 
problems. By looking at Bacon's characterisation of these problems as the 
'idols', this section shows how the link between instrumentation as a set of 
methods and a number of varying problems of scientific epistemology is 
constituted. 
The Organon was Bacon's exposition of an inductive and experimental 
science intended to replace the 'sophistry'^'of his time, which 'impeded' the 
proper 'interpretation of nature'. Within it Bacon described a full account of 
the aspects of human perception and culture that put an undistorted study of 
nature at risk, and his directions for negotiating these problems. The potential 
pitfalls that Bacon identified are catalogued under the general name of the 
'idols'. AU of which can be seen as an analogue to modern notions of 
subjectivity on the part of experimenters and natural philosophers as a risk to 
clear knowledge in science, and the justification for a careful form of 
experimental science which used instrumentation to structure and manage; to 
make the object of scientific study just that, untouched, independent and objective 
what Bacon called the 'vexation' of nature, such as the air pump, wliich created 
artificial conditions and phenomena (Abrahams, 2000, p.l530)(2). Sprat's The History of 
the Royal Society of London (1667) (published by the societ)''s own press) gives an 
indication of the high esteem in which Bacon's work was held within the societ\f; 
'I shall onely \sii] mention one great Man, who had the true Imagination of the whole 
extent of this Enterprize [JVI'|, as it is now set on foot; and that is, the Lord Bacon. In 
whose Books that are every where scattered the best arguments, that can be produce'd 
\sic\ for the defence of Experimental Philosophy ; and the best directions, that are 
needful to promote it' (Sprat, 1667, p.35). 
^'^ The original Organon was Aristotle's text on logic. '1 he New Organon is at least 
partly dedicated to a critique of the methods of this particular 'sopiiist'. 
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of the potentially faulty perceptions of the experimenter. 
In the Organon Bacon explains this doctrine of idols, the impediments to 
the philosopher-scientist's clear study of nature. They are those things in the 
nature of man 'to which we give false worship','^ '^' the 'psychological 
dispositions and fears' that prevent progress in the sciences (Abrahams, 2000, 
p.1530). He names them the Idols of the 'Tribe', 'Cave', 'Market-Place', and 
'Theatre' (Bacon, 1860, p.319). 
The Tribe refers to the faulty perception of human beings as a race, as he 
explains, 'the human understanding is like a false mirror, which, receiving rays 
irregularly, distorts and discolours the nature of things by mingUng its own 
nature with it' (p.77). Alongside this distorting perception, 'the errors common 
to human nature in general' (p.77), there are also the idols of the Cave or Den, 
associated with the personal attributes and history of the individual human 
observer. These amount to the idiosyncrasies of the individual, 'owing to his 
proper and pecviHar nature', 'education', 'conversation with others', 'the reading 
of books' and the 'authority of those he esteems and admires' (p.77). So Bacon 
establishes the risks of human perception being prone to error on an individual 
level, either from the natural dispositions of the perceptual apparatus of the 
tribe, or the intellectual Ufe knowledge though which perceptions are filtered, 
what he calls 'the cave'. 
'•" Note the moralistic overtones of Bacon's choice of the term 'idol', which he clearly 
indicates with his reference to 'false worship'. Daston and Galison have commented 
on the role of moralit}' and its reladonship with objectivit)' in their discussion on 
development of a 'scientific self. Here they chart the changing relationships of 
concepts of moral purit)' with various epistemological concerns, such as objectivity 
and self-restraint in observation through the 18* and 19''' centuries (2007, p.191-251). 
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In addition, two further idols, of the Theatre and Market-Place, establish 
that the concepts shared between humankind in the form of language and 
culture, and the existing systems and principles by which the natural world is 
understood, also pose a source of misdirection. The idols of the Theatre, are 
the tendency of existing theories, philosophies and methods to render sciences 
'dogmatic and magisterial' (Bacon, 1860, p.98). Bacon compares them to the 
theatre because 'all received systems are but so many stage-plays; representing 
worlds of their own creation after an unreal and scenic fashion' (p.78). 
Finally, the idols of the Market-Place 'are the most troublesome of all' 
(Bacon, 1860, p.86). They are so-named for the 'commerce between men' and 
which in this market is the commerce of words, discourse. The Idols of the 
Market-Place creep 'into the understanding through the aUiances of words and 
names'. Words, Bacon tells us, become fixed in meaning, and when we might 
modify them to more closely represent nature they resist, 'rendering the 
sciences and philosophy sophistical and inactive'. As he points out; 'The high 
and formal discussions of learned men end often-times in disputes about 
words and names' (p.87). 
Bacon's catalogue of the possible errors confronting aspiring natural 
scientists can be seen pardy to be intended to offer a strong support for his 
new systems of experiment and induction, part of an attack on the 'sophistry' 
that he claimed preceded his intervention. His argument relies upon a 
demolition of prior knowledge, existing philosophical systems and language 
that shape the interpretation of new discoveries. However, in addition to this 
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Bacon argues that even the most fundamental physical aspects of human 
perception pose problems for clear observations;''' 
[...] by far the greatest hindrance and aberration of the human 
understanding proceeds from the dullness, incompetency, and 
deceptions of the senses; in that things which strike the sense outweigh 
things which do not immediately strike it, though they be more 
important. Hence it is that speculation commonly ceases where sight 
ceases; insomuch that of things invisible there is littie or no observation 
[...] For the sense by itself is a thing infirm and erring; neither can 
instruments for enlarging or sharpening the senses do much (Bacon, 
1860, p.82). 
Science in response to the idols 
The Novum Organon was the second part of a larger project for Bacon, 
which remained unfinished, to produce a ground from which natural 
philosophy's 'interpretation of nature' could proceed free from the errors that 
he had diagnosed. The tide. New Instrument refers to his now famous 
development of a notion of scientific induction based on experimental 
''1 As Lorraine Daston notes in her essay Scientific Ennr and the Eithos of Be/ief {2002-
2003), other early modern naairal philosophers Rene Descartes and John Locke, like 
Bacon, chose skeptical reduction as a starting point for their enquiries (jo.58). The 
popularitjf of Bacon's cautionar)' rigour with tlie naairal philosophers of the Royal 
Societ}' in die late 17th century signaled a continuing concern in the more general 
communit)' of natural philosophers with the problem of human error as a hurdle to 
the investigation of nature. As Daston comments, diis period of scientific liistor)^ was 
characterised by a 'collective and prolonged epistemological shock' caused by a 
number of revolutionar}' discoveries: 'the voyages of discovery, the Reformation, the 
triumph of Copernican Astronomy and Newtonian natural philosophy, the 
demonstration of the circulation of tlie blood' (p-51). The result of tliis 'dramatic and 
disturbing' (ibid) realisation for early modern thinkers that so much of the orthodoxy 
had been at fault for centuries appears to have manifested in an ever present concern 
with developing a scientific epistemologj' which could explain and prevent error. 
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observation. To this end, the Organon provides not only epistemological 
cautions as seen in his taxonomy of the 'idols' - but also a lengthy 
categorisation and explanation of forms and methods of practical experiment 
by which empirical observations may be made and recorded. Instruments 
played an important role in Bacon's suggestions for an experimental science 
that dealt with the problems of the idols, so linking the use of instrumentation 
with a concept of the insufficiency of human perception. Bacon's main 
recommendations for dealing with this problem were to proceed from 
experiment. 
To address the lack of progress in philosophy caused by dogmatism and 
commitment to old ideas - the idols of the Theatre or Systems, Bacon suggests 
a number of tools of observation and experiment, he provides: 
[...] a history not only of nature free and large... but much more of 
nature under constraint and vexed. Therefore I set down at length all 
experiments of the mechanical arts... the nature of things betrays itself 
more readily under the vexations of art than in its natural freedom 
(Bacon, 1860, p.48). 
To this end he suggests that aspiring investigators might hunt out 
experiments from the 'mechanical arts' (technology)''^ that can broaden 
knowledge of nature by manufacturing states of 'vexation'. As part of his 
directions for a natural science of reason supported by physical 
•"'2 For a brief history of the changing terminologies and understandings of what is 
generally at present called technology, David Nye's (2006) introduction in 
'Technology Matters; Questions to live with' is recommended. 
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experimentation Bacon suggests an approach of extreme caution on the part of 
investigators. He suggests that they go about establishing 'progressive stages of 
certainty' (p.60). 
There remains but one course for the recovery of a sound and healthy 
condition - namely, that the entire work of the understanding be 
commenced afresh, and the mind itself be from the very outset not left 
to take its own course, but be guided at every step; and the business be 
done as if by machinery (p.61). 
Here Bacon uses the term instrument to indicate both physical tools (an 
instrument of the hand) and conceptual mechanisms (instrument of the mind). 
The physical instrumentation he refers to is of two kinds - tools to 'aid the 
immediate actions of the senses' such as the microscope or telescope - and 
devices like 'measuring rods, astrolabes and the Hke, which do not enlarge the 
sense of sight but rectify and direct it' (Bacon, 1860, p.273). Like the 
instruments of the mind, these devices sharpen and guide observations. Once 
reliable sensory data has been obtained. Bacon prescribes a highly cautious and 
mechanical method for the management of this information, mapping out 
experimental knowledge as 'tables of discovery' (p.l36). This cautious method 
of building knowledge could then guarantee that natural scientists would arrive 
at their conclusions inductively rather than allowing their understanding to 
'jump and fly from particulars to remote axioms' (p. 137). 
114 
Instrumentation as a guide for the senses 
Despite his cautions regarding the reliability of perception, Bacon states; 
'the evidence of the sense, helped and guarded by a certain process of 
correction, I retain.' (p.60) He then teUs us that it is the immediate action of 
the mind upon the observation that is the more serious risk, the raw senses 
need to be correcdy managed. It is 'the mental operation which follows the act 
of sense I for the most part reject; and instead of it I open and lay out a new 
and certain path for the mind to proceed in, starting direcdy from the simple 
sensuous perception' (p.61). To this end he introduces instruments as devices 
that may be used to guide the intellect and the hand in the making of 
observations; 
Neither the naked hand nor the understanding left to itself can effect 
much. It is by instruments and helps that the work is done, which are as 
much wanted for the understanding as for the hand. And as the 
instruments of the hand either give motion or guide it, so the 
instruments of the mind supply either suggestions for the understanding 
or cautions (p.66). 
Here, it might be tempting to interpret Bacon's words with the benefit of 
hindsight, for it is easy to interpret Bacon's ideal for 'recovery' - a 
mechanisation of 'the understanding' as a historical precvirsor for 
contemporary scientific technologies. Bacon's writing clearly communicates a 
desire for a particular type of perception, uninterpreted and uninfluenced by 
prior knowledge or theory - in Daston and Galison's words, 'unmarked by 
prejudice or skiU, fantasy or judgement, wishing or striving [...] Objectivity is 
115 
blind sight, seeing without inference, interpretation, or intelligence' (2007, 
p.l7). 
It does appear clear that Bacon's interest in the mechanical collection of 
information mentioned above indicates that basic strategies for creating this 
form of 'blind sight' as scientific methodologies were identified long prior to 
their implementation as mechanised systems of measvirement. Bacon's writing 
also describes a particular rationale for his new doctrine of experiment; 
[...] but aU the truer kind of interpretation of nature is effected by 
instances and experiments fit and apposite; wherein the sense decides 
touching the experiment only, and the experiment touching the point in 
nature and the thing itself. (Bacon, 1860, p.82) 
Bacon describes the experimental setup as a conduit through which true 
knowledge can make itself known to the observer's senses, through a careful 
arrangement of 'experiment' as a connecting path between the 'senses' and 
'nature'. Even while his profound scepticism regarding the fallibility of human 
perception (the tribe), judgement (the cave), and linguistic description (the 
market-place), long pre-dates the introduction of measuring machinery into 
laboratory practices, akeady in the Novum Organon we see Bacon pointing to 
the notion of an 'experiment touching the point in nature and the thing itself 
(ibid). This epistemology which so simply positions physical and empirical 
systems in contact with nature already begins drawing together the argument 
which could be later seen in the writings of nineteenth and twentieth century 
physicians who, as wiU be discussed in the next section, supported the use of 
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automatic measuring instruments in their clinical practice. 
The experiment 'touching' 'the thing itself is a notion that will be 
returned to in chapter 4's discussion of the philosophy of instrumentation, in 
particular Latour and Woolgar's (1978) discussion of scientific instrumentation 
as 'inscription devices' which they claim are understood by scientific 
experimenters to make transformations (or transductions) from a 'piece of 
matter' (the thing itself) to an inscription, a permanent mark, or record. 
Centuries later, contemporary devices which automatically register data, 
from early graphing devices, seismograph, plethysmograph, to computerised 
data logging, appear to do just what Bacon intended, recording observations 
'as if by machinery''^^. In Bacon's ideas we can see what may be the seed of the 
desire for (or the eventual justification of a set of technologies which covild be 
understood as providing) mechanical objectivity. However it was much later 
that certain philosophical and social imperatives made the use and 
development of mechanised data registration techniques a necessity for 
scientists (Daston and Galison, 2007). The general move amongst scientists 
toward the achievement of 'blind sight'; objectivity as understood in the 
contemporary era, took place in the mid 19* century (2007, p.l7; p.42). 
Daston and Galison suggest a number of reasons for the mid-19* 
century push to develop and use these types of technologies, some of which 
''•' However it is worth noting that Bacon is talking about instruments that are used as 
'guides' for obsen^ation, and because the role of instruments as 'guides' only remained 
as such until the 17th century, as previously noted, (36) a far greater concern for 
scientists was the debate regarding whether the individual attributes of the observ^er 
who made them qualified them as a reliable witness. 
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win be discussed in the next chapter in more detail (2007, p. 17). One of these, 
which related to mechanical objectivity, was the desire to remove the observer 
entirely - 'aperspectival' objectivity (Daston, 1992a) (which actively denies the 
'subjective' position of the observer) was also unknown until the 19th century. 
Prior to this time, the notion of being a skilled and trained observer, who could 
perceive the truth of nature and represent it, had far more influence on how 
natural scientists thought about their practices and the problems of scientific 
work. 
Mechanical objectivity and 'blind sight' 
The kind of behaviours, mode of conduct, and methods of observation, 
which are described in contemporary scientific culture as 'objective' are a 
relatively recent invention. Some of the problems that these methods are 
designed to counter are within Bacon's original diagnosis of the idols. 
However, whilst prior to the popularisation of a modern notion of the term 
these issues were noted as problems by scientists and physicians, without the 
problematic complexity that accompanies the modern incarnation of the 
concept of objectivity. For the scientists of the 19'"" century, measuring 
instruments, particularly those that used photographic technologies and other 
graphical means to record information came to be considered the exemplar of 
objectivity. The concept of disinterested and mechanistic approaches to the 
collection of reliable data led to the development of a range of technologies by 
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the scientists of the time such as drawing grids, measuring tools, lab notebooks 
(Daston, 2007, p.38-9). The pursuit of metrological standards and best 
practice in the performance of measurement was reinvented as what can be 
described as a moral imperative for scientific practitioners (p.39-40). 
This concept of the objectivity of machines, described by Theodore M. 
Porter (1996), Peter GaHson (1998) and Daston and GaUson (2007) as 
'mechanical objectivity' has had changing fortunes. Galison (1998) chronicles 
the rise of the particularly mechanical notion of objectivity to a period after 
1830, when; 
[...] both the persona of the natural philosopher and the status of 
pictorial representations of nature shifted. Instead of a transcendental 
Genius improving or idealizing nature, the desired character of the 
natural philosopher inverted to one of self-abnegation. Instead of truth 
to nature, these scientists aspired to let nature 'speak for itself through a 
set of instrumentalities that minimized intervention, hamstrung 
interpretation, and blocked artistic licence (Galison, 1998, p.328-9). 
This notion of the mechanical was, for GaUson, a form that had 'nothing 
to do with truth, and nothing to do with the establishment of certainty' (p.331). 
Mechanical objectivity was instead, shaped by a; 
[...] machine ideal: the machine as a neutral and transparent operator 
that would serve both as instrument of registration without intervention 
and as an ideal for the moral discipline of the scientists themselves. 
Objectivity was that which remained when the earlier values of the 
subjective, interpretative, and artistic were banished (p.332). 
Galison's history charts the changes in how scientific adas makers in 
diverse scientific fields such as 'topographical and sectional anatomy', 
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'encephalography' and 'stellar spectra' (p.332-8) described their methodology 
for the production of the collections of images within their adases. The 
'machine ideal' was considered exemplary for the acqviisition of data and the 
creation of scientific images, and was greatiy in favour with the scientists of the 
'last two thirds of the nineteenth century'. GaUson also charts the later turn 
away from eighteenth-century mechanical objectivity by the atias makers of the 
early twentieth century (p.334), towards a culture of'trained judgement'. 
However, he notes, and this sentiment is reiterated in his later collaborative 
study with Lorraine Daston (2007), that these changes in view were not 
comprehensive across all sciences or historical periods. Instead it is more 
accurate to understand the attitudes toward objectivity and the methods that 
count towards it, the variety of 'epistemic virtues' (Daston and Galison, 2007, 
p.41) as ideas and practices that work in 'parallel and overlap', and while newer 
ideas 'inevitably' modify the existing ones, they often coexist (ibid). 
Mechanical objectivity was central to scientific work from the mid-
nineteenth century to the early twentieth. While as a central concern for 
scientists, it was relatively short-lived, however as a concept relating to 
automatic machine registration, it persists. In practice, mechanical objectivity 
has been joined by other concepts of objective reason, such as trained 
judgement, which stresses the importance of expert knowledge and experience 
in the reading and analysis of scientific data and documents of 'judgement and 
interpretation' (Galison, 1998, p.332). Central to Daston and GaUson's (2007) 
history is the understanding that that the different epistemological periods and 
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virtues they identify are interleaved and coexist even in contemporary scientific 
practices, but what is crucial for the thesis is that the move away from 
mechanical objectivity was based on an understanding of the importance of 
subjective interpretation on the part of the scientist, interpretation necessary in 
order to construct and recognise scientific knowledge. In distinction, the 
notion of a mechanical objectivity as it might be seen as an attribute of the 
instrument, as a physical and mechanical device that when used to interact with 
the material world around it wiU produce documents that are, because of their 
machine-like rendering of reaUty, sometimes inscrutable to any interpreter but 
the trained eye of the expert, remains intact. This is not to attribute a human 
form of knowledge to devices, but to question their relation with the rest of 
physical reaUty as being a one-way path, through which they translate 
phenomena into marks, but leave that reaUty unmodified. 
The concept of objectivity 
The reason that these different understandings of objectivity raise a 
potential problem in the thesis is that, as Ted Porter notes, 'objectivity is nearly 
synonymous with realism' (1996, p.3). Traditionally the positivist tradition in 
the philosophy and history of science has led to the notion of objectivity being 
accepted uncritically as a boon for any study, medical, historical or social (p.4). 
He identifies 'absolute objectivity', 'disciplinary objectivity' and 'mechanical 
objectivity' as distinct uses of the concept which have emerged at different 
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times and been considered important by different groups (p.3-4). 'When 
philosophers speak of the objectivity of science, they generally speak of its 
ability to know things as they really are' (p.3). It is a relatively recent movement 
in the historical and science studies Uterature in which notions such as the 
usefulness of mathematical measurements, and of studying the quantifiable and 
the objective have been questioned/''* 
In line with this move to re-examine the claims to reaUty made by 
scientific practices, Daston and GaUson (2007) point out that 'scientific 
objectivity has a history' (2007,17), and that; 
All sides of these several debates have largely assumed that objectivity is 
and has been a monolithic and immutable concept, at least since the 
seventeenth century. So pervasive and apparentiy persuasive is this 
assumption that it is rarely even uttered [...] the implication is that 
objectivity itself has no history (Daston, 2002, p.598.) 
On charting this history, Daston and GaUson (2007) show that in the 
practice and philosophy of science, objectivity represents a group of ideas 
rather than a singular concept. They examine the development of the word 
'objective', which, while always the antonym of subjectivity, underwent — at the 
hands of Immanuel Kant and his interpreters - rescue from relative obscurity 
and a dramatic reversal in meaning.''^ As Daston and Galison show, through its 
redefinition by Kantian philosophy and following adoption by the sciences. 
This shift is the result of a number of factors, one of which is the influential work 
of historian T.H.Kuhn (1970), which began to inspire those in the social sciences and 
history to revisit and question some of the assumptions underlying the story by which 
science explained itself. 
''^ They chart the development of the two terms (Daston and Galison, 2007, p.29). 
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objectivity has come to mix the moral and practical imperatives of what would 
be understood to constitute good scientific practice. As they explain; 
Conceptually it operates by synecdoche, making this or that aspect of 
objectivity stand for the whole, and on an ad hoc basis. The criterion 
may be emotional detachment in one case; automatic procedures for 
registering data in another; recourse to quantification in still another; 
belief in a bedrock reality independent of human observers in yet 
another. In this fashion, it is not difficult to tote up a long list of 
forerunners of objectivity [...] The aim of a non-teleological history of 
scientific objectivity must be to show how all these elements came to be 
fused together (it is not self-evident, for example, what emotional 
detachment has to do with automatic data registration), designated by a 
single work, and translated into specific scientific techniques. (Daston 
and GaUson, 2007, p.29)[orimal italics]. 
This mixture of practices and imperatives in which 'certain parts come to 
stand for the whole' result in technical practices such as 'automatic data 
registration' being linked with methodological strategies such as 'emotional 
detachment' and philosophical ideas like 'belief in a bedrock reality 
independent of human observers'. The effect of this is a confusion regarding 
how instrumentation can be understood in a philosophical context that does 
not marginali2e the role of the human observer. This chapter clarifies and 
disables this confusion by reflecting on work of scholars who have gone about 
disentangling the discourse, from different vantages; historical, such as Daston 
and Galison (2007) and philosophical, by returning to Richard Rorty's (1980) 
work. While measurement technologies are useful because they are objective, 
many different interpretations can be made of what this statement means. 
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The thing itself, mechanical objectivity in medical science 
In medical science, the rationale of mechanical objectivity persists. It can 
be detected both in the way in which physicians make use of a combination of 
scientific technologies and rational analysis to arrive at diagnosis, (Saunders, 
2008) and also the idea that imaging technologies can be used to render the 
human body visible and transparent, to diagnose, and record. Diagnostic 
devices, imaging machines, electrophysiological sensors, chemical analyses, 
genetic testing, are among the high tech methods by which human bodies 
become the subjects of data collection or image making practices. It is not the 
aim of this thesis to examine in particular any of these methods, the claims of 
their users, or comment particularly on the way in which they each individually 
represent human bodies (in terms of the documents and evidence which they 
produce).^ '*" The concern of this thesis is with a somewhat more elusive notion, 
the idea that instrumental devices are not only a form of representation, but of 
production, which may be exploited by creative practices which incorporate 
instrumentation. 
The contrasting ways in which we can understand how instruments 
represent the 'reaUty of the body' or 'things themselves' is exemplified by the 
following contrasting descriptions of two types of medical instrumentation. 
Consider physician Thomas Lewis' (1920) observation on the advantages of 
'•'' A selection of recent literature which examines medical technologies and the 
discourses, both social and scientific, surrounding their production of images and 
bodily categories are Joseph Dumit's Picturing Personhood (2004) and Joyce's (2008) 
studies of FMRI scanning as well as Saunder's (2008) text on CT (Computed 
Tomography) Scanning. 
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the electrocardiograph made in the introduction to his The Mechanism and 
Graphic Rsgistration of the Heart Beat, 
The records in themselves constitute the most exact signs of cardiac 
affections which we possess. Imprinted by the disease itself they form 
permanent and unquestionable testimony of events which occurred [...] 
(Lewis, 1920, p.ix). 
Lewis's claim that the 'records' made by the electrocardiograph 'in 
themselves' 'constitute the most exact signs' of 'events which occurred' ' 
demonstrates the persuasive influence of mechanical objectivity as claimed on 
behalf of a mechanical system. The apparatus becomes transparent, a conduit 
for the actions of 'the disease itself. This description is littie different from 
Henry Fox Talbot's description of the photographic process of the calotype as 
'sun pictures' made by 'the pencil of nature' in his 1844 book of that name. 
Within visual studies scholarship surrounding photographic technologies, the 
naivete which seemingly persists in discourses surrounding novel technologies 
has long been replaced by more sophisticated and critical approaches to the 
role of mechanical apparatus in the production of imagery. As Roland Barthes' 
(1980) observed, the photograph appears to operate as a transparent package 
for what it depicts, the photograph is always pointing away from itself as an 
object. The apparatus, and the work that it does, becomes transparent. 
Lewis's description of instrumentation is characteristic of the textbook 
view of scientific instruments adopted by medical science in die late 19* and 
early 20* century (Reiser, 1981, p.l62), which takes an uncritical stance 
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towards the representation of entities by medical devices and diagnostic 
methods, eager to adopt objective methods of diagnosis in order to avoid the 
error prone 'subjectivity' of both the patient, and the physician. 
Statements of this kind still persist in contemporary medical imaging 
discourses where this rhetoric of transparency and precision is central to the 
popular narratives that surround medical imaging practices. Joyce's (2009) 
sociological study of magnetic resonance imaging practices leads her to 
observe that; 
Believed to be precise and indefatigable, machines ate highly valued in 
knowledge production. In contrast, the human, positioned as fallible and 
biased, is transformed into a suspicious figure. The attribution of 
precision to mechanical reproduction produces a halo of certainty 
around machine-produced information; numbers, graphs and anatomical 
pictures all benefit from this shared beUef (p.52). 
This positioning of the machine as independent producer of data or 
images, as Joyce observes, operates to render 'invisible' the human work, 
negotiation and decision making that is required to produce usable outputs 
from instrumental technologies.''^ This can be seen as a rhetorical strategy that 
reinforces the authority of medical interpretations and diagnosis. One effect of 
this pervasive attitude towards these machines is that responsibility for 
production and interpretation of evidence is transferred from medical and 
research staff to machines that are considered to be essentially automatic 
'''' These aspects of the technical work required to produce images which are 
obhiscated by their representation as objective, mechanically produced, texts is 
discussed in detail by Dumit (2004) and Joyce (2009). 
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(Joyce, 2009, pp.48-9). 
There is a particular aspect of this strategy of deferment to machines that 
only appears rational if there is a fixed reaUty for instrumentation to interface 
with. As Joyce points out 'narratives about MRI examinations are saturated 
with the notions that they represent unmediated access to a body that exists 
outside of language and human actions and that they provide definitive 
answers about a person's physical condition' (Joyce, 2009; p.53). Thus Lewis's 
statements about the 'unquestionable testimony' of the 'disease itself can be 
seen to link with a notion of access to an authentic reaUty. Whilst physicians, 
technicians and research scientists using body imaging technologies are well 
aware of the work that goes into the production of images, they are generally 
resolutely realist about the physical provenance and connections between the 
output of instruments and the phenomena with which they are associated. It is 
not the aim of the thesis to develop a counter argument to this position, but by 
discussing it, the thesis aims to point out that the representations produced by 
instrumental apparatuses are ones among many possibilities, and that the 
apparent objectivity and attachment of devices to a concept of reality 'as it 
really is', overshadows the possible renegotiation of these representations as 
well as the further, and more crucial point, that these representations influence 
the body itself, and can be seen as part of it. One effect of having a 'thing in 
itself that instruments might interact with, is that it prevents us from 
considering that alternatives to what is made visible by the technologies we are 
using. 
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To further examine this claim, an alternative understanding of how 
medical imaging technologies interact with the world can be seen in feminist 
and science studies theorist Karen Barad's description of ultrasound 
technology; 
[...] the [piezoelectric] transducer does not allow us to peer innocentiy at 
the fetus, nor does it simply offer constraints on what we can see; rather, 
helps produce and is part of the body it images. That is, the marks on the 
computer screen (the sonogram images, sonic diffraction patterns 
translated into an electronic image) refer to 2. phenomenon that is 
constituted in the intra-action of the 'object' (commonly referred to as 
the 'fetus') and the 'agencies of observation' (Barad, 2007, p.202). 
Barad makes a somewhat different claim to that of Lewis, this time on 
behalf of another piece of medical technology, the piezoelectric transducer 
used in the probe of an ultrasound machine. Her discussion of this element of 
the apparatus of obstetric ultrasound serves as an illustration of her philosophy 
of scientific measurement. Barad argues that the foetus is a phenomenon 
produced by the act of observation. The apparatus that does this cannot be 
reduced to an 'idealised observing instrument' (p.202), but something which 
materializes the phenomena of the foetus through 'an open (but nonarbitrary) 
temporal process' (p.301). 
The difference between Lewis's and Barad's descriptions of these devices 
of course reflect their own pragmatic needs from a description of the 
apparatus. Barad's work aims to interrogate ultrasound imaging and the values 
implicit in the way in which the technology manifests its phenomena. In 
contrast, it may be that Lewis' realist perspective on the information produced 
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by the electrocardiograph, and his rhetoric regarding its relationship to the 
'disease itself is necessary because of the machine's function in medical 
diagnosis, there is a pragmatic value in taking the machine at 'face value"^". It 
makes sense for a physician to take a matter-of-fact approach to the entities 
that are manifested by the instrumental tools that offer a way to obtain 
information about them, and the bodies of the sick. 
At the same time, Barad, and the many other scholars like her who count 
Michel Foucault amongst their intellectual heritage, are concerned not with the 
use of medical technology as a means to a particular instrumental end — 
pragmatically deciding a treatment route, assessing risk. To do so is to neglect 
the way in which technologies form part of a discursive dimension that shape 
human bodies and human subjectivities, a dimension which cannot be 
separated from 'legal, educational, hospital, medical, architectural, military, 
industrial, and state apparatuses' and their 'disciplinary' effects (Barad, 2007, 
p.204). 
Through the argument of the thesis, it should become apparent, that 
instruments can be seen to have a formative influence on human bodies. 
Following the ideas of scholars like Barad, it will stress that those effects are 
part of how instruments operate in the world, and are not effects that should 
be considered as unimportant epiphenomena, but can be seen as central to 
how medical practices are understood. These understandings can help to 
''*' The placebo effect has been recorded as being influenced by the belief of doctors in 
the treatements they prescribe, as well as patients (Moerman, 2003). 
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inform the use of instrumentation in practices outside of scientific research 
and medicine. 
Summary 
As we have seen, historically, the perceived need to reform natural 
science in response to the threat of error led thinkers like Francis Bacon to 
propose new methods, starting points and distinctions for the emerging 
discipline of natural philosophy. In retrospect, it might be easy to conclude 
that scientists making use of Bacon's ideas were concerned with avoiding the 
risks to a true account of nature through the application of what we would 
understand to be scientific objectivity. However, as Daston and Galison (2007) 
suggest, it was only in Kant's philosophy that a relationship was established 
between the idea that there was a set of scientific methods that could provide 
reliable evidence allowing the notion of an underlying true and objective nature 
to be established. 
This construction of, and disconnection between, the 'objective' external 
and physical world, and the internal, transcendental subject was the result of 
the philosophical system devised by Kant and his contemporaries and critiqued 
in PMNby Rorty (1980). This separation provides the final part of the story 
that takes the argument of the last two chapters from discussions of the mind-
body problem, to the concept of two separable orders of thing. Kant's 
philosophy proposed that not only was there an internal, experiencing. 
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knowing and rational subject, but that there was also an external, physical and 
objective world, independent of that rational subject. 
This division is what, in philosophy, is sometimes used to explain why 
mechanical instruments are useful for rational, 'objective' observations. 
However, if the essential separation between subject and the world that Kant 
proposed is denied, and an alternative relationship established, there remains 
many reasons that mechanical registering instrumentation is useful to scientific 
and medical practices. These will be addressed in more detail in the next 
chapter, which further examines the circumstances of the 19* century adoption 
of mechanical instrumentation into medicine. 
The turn towards scepticism in the 17th century can certainly be seen as 
a motivating factor for the adoption of devices used for instrumental 
measurement. In the forms of both instruments of the mind and hand, the 
concept of mechanistic authenticity could now be considered as part of a set of 
factors which motivated the adoption and development of instrumental 
technologies as part of the wider technological development of empiricism. 
Measurement and managed laboratory arrangements, double-blind 
experiments, are all technologies developed by natural scientists to address the 
problems relating to the various idols which might otherwise block the path 
towards a true understanding of nature. 
A methodological problem, relating to what is measurable and what is 
not, and how measurements and standards can be agreed and shared, through 
this discussion has been shown to be related (partiy by synecdoche) to a set of 
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ideas whereby the difference between the internal and perceptual and the 
external and objective are differentiated. By designating an a priori difference 
between things subjective and things objective, an argument might be made 
that there is something fundamental to the ontology of instrumentation that 
links it to truth making. The aim of this chapter was to show that this 
apparently fundamental aspect of machines is actually the result of a specific 
philosophical problem raised by a distancing of human senses from 
knowledge, in essence the mind from the body, and in effect a distancing of 
the mind from the world. These incisions can all be understood, in the present 
discussion, to implicate with different emphasis, measuring instruments as 
either a problem or solution. However, if, following the discussion in chapter 
1, the distinction between mind and world are radically coUapsed, the use of 
instrumentation is no longer validated by a need to access an authentic reality. 
Chapter 3 will address the themes identified here in the context of the 
historical development of medical instrumentation, in particular with reference 
to the way in which is was incorporated into hospital treatment. The history of 
the development of medical instruments raises particular themes such as the 
role of the patient as subjective perceiver. As will be seen, these ideas add a 
further layer to the previous discussion of problems posed for scientific 
practices by the subjectivity of the scientist (physician). 
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Chapter 3. Objectivity, subjectivity and medicine 
Chapter Three extends the discussion of objective measurement to the 
realm of the body, by considering the introduction of instrumentation into 
medicine. It examines the major movements in the critical literature that 
contribute to a methodology for understanding this history. 
The chapter will develop the themes of subjectivity and objectivity as 
they relate to the practice of measurement and diagnosis. Medical 
instrumentation provides a useful focus for the discussion because the way it is 
talked about often represents a superficially simple view of the relationship 
between human actors, technology and reality, and at the same time 
incorporates a deterministic understanding of technological change whose 
objectivity is open to question. An uncritical attitude to the neutrality of 
medical instruments is exemplified in Lewis's (1920) statements (discussed in 
the previous chapter) regarding the electrocardiograph and described in Joyce's 
(2009) analysis of popxilar descriptions of MRI imaging technologies, both 
discussed in the previous chapter. In these formvilations instruments are 
unproblematic, 'transparent' transducers and transcribers of the physical world; 
considered simply as machines, their relationship to that world appears 
deceptively straightforward. 
This chapter describes an alternative approach to understanding the 
origins, applications and uses of medical instrumentation. Its makes use of 
133 
histories of medical technology by scholars like S.J. Reiser - whose work 
provides a history of the role of technology in medicine (Reiser, 1978 ;1993) -
but will depart from Reiser's critique of the negative influence of medical 
technologies. The chapter will use the example of thermometry to elucidate 
some of the more contemporary critical approaches to instrumentation. It will 
discuss how actor-network theory (ANT), a theoretical approach to 
understanding technological and cultural relations, and the emergence of 
technological and scientific entities, might influence how we consider the 
development of a medical instrument such as a thermometer; revealing the 
multiple causes and negotiated nature of its production. The chapter wiU then 
consider how contemporary scholarship unravels the multiple forces that bring 
an instrument into being, enabling it to become reified - or, what electronic 
engineers might call 'black-boxed' (Latour and Woolgar, 1979, p.242). 
This chapter will introduce a range of approaches to understanding the 
meaning of body measuring instrumentation, as both scientific technique and 
as a way of representing the human body. Such approaches have developed as 
an alternative to — and a critique of — popular discourses regarding technology 
that tend to regard all technological medical advances as unquestionably 
positive. This trend leads to a deterministic view of medical equipment as a 
collection of self-defining objects, whose function cannot be interrogated or 
renegotiated without risking accusations of Ludditism. But it is reductive to 
assume that the apparentiy benign and fixed world of 'things' is innately 
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objective; the values inherent in a technology's representation of the body need 
to be teased out, and the usefulness of that technology pragmatically assessed. 
There is a good reason why this chapter looks so closely at medicine. 
Not only is there a highly developed scholarship of medical history, but 
physicians and other medical practitioners also find themselves in a 
problematic position as regards the relationship between technologies and 
subjectivity in their practice. 
Medicine is both an art and a science; it blends the ethical, the scientific 
and the pragmatic. Medicine maintains a tension between the values that 
inform scientific practices - namely, objectivity, rationality and evidence - and 
the humanistic imperatives that stress the influence of factors such as lived 
experience, meaning and ethics. As Byron Good (1994) asserts, he is 
'convinced that medical anthropology is one of the primary sites within 
anthropology where alternative responses to the confrontation between 
historicism and the natural sciences is being worked out' (p.24). That two 
potentially conflicting paradigms are present within the discourse of medical 
practice may well account for the number of disciplines preoccupied with the 
study of medicine, often referred to collectively as the 'medical humanities'. 
A look at the histories of medical devices shows how physicians of the 
18*" and 19* centuries not only adopted but also resisted novel medical 
technologies; the latter less evidence of the backwardness of early physicians 
than a demonstration of the often fraught range of imperatives and both 'ways 
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of thinking' and 'uses of the senses' (Kuriyama, 1999, pp. 12-3) present in 
medical practices of knowing the body. 
Scholarly criticism of medical objectivity 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the historical relationship between 
scientific epistemology and ontology is complex; this chapter wiU examine how 
the resulting debates and tensions have influenced the development of 
instrumentation. The opening section wiU illustrate how the epistemological 
concerns of science introduced in the previous chapter have impacted on the 
thinking and methods of physicians, as well as on how the practice of those 
physicians is understood by other disciplines. This discussion will make 
particular reference to the problematic relationship between subjectivity and 
diagnosis. 
That subjectivity and objectivity have been formulated by Kantian 
philosophy as complementary-but-opposing ontological states has influenced 
the way some disciplines have sought to address contemporary medicine and 
hospital technologies. Consequentiy, there is a general sense of the pertinence 
of this philosophical discourse, which sees a disjunction between scientific 
accounts of the body and the sociological, psychological or anthropological 
accounts of a patient's (apparendy incompatible) socio-subjective experience of 
illness. However — and while these debates rarely come down to comparing 
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ontological status - while arguing that it is neglected, medical humanities 
scholars do not consider patient testimony to be of equal value to 'objective' 
medical data; just as it is rare that the physicians they observe actually treating 
patients consider psychological, social or experiential (for example, symbolic) 
factors to be either effective or medically relevant. 
In discussions of technology in hospital settings, the problematic 
philosophical terminology of subjectivity vs. objectivity pervades the literature, 
particularly as seen in the scholarly work of nursing practitioners and 
physicians, such as James Lynch's (1999) sociological investigations in the 
Intensive Care Unit. Almerud et al. (2008) comment on the inability of 
theoreticians to not 'beat the proverbial dead horse'(p.55). While Lynch's work 
signalled a valuable contribution to a tvim toward an understanding of the 
effects of negative emotion on cardiac health, in many cases this Utetature 
concludes by claiming an apparendy mysterious ineffabiUty is at work. For 
example. Lynch decides that 'something' is missing from technological science; 
it cannot give an account of the subjective factors that are so powerful in these 
settings. In his history of medical technologies in the hospital, S.J. Reiser 
similarly faUs foul of the terminology. He criticizes physicians' increasing 
reliance on technology, and argues that this has led to a reduction in the 
amount and quality of their interaction with patients. 'Objective' medical 
measurement means that physicians no longer need to speak to their patients, 
and the patients' own experience of their symptoms ceases to be so relevant. 
Conversely, with the introduction of mechanical objectivity as both trope and 
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method, medical practice has achieved an even greater distance from its own 
object — the actual body of the patient. Automatic measurement techniques 
and technologies - from graphing temperature readings (charted by nurses to 
later be consulted by doctors) to the electrocardiograph, CT and MRI - now 
enable physicians to carry out a consultation to a standard which meets 
professional norms over the telephone. While it is reasonable to argue that 
physicians' over-reliance on instrumentation is neglectful of their broader duty 
of care,* '^ the argument that subjective or 'innate' knowledge is inherently 
superior to technical practice can only be made with oblique reference to the 
extra entities which have been attached to Kantian subjectivity. Byron Good's 
anthropology of medical rationaUty describes the difference between the 
'ordering of reaUty' by physicians and the reaUty of the sufferer. In biomedicine 
(the branch of contemporary medicine informed by modern science); 
Disease is located in the body as a physical object of physiological state, 
<>' Reiser also suggests that subjective ways of knowing are ecUpsed by the 
introduction of technology into hospital practices. This is also suspect - later scholars, 
such as Anne Marie Mol (2008), and Daston and Galison (2007), suggest instead that a 
richer combination of methods of knowing are in use in contemporary medicine and 
science. Mol's anthropological studies of hospital practices suggest that different types 
of medical knowledge-gathering do not simply replace one another: for instance, 
patient testimony - information about day-to-day functioning, or how far they can 
walk without getting tired - might be assessed alongside more high-tech diagnostic 
information such as an angiogram (a form of x-ray) to build a larger clinical picture. 
Daston and Galison note that differing types of objectivity present overlapping and 
co-existing tendencies in thinking about scientific evidence, rather than distinct eras in 
which one method replaces another. For example, contemporary scientists refer to the 
epistemological values such as trained judgement and mechanical objectivity when 
considering the quality of the evidence they produce from a particular experiment. 
This mixture of approaches supports Mol's observations regarding clinical practice in 
medicine. 
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and whatever the subjective state of individual minds of physicians and 
patients, medical knowledge consists of an objective representation of 
the diseased body (Good, 1994, p.ll7). 
However, in Good's anthropological world-view, the medical aspect 
omits essential aspects of the body: 
The body is subject, the very grounds of subjectivity or experience in the 
world, and the body as 'physical object' cannot be neady distinguished 
from 'states of consciousness' (p.117). 
But this discourse is a thorny one. Not only is the term 'subjective' 
already value-laden in its scientific setting (patients' experience of symptoms 
can be said to be 'only subjective' or 'all in the mind'), there is also an 
unsettling power dynamic at play when one person designates what is and is 
not physically real in the body of another. Correspondingly, to many 
practitioners in the medical humanities the notion that subjective experience is 
inconsequential to medical practice is anathema. However, even Byron Good's 
advocation of a phenomenological aspect to the study of medical experience 
lacks a correlative instrumental and practical grounding; the impact of 
experience on healing or body state is not discussed, and experience is treated 
merely as epiphenomenon. While subjectivity is certainly still relevant (it can be 
argued that the human life lived in misery is not worth extending, regardless of 
the medical picture drawn of that physical body), it is - according to Good's 
model - extraneous to practitioners concerned with the 'real' heaUng of 
'objective' disease. By this reckoning, while the real, subjective experience of 
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illness is fundamentally and inextricably Unked to its organic counterpart, its 
close relationship is one defined by difference - it is ineluctably present, but 
distincdy separate. The dualistic ontology is maintained; experience is not 
incorporated into the objective ontology of the human body, and remains cut 
off. 
Reiser's work describes two stages in the history of medical diagnostics 
in which doubt of subjective testimony plays a part. Both are presented as 
origination stories in the development of contemporary medicine. The first is 
the progression of medical diagnostics away from patient interview and 
towards methods of physical examination, and often involving instrumental 
techniques such as urinalysis, percussion, pulse feeling and auscultation 
(listening to the interior sounds of the body). One story involves Lannaec's 
invention of the stethoscope, created from a roUed up tube of paper and 
enabling him to Usten to the heartbeat of a female patient upon whose chest 
the mores of the time prevented Lannaec from placing his ear. Lannaec's 
stethoscope — like several other devices such as the ophthalmoscope, a 
magnifying glass for close examination of the eye — offered physicians broader 
methods of examining patients, though they remained comparable in effect to 
older, venerated practices such as pulse reading. 
This early innovation is cast by Reiser — as well as scholars in fields such 
as health studies (Sampson, 1999, pp.3-21) - as one intended to avoid the 
subjective and unreliable account by a patient of their own symptoms. Rather 
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than have to speak to a patient to elicit the precise nature of their problem, 
these new techniques of examination allowed the body to speak for itself. This 
concept of consulting the body directly can be traced throughout medical 
history, from ancient Chinese texts about physicians who would not allow their 
patients to speak until they had felt the patient's pulse, or '/z?o'™ (Kuriyama, 
1999). 
The second stage in Reiser's history charts the introduction of an 
instrumentation that solved the problem of the physician's own subjectivity. 
For all the apparent necessity of scientific objectivity when establishing a 
reliable view of nature, the introduction of medical measuring instruments and 
automatic data-recording devices was by no means as inevitable a development 
as has been retrospectively suggested. Historians of medical technology writing 
in the late-19* and 20th century appear bemused by the ambivalence of 
physicians to the medical innovations of thermometry, respiration, and pulse 
counting (as distinct from ^pvihe. feeling, which has been the norm in most 
Western medicine, a variation of which continues to this day in the Chinese 
tradition). Silas Mitchell in his 1892 address to the Second Congress of 
American Physicians and Surgeons — of which he was president at the time — 
™ The mo is the quality measured in Chinese pulse measurement. While the practice 
looks similar to the contemporary western equivalent - a light pressure of the 
physician's fingertips on the patient's wrist - it is in fact very different: rather than 
count a beat, Chinese physicians feel for particular quaUties of the mo, which is 
conceptualised as an energy flow throughout the body, rather than the changing 
movements of arterial blood. Kuriyama (1999) has written a fascinating comparative 
study of the historical development and major concepts of Chinese and Western 
medical practices, which includes a more in-depth description and consideration of 
the mo. 
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asked: 
Does it not seem incredible that of numberless physicians who sat by 
bedsides, thoughtful, with fingers laid upon that bounding artery, none 
should have had the idea of counting it? (Mitchell, 1892, p. 17) 
Mitchell then later goes on to say: 
How useful, how simple, it seemed to count the pulse and respiration, or 
to put a thermometer under the tongue, and yet it took in the one case a 
century, and in another far more, before the mass of the profession 
learned to profit by the wisdom of the few (Mitchell, 1892, p.24). 
Matters were, of course, not so simple. The new historicist approach to 
mapping the development and adoption of new technologies, and the evidence 
offered by more critical historical accounts of medical technologies, such as 
Reiser's Medicine and the Reign ofTechnology (1978) tells the other side of this 
technologically determinist tale, offering counter arguments to Mitchell's rather 
condemning view that "error died hard" (Mitchell, 1892, p.23). Instead, 
examining the way in which new technologies were used, thought about, 
debated and developed by both technologists, physicians and the public, shows 
the complexity of outcomes of a novel technology, and in the case of 
measuring instruments, the dependence of the way in which the final 
phenomena measured by the device — in the following, body temperature, was 
at different points in its history open to different interpretations and 
manifestations. 
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Social Construction of Technology and Actor-Network 
Theory 
The following discussion of thermometry will move beyond the 
technologically determinist and classical view of instrumentation, in which 
instruments are developed from iterative experiments, slowly improving in 
their function of interfacing with, and representing reality. In the last thirty 
years, developments across the humanities dealing with technology such as 
sociology, anthropology and philosophy, have developed alternative 
approaches to understanding the forces shaping the way in which technology 
develops. Before focussing further on the particular case of the thermometer, 
the primary aspects of some major currents in this scholarship wiU be 
described in brief — these being the Social Construction of Technology 
(SCOT), which considers new technologies to be the result of social factors 
rather than reflections of physical nature; and Actor-Network Theory (ANT), 
which analyses technologies in terms of networks of different actors. 
Social construction as an approach to understanding technology 
emerged in the mid 1980s (Bijker et al., 1990), pardy in response to the 
emerging approach of Sociology of Scientific JCnowledge (SSK), proponents of 
which were concerned with establishing a relationship between scientific facts 
and the social and cultural circumstances of their conception. As Bijker et al. 
(1990) describe it, SSK takes as a 'central tenet' that; "in investigating the 
causes of beliefs, sociologists should be impartial to the truth or falsity of the 
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beliefs, and that such beliefs should be explained symmetricaUy"(p.l8). This 
'symmetrical' treatment means that sociologists are required to seek elsewhere 
than in the scientifically established explanations for why certain theories, 
explanations and facts are chosen over one another. 
Within such a program all knowledge and all knowledge claims are to 
be treated as being socially constructed; that is, explanations for the 
genesis, acceptance, and rejection of knowledge claims are sought in 
the domain of the social world rather than the natural world (Bijker et 
al, 1990,p.l8). 
The theory of social constructionism has had a considerable influence 
on science and technology studies; its view of scientific and technological 
entities as products of social groups (and their actions) offers a more hopeful 
and flexible model of the relationships between human cultures, actors and 
desires. 
As an approach, SCOT drew attention to the powerful influence that 
cultural understandings and interpretations of technology have in its 
development, influences which were previously often neglected by historians 
and theorists. However, as a strong program, SCOT also had its limitations. 
The main arguments propounded by the SCOT model amount only to a partial 
counter to the problem of an overly mechanistic view of technology. In 
particular the approach fails to deal with a continuing ontological division 
between the idealist and realist conceptions of technology, and by attempting 
to source the criteria for technological forms in the social, rather than the 
natural, it compounds the conceptual separation of physical and social reality. 
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In contemporary scholarship the influence of 'strong program' social 
constructionism has waned in favour of a more supple analysis of scientific 
products, one less open to the charge of being inherently idealist or 
unsustainably relativist. This is achieved by rejecting the assumed separation of 
a physical, material reality from cultural or social forces, suggesting alternative 
approaches and ontologies. Contemporary scholars are now as likely to 
describe science's relation to physical reality as a process of 'framing' rather 
than 'constructing', making clear the pre-existence of a world to be 
investigated, elucidated and manipulated. Critical approaches Uke Actor-
network theory and posthumanism have emerged, which both pointedly reject 
that is it meaningful to make any distinction between social and material reality, 
and question the concept of materiality as it is modelled as prior to human 
knowledge. These movements can be broadly characterised as 'anti-
essentialist'. 
The posthumanist position, championed by thinkers such as Haraway 
(1991) and Pickering (1992), is one approach which aims to reconcile the 
tension between the material agency of the physical world and the social forces 
that have powerfiiUy influenced the shape of new technologies by embracing 
an alternative ontological frameworks (such as the 'flat ontology' described in 
chapter One) which rejects traditional separations between orders of thing, 
such as that between human and machine, natural and social. In a 
posthumanist framework, it is non-sensical to argue for an either-or causality 
of technological form and change, instead the interdependence and complexity 
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of the relationship between mixed entities are stressed. 
ANT can be seen as both product and critique of SCOT literature. 
Bruno Latour, who coined the term 'Actor-Network TheoryV' is an outspoken 
critic of sociology's tendency to reify 'the social' as a force. Latour (2007, p.68) 
claims this tendency lends the field a kind of confused dualism, tying it to 
theoretical objects that have no ontological significance but have simply come 
to stand for the network of forces and interests described as social (as opposed 
to, for example, 'natural'), while the depiction of these as such is an empty 
dichotomy. The influence of ANT on technology studies, and - as will be 
discussed later, medical anthropology - has led to more flexible accounts of 
technology where they are understood as physical practices or entities shaped 
by embedded in wider networks of meaning and action. As Latour has argued, 
the connections (what he calls 'alliances') between actors (people) and actants 
(things) are so ubiquitous they can be seen to materially constitute their objects. 
The term 'social', and the concept of 'social forces' has become extraneous, 
and technologies, rather than being a set of things or object, are better 
considered as a set oih.\im2in practices m a constant processes of resisting, 
manipulating and creating objects and facts. 
Latour has argued that ANT offers a method (rather than a theory) by 
'" Latour has since taken some pains to revisit, and attempt to clarify what is meant by 
the term, particularly stating that he is troubled by the meanings ANT has taken on 
since the introduction of the web, when the term 'network' has become less flexible 
and rhizomatic; indeed, other commentators on ant theory like Law and Mol have 
suggested that the term 'fluid' or 'train' might be more suitable in its place. 
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which social science can reconcile the local and global within its subject. 
Allowing it to address the disjunction between the two levels of its inquiry, the 
micro- (local, grounded interactions and observations) and macro-level 
(explanatory structures such as society, culture and norms — those forces 
responsible for the forms observed actions take). 
Ant is merely one of the many anti-essentialist movements that seems to 
characteri2e the end of the century. But is also, like ethnomethodology, 
simply a way for social scientists to access sites, a method and not a 
theory, a way to travel from one spot to the next, from one field site to 
the next, not an interpretation of what actors do simply glossed in a 
different more palatable and more universaHst language (Latour, 1999, 
p.21). 
Latour's description of A N T as a 'method' is supported by much of his 
early work, drawing heavily upon the use of case studies — such as the 
development of scientific facts (1979) technologies such as the Diesel engine 
(1987) and scientific and medical entities such as microbes (1993). However, 
Latour's work, taken as a body (and keeping more recent texts in mind) can be 
seen to constitute a particular philosophical position,'^ and this is reflected in 
the way in which philosophers are now responding to his work, in particular, 
Graham Harman's Prince of Networks (2010) describes Latour's work in terms of 
a philosophical project. 
The influence of A N T and the anti-essentiaMsm described by 
posthumanists on the following account of the development of thermometer 
2^ According to Harman's (2010) preface Latour is about to pubUsh a book which 
positions him as a philosopher, at the time of writing, this text has been through a 
process of review by other scholars (Harman included) but the contents are not 
public. 
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technology can be seen in the way in which it questions the traditional and 
somewhat Unear history of the development of the device, from 'crude' early 
versions, through a period of flux in which there were superstitious 
understandings of its meaning and possible application. Instead, the short 
account below ties together — and re-appropriates some aspects of the history 
that are discarded in retrospect. It also foregrounds the role that the device had 
in influencing the resulting production of temperature as a disease — fever — 
and the tension between the way in which temperature as a phenomena can be 
considered as a fundamental aspect of physical matter, a state which can be 
measured as a universal by instruments such as thermometers. In particular, 
this discussion is intended to raise the prospect of the necessity, and problem, 
of context within the activity of producing measurements. Whilst we might 
describe what a thermometer measures as the energy of particles of a particular 
space in the environment or piece of physical matter, when applied in 
medicine, the thermometer is linked to and precipitates certain types of action. 
Human body temperature is thought to be relatively stable at 98.6 degrees 
Fahrenheit, a measurement between 100.4 and 104 degrees Fahrenheit is 
considered to be a fever, temperatures above this are often considered to place 
patients, particularly children, at risk, and classify them in need of immediate 
medical attention. Taking a person's temperature sits within an understood 
pattern of possible actions and diagnostic criteria.^^ 
3^ NHS Direct - Check your symptoms. Available at: 
http://www.nhsclirect.nhs.uk/checksymptoms [Accessed November 7, 2010] ; Caring 
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Thermometers, fevers, and temperature 
The following section will use the example of the thermometer to 
emphasise certain dimensions central to the development of novel 
technologies that may be overlooked. David Nye, in Technologji Matters, (2006) 
identifies stages of technological invention, innovation and diffusion. These 
stages do not necessarily foUow a smooth pattern of conception (invention), 
design and improvement of a device so that it might be adopted and 
manufacture and then adoption of new technologies, for instance when the 
initial ignorance of potential users has been overcome, or affordable 
manufacturing processes are arrived at. Often it is necessary for users to 
innovate a use for and social meaning of a technology before a clear 
understanding of what it is becomes clear. This process has been well 
documented in new historicist studies of the development of many media 
technologies. Novel forms of media technology can be seen to be in a state of 
flux, open to innovation and experiment, and importantly, to definition by the 
social uses that are innovated around and through them (Gitelman, 2006). For 
example the early telephone was used to broadcast a whole range of media as 
entrepreneurs 'scrambled' to find uses for the new technology - amongst them 
live music concerts, faith healing, weather reports and emergency news 
for Your Child's Fever - Department of Pediatrics. Available at: 
http://\\--\\^v.cpmc.org/advflnced/pecliatL-ics/patient.s/topics/tever.html [Accessed 
November 7, 2010]. 
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(Fischer, 1994, p.66). As Punt (1995) explains, the emergence of the cinema as 
a recognisable media form was not a result of the right set of technologies 
becoming available, the mechanical and chemical apparatus necessary were 
available 50 years prior to the emergence of a recognisable cinema. In fact the 
ideas and understanding of what cinema was, and what it meant, that 
motivated early innovators in the field (Paul, the Lumieres, Dickinson and 
MeUes) were highly divergent (p.390). 
The forces that shape medical instrumentation and other technologies — 
and designate the possible and most efficient configurations of an instrument — 
are not only industrial; as the following discussion wiU show, there is far more 
flexibility and contingency in the possible forms an instrument can take. By 
examining the history of the thermometer, and the some of the variety of 
factors that have shaped it, we are invited to consider the alternative forms the 
device might have taken had influences been balanced differentiy, or scientific 
and medical practices not come to adopt it in a particular way. While the 
thermometer would not qualify as an instrument by the terms of all the 
literature surveyed above (particularly in Latour's contemporary laboratory), an 
account of the thermometer's history and 'reification' as a device - including 
the establishment of practical protocols around it, and its use, within the larger 
apparatus of body-monitoring equipment — wiU illustrate the theories already 
laid out and enable them to be pragmatically assessed. This section of the 
thesis does not aim to provide a complete history, but to make clear that the 
tensions that accompany the production of devices are related to many 
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different voices and values. The thermometer as we know it, as a 'textbook' 
instrument, is an embodiment as much of scientific and philosophical values as 
it is of a particular phenomena - temperature. 
It is Ukely that readers of this thesis have used a thermometer of some 
kind to measure their body temperature, or been the subject of thermometric 
measvirement. Thermometers are a medical measuring instrument commonly 
found in the modern western home, and the familiarity of the device makes it a 
telling case, demonstrating how something so quotidian and apparendy 
straightforward actually exists in a state of constant flux and (re)negotiation. 
The history of these instruments (such as that suggested by Davis, 1981) is Uke 
that of many other technologies, often depicted as one of trial and error — 
successive improvements that eventually reveal the 'best' form. Certainly the 
thermometer is rarely interrogated in common use; we take for granted that it 
must be sensible, logical, and of the optimal form for the functions it performs 
— but this is a post-hoc rationalisation. Even a cursory look at the history of 
the thermometer will demonstrate that there are certain necessary requirements 
for a device of this kind to come into being - to be, in Bachelard's words, 
reified. 
In recent years of course thermometers are often electronic, but as the 
electronic thermometer is designed analogously with the glass and mercury 
version, for the purposes of simplicity it will be this traditional kind discussed 
in the following. This comprises in its ideaU2ed form a hollow glass tube that 
is usually between 5 and 30 centimetres long, with a bulb at one end containing 
151 
mercury. The other end is sealed and often straight, though sometimes better 
shaped to fit parts of the body other than the mouth such as the ear, 
underarm, or anus. Contained in the tube is an amount of liquid metal mercury 
that, depending on its temperature, expands in size, filling the tube to a greater 
or lesser extent. On the side of the tube there are regular, numerical markings. 
The mark and number to which the mercury aligns is calibrated to correspond 
to a particular temperature. 
The construction of temperature as a universal 
Thermometers (and thermoscopes, their non-metrical predecessors) 
have been built for a long time and in various ways, with different liquids or 
gasses expanding or contracting in response to temperature variation. Between 
1593 and 1597 Galileo developed a crude open thermometer using glass bulbs 
set in a bath of water (Mitchell 1892, plO). Whilst he used the heat of his hands 
in order to test the device, Galileo appears to have not investigated the 
possible use of the thermometer in the investigation of disease (Reiser, 1978, 
p.llO). In 1613 Sagredo announced in a letter to Galileo that he had improved 
Galileo's system by hermetically sealing and adding a scale to it (ibid). A 
multiplicity of methods for the production of temperature methods has existed 
since, thermometers have contained linseed oil, water, mercury, alcohol in 
various forms (p. 112). During the enlightenment the question of a system of 
universal calibration for thermometers was raised, and a variety of alternatives 
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proposed and debated, some more fanciful than others. With doubts cast on 
the reliability of the chemical behaviour of materials used in thermometers — in 
particular, mercury — the consistency and objectivity of the device has varied 
throughout its history, to eventually setde into the relatively simple form with 
which we are today familiar. 
In its early form, the thermometer and barometer were the same, and so 
measured changes and temperature and pressure simultaneously. In 1644 
TorriceUi discovered the effects of air pressure allowed the thermometer and 
the barometer to be separated into two different instruments by the sealing of 
the glass tube (Casde, 1995, p.23). The barometer (or weatherglass as it was 
known) was developed by members of the Royal Society, particularly Robert 
Hooke and Robert Boyle (ibid) and improved throughout the second half of 
the seventeenth century, leading to the general adoption of mercury, and 
eventually uniform scales, although almost seventy different scales were 
reputedly in use during this period (p.24). 
It is not only the case that the correct form and material of the 
thermometer and barometer have evolved over the last few centuries, Casde 
(1995) has noted that an evolution of the imagined components of their 
working took place as well, as evidenced by their metaphorical descriptions 
both by scientist and the way in which they appeared in literature and popular 
culture during the seventeenth century; 
[...] with their curious, seemingly animate capacity to "feel" alterations in 
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the atmosphere, weatherglasses, as they were known in the seventeenth 
century, lent themselves to metaphoric adaptation. In the hands of 
eighteenth-century wits, they became registers for measuring fanciful 
changes of all sorts—fluctuations in sexual desire, physical or emotional 
excitement, religious enthusiasm and so forth (Casde, 1995, p.22). 
The early language of enlightenment scientists shows their interactions 
with early weatherglasses supported a more general experience of the device as 
having an unpredictable inner life, a temperamental and sensible nature that 
was somewhat mysterious. As Castie observes, in his Micrographia (1665), 
Hooke describes how to calibrate a sealed thermometer to zero degrees and 
create a device of 'tenderness'. Similarly Gustavus Parker's Account of a Portable 
Barometer (1710) is also cited, and Parker noted for his 'torrid' terminology, 
'Terrine Emotions,' 'Effervescencies', 'Subterraneous or Submarine Eruptions,' 
'Copious Effluvioums' and 'Protrusions of Exotick Force' (Parker, 1710, in 
Castie, 1995, p.25). Castie suggests that fluctuations of the weather glass and 
human emotions were further bound together by the unconscious impulse of 
early experimenters to tint the Uquids be they mercury, 'spirit of wine' or 
linseed oil within their devices blood red, with 'lovely [...] cocheneel' [si^ 
(Hooke, 1635-1703, no page) or 'kermes, dragon's blood, or red wine spirits' 
(Casde, 1995, p. 26). These emotional instabilities and sensibilities were 
therefore not only present within the 'satiric' imagination of writers and 
comedians of the seventeenth century, but were part of the way in which early 
experimenters used and experienced the behavior of these instruments. The 
analogy of sexual excitement and loose morality chimed with the 
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unpredictability of the device, which itself harbors the ability to 'feel'. 
Later, the adoption of the device as a consumer technology also links to 
the emergence of a metaphor of a mercurial, changeable temperament where 
the thermometer becomes a focus for introspection and self-monitoring of the 
emotions. Casde identifies a number of Romantic poets who have referred to 
the technology in their work, citing both Rousseau and Keats, (p.34) and into 
the twentieth century in Freud and Flaubert (pp.38-40). 
Medicine itself was not impervious to debates surrounding the possible 
application of thermometers. Which were not also limited to technicalities, 
such as the best way to bmld the device or to solve the problems posed by 
body temperature measurement, such as placement and protocols. More 
fundamental questions also came from those physicians who doubted the 
relevance and value of a measurement made by a device of this kind (Reiser, 
1987, p. 114). In contemporary eyes, the instrument that gives the most objective 
measurement is superior, with the numerical scale on a thermometer being the 
mark of such objectivity. However, in order for the measurement to be useful, 
it has been necessary to reify and narrow our understanding of the quality we 
have come to know as temperature - historically of central relevance to medical 
diagnosis and monitoring, temperature has been a different thing at different 
moments in history. 
Despite the developments of the apparatus for the measurement of air 
temperature for use in meteorology, the general attitude of physicians towards 
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the thermometer as a device for reading the body was dismissive. This might 
appear paradoxical considering that the relationship between increased body 
temperature, fever, and pathology has been significant to medical practice and 
has been recorded since antiquity — knowledge and traditions relating to the 
relationship between health and body temperature are pervasive in human 
medical cultures (Blatteis 2001, p.7). As crucial as it has always been, 
temperature-taking for diagnostic purposes - when it was the fashion — was 
always by hand, or reliant upon the accurate report of the patient. By this 
standard, the information provided by a thermometer was incredibly accurate -
indeed, Robert Boyle criticised this new precision-thermometry as 'a work of 
needless curiosity' (Porter, 1999, p.344). However, what we might overlook, 
thermometry's one-dimensionality meant it was considered entirely inferior to 
the faculty of the physician's own senses; the thermometer could not hope to 
detect the "acrid, irritating quality of feverish heat" or other diagnostic 
indicators that could be gauged by hand (Reiser 1978, p.114). Physicians 
considered heat-measuring devices as doing only that. Reiser cites a French 
physician who stated that thermometers indicated: 
[...] not more than the degree of intensity of heat; and these differences 
are the least important in practice; ... the doctor must apply himself, 
above all, to distinguishing in feverish heat qualities that may be 
perceived only by a highly practiced touch (ibid). 
In order for a thermometer to in medicine effectively it must be applied 
in an appropriate setting; the data gathered from such an instrument does not 
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specify the state of the patient's body as a whole - it calls for interpretation. 
However, the lingual «??jinterpretation apparendy avoided by the introduction 
of numerical measurement is merely displaced onto the practices surrounding 
that instrument. And without a patient's medical history, the information 
provided by a device such as the thermometer is without context and rendered 
meaningless; without a set of known norms for the body — relating to age, sex, 
and medical history (or, in future, most likely genetic profile) - deviation from 
the norm is hard to assess. There must be a protocol for interpreting 
instrumental data. 
It was not until the mid-19th century that physicians began to make 
large-scale studies correlating temperature with disease states using 
thermometric measurements plotted over time (Porter, 1999, p.344). An 
influential early pioneer was Carl WunderUch, who published his The 
Temperature in Diseases in 1868, a book containing and commenting on data 
collected from almost 25,000 patients. This mass of information enabled 
Wunderlich to analyse the patterns of temperature change in 32 different 
diseases (p.345), allowing him to demonstrate the prognostic value of regularly-
made and -plotted temperature readings, and to show that 'certain temperature 
oscillations were signs of particular maladies' (ibid). It was this graphing of a 
patient's temperature over time that constituted another technology — data 
logging and managing - and in combination with the simplicity of 
thermometer reading, led to the creation of a set of principles relating 
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temperature variation to disease, and resulted in the increased use of anti-fever 
medications.^'' 
Once the thermometer was established in a practical protocol for the 
production of knowledge (the diagnosis or prognosis and the consequent 
recommendation of a specific treatment of drug), various claims and 
counterclaims on its reliability as an instrument were made. Debates focused 
on its numerical scale, its construction materials, and the site and suitability of 
manufacture - aU arguments thrashed out between interested parties and 
professional practitioners. 
Medical devices of this kind are untidy, vulnerable to inconsistency. 
And it is the users of machines - technicians, for example - who in most cases 
provide the final context, determining a course of action on the basis of the 
machine's findings. Conversely, the 'mechanical objectivity' of a scan or graph 
must eventually be supplemented by the 'structural' knowledge of norms, past 
findings, medical histories — in other words, how the examined body fits into 
the patterns of the world. 
Measurement language and intersubjectivity 
The adoption of techniques such as pulse counting came about partly 
as a response to a long history of knowledge-communication difficulties 
'''• Porter notes that "Initially somewhat controversial, thermometry established itself, 
reinforcing the notion that specific, objective and preferably graphic data were 
fundamental to clinical practice. In certain respects, pa(ho/o^ was being translated into 
recordings made by instruments^ {my emphasis){^otX.et, 1999, p345). 
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between physicians. For example, training the next generation of practitioners 
to recognise intricate differences between types of pulse was problematic. Until 
at least the 18th century, pulse-taking was a process of reading certain qualities 
of pulse rather than simply counting heartbeats. Galen wrote at considerable 
length on the difference between types of pulse, and to the modern reader his 
terminology seems excessively fanciful and metaphorical: pulses long and 
short, worming, antcrawUng, mouselike and gazeUing. AU this detail rested on 
the conviction that each pulse type could be felt by the carefuUy trained fingers 
of the physician and linked to a state in the body of the patient, leading to 
diagnosis (Kuriyama, 1999, p.61-70). It appears, however, that physicians lost 
patience with this hard-to-master and -communicate art. While the value of the 
pulse as a diagnostic tool went undisputed, Kuriyama (1999) offers several 
examples of physicians who criticised this overly subde and unreliable mode of 
diagnosis. The history of the pulse can be considered a history of a 
'nervousness about words' (p.70), and the move towards quantifying rather 
than qualifying the pulse was motivated by the perception that 'numbers suffer 
no semantic slack' (p.70). 
Numbers offer an apparent solution to some of the problems posed by 
Bacon's idols; numerals are considered in western metaphysics to have an 
existence independent of the mind - a prior, platonic stability. While words 
might vary in their relation and correspondence to 'the outside world', or shift 
meaning between speaker and listener, numbers are universals. That each 
individual's interpretation of words is to some degree idiosyncratic precludes 
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the reliable communication of knowledge, hindering teaching and scientific 
standardisation. An individual's expertise in interpreting the evidence of their 
senses no longer appears to count for as much by the 19th century as the 
ability of a group to reliably compare and communicate their observations. 
Measurements taken using standardised instruments held a number of 
attractions for medical practitioners and scientists. Not only could such 
measurements be consulted by several practitioners simultaneously, enabling a 
discussion of the contents and main features of the findings, they could also be 
compared with one another over time, to show the development and changes 
of disease within the organism. Eventually, these measurements could be 
collated as tables and atiases detailing forms of normal or abnormal structures 
or events — these might then be used to provide authoritative consensus on 
group scientific knowledge, making it available to other researchers. 
Somewhat later, towards the mid-19* century, scientists and 
physiologists such as Ettienne-Jules Marey began working with automatic 
recording devices, collecting and analysing records of movement and other 
physiological processes such as blood-flow or changes in blood pressure. 
Marey, who called his innovation 'the graphic method', was a trained medic 
whose interest in engineering led him to develop and improve a range of 
physiological instruments that could measure such things as pulse, respiration 
and gait in humans and animals. In particular, Marey adopted recording 
methods from the natural sciences, such as revolving cylinders and 
chronometers, which allowed his devices to generate very accurate graphical 
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records of physiological activity. Marey's project aimed to 'put aside the senses 
of the doctor, rather than "extend" them in the fashion of the stethoscope or 
laryngoscope and instead create a form of "direct writing", the "graphic 
method"' (Dagognet, 1992, p.39). 
Even before these forms of automatic recording were available, 
scientists put particular stock by the idea that objective measurements could be 
made if the correct form of disconnected attention were exercised. French 
physiologist Claude Bernard described the importance of objectivity, and the 
need for researchers to spUt scientific experimental duties between the work of 
the learned, hypothesising scientist (who sets up the experiment) and the 
uneducated observer, or instrument (who/which takes the readings objectively 
with 'passive senses', Daston, p.63). 
It was commonly understood that a graphical record of bodily data 
such as a sphygmograph, was one of a range of methods enabling nature to 
write itself, providing un-interpreted documents for the scrutiny of scientists, 
much like imaging technologies like photography ('nature's pencil) and x-rays. 
In addition to this immunity from human intervention, images made by a 
machine detailed that which was not usually available to human perception, for 
example in the case of Marey's innovations in photography, because it moved 
too quickly. 
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Summary 
During the 19th century there was an acceptance and increasing 
prevalence of instruments in the physician's arsenal. The stethoscope and 
opthalmoscope were two early sense-enhancing devices, and they allowed 
physicians to interrogate the patient's body direcdy rather than rely on the 
older method of interview, which needed the patient's compliance, veracity and 
articulacy to give the physician the information necessary to make a diagnosis. 
With the development of these instruments, physicians began to consider it 
possible to diagnose without patient consultation, the 'objective truth' of the 
body was considered to provide more accurate information than could be 
gathered by other means, such as patient report (Reiser, 1978). 
While earlier instruments with their sense-extending capabilities had a 
number of usefiil attributes - enabling the living body to be 'autopsied' (Reiser, 
1978) — they also picked up signs of disease (such as heart abnormalities or 
tuberculosis) prior to the onset of other symptoms, allowing medics to infer 
prognoses by tracking changes in the patient's state throughout the disease's 
course. These instruments also inspired trust and complicity in patients and 
their carers, as prognosis was now provided by a technological apparatus and 
expertise of reading and interpretation they lacked; physicians were lent an air 
of authority, adding 'credibility to their medical judgments' (Reiser, 1979, 
p.l20). 
Instruments of this type (such as the thermometer) naturally attracted 
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criticism — charges that they created too much work in terms of their 
management, that they required regular application by trained individuals, and 
that the large amount of graphical data they produced was time consuming and 
difficult to interpret. Physicians were also critical of the distraction these 
devices caused, which worked to the detriment of other forms of consultation 
with diagnostic and clinical value (Reiser, 1979, p. 120). 
The notion of a subjectivity/objectivity split can be traced in the few 
critical works that address the history of medical practice and the philosophical 
implications of the role of instrumentation. However, we might consider this a 
pseudo-problem, generated in part by the complicated nature of the term 
objectivity (as discussed in chapter 2) and by the governing nature of the mind-
body split, which in its different forms colours the way body and mind - and 
subject and object — are thought about. 
Because of the way in which physicians have adopted and appUed 
scientific methodologies in biomedical practice, the question of how 
experiencing subjects are dealt with within the conceptual structures of 
medicine have understandably become a point of concern for those working in 
disciplines (such as sociology and anthropology) that stress the humanistic 
aspects of medicine over the utilitarian and scientific. In some cases 
instruments have been implicated in these discussions, representing as they do 
a range of scientific principles that are often taken to link with objectivity, and 
therefore privilege the evidence constituted by, and maintenance of the 
material body, over the experiencing mind. However, if we, as the thesis does. 
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reject the notion that instruments a priori can interface with the body only, at 
the expense or neglect of the experiencing subject, then there is no reason to 
suppose that instrumentation technologies are problematic because of their 
ontological status as physical objects. Instead, the question relates to how 
instrumental phenomena measured are understood to be more or less bodily 
and more or less related to the embodiment of the subject. 
In order to make sense of this alternative view of instruments this 
chapter has discussed two related scholarly approaches to the analysis of 
emerging technologies, SCOT and ANT. Instruments like the thermometer 
can, if we examine their history in the right way, be seen to have not simply 
emerged in response to a pre-existing phenomena - that of heat - but to have 
taken a particular (and current but by no means fixed) form through a process 
of modification and dialogue. Not only the hardware which constitutes what 
we think of as a thermometer (which is a caricature of a device and likely vary 
depending on whether they are something you work with regularly, or 
remember from childhood) but also the protocols adopted by its users to make 
use of it, exist in variety of forms that they do because of the many different 
actors and actants which have an investment in the development of the 
technology. Within that process a further, and fundamental aspect of the 
practice of instrumental sensing thermometry has also been brought into a 
certain form of being, and modified by the interactions of the meanings of 
instruments and other ways of measuring, experiencing, and using that 
phenomena, that of temperature itself. This notion will be further developed in 
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the next chapter, which will look at the relevant philosophical literature that 
examines instruments as productive of phenomena such as temperature, rather 
than simply reveaUng of it. 
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Chapter 4. Instrumentation and Phenomena 
This chapter draws on Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Technology 
and Science Studies literature to explore some key discussions of 
instrumentation relevant to the concerns of the thesis. Through a brief 
genealogy of the relevant philosophy of instrumentation, the chapter shows a 
number of ways in that philosophers have attempted to define 
instrumentation; as perceptual devices: that enhance, or produce an objective 
view of reality; by its productions: marks, inscriptions, technical images and 
phenomena; or with reference to its material, mechanical and logical 
embodiment of the relationships it manifests between representations (marks, 
inscriptions and technical images) and phenomena (reality). 
While this review of approaches to describing instrumentation includes a 
number of useful ways in which instrumental technologies can be 
characterised, the main concern of the chapter is with a discussion of the wider 
context within which these understandings of instruments are interpreted; as 
producers of representations or Unks with reality. To this end, the discussion is 
primarily located around the discussion of scholars who have explored 
alternatives to the account of scientific instrumentation as a tool used to reveal, 
record, or mediate physical reality. 
The result is that the chapter introduces an understanding of 
instrumentation that is not posited on a division between knower and reaUty, 
as shown to be a problem generated by Kantian philosophical concerns in the 
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first two chapters of the thesis. Instead of instruments reveaUng a pre-existing 
reality, or contributing to the production of theories about that reaUty, in the 
following they are instead positioned as elements of practices that produce the 
real, an action that Karen Barad (2007) calls 'mattering'. 
While retaining the methods of describing instrumentation as mark 
making, and linking to phenomena, this chapter wiU show that these 
descriptions can be repositioned within a broader understanding of 
instrumentation as part of wider practices that work to produce, and construct 
reality in particular ways. Scholars Uke Barad who have explored some of the 
particular implications of this way of thinking about measviring instruments, in 
the particular case of scientific measuring instrumentation and body imaging 
technologies, offer a way to reference wider discussions of technology which 
reject the Kantian metaphysics which separates instrumentation from the 
phenomena it produces. 
The previous chapter presented an overview of the main movements in 
the critical literature that offer an insight into how factors influencing the 
development and form of technologies can be analysed. This history of the 
development of the thermometer, and the factors which shaped it, are 
evidence of the context dependent and constructed nature of measuring 
instruments. A question is posed by the understanding of technologies as 
determined by a mixture of factors; to what extent can factors which are not 
part of the physical world, for instance, those that are social, determine the 
final configuration of instrumental technologies, and the phenomena that they 
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sense? This question is one that has been rejected by the scholarship that has 
followed the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) and SCOT movements, 
and earlier ANT theory. As discussed in the previous chapter, Bruno Latour 
(1999; 2005) has singled out the particular idea of the social as highly 
problematic and critiqued the social sciences for its continued commitment to 
a dualistic framework. By rejecting an underlying dichotomy between two 
realms of nature and culture, the question above looses its potency as a 
potential problem. This chapter therefore serves to draw on the literature of 
instrumentation to show how these dualisms can be rejected in favour of an 
ontology in which the epistemological separation between knower and known, 
thing and representation, is no longer a given, but, as Barad argues, something 
produced by a particular instrumental configuration. 
This chapter therefore extends the previous discussion of the 
thermometer with particular reference to the argument that it offers regarding 
the way in which the phenomenon of temperature has been produced by the 
particular form, conventions, and ideas surrounding the thermometer as an 
instrument. This is simply the idea that the ability to sense temperature, and in 
fact the existence of temperature as a category, is reliant on the existence of the 
apparatus that measures it. This chapter fleshes out that argument, using 
examples of similar claims made in the literature; that the phenomena which 
are usually considered to be independent properties of matter, such as 
temperature, that are rendered perceptible by instruments, are arrived at 
through processes of negotiation between physical, technical, discursive and 
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social factors and are not pre-determined or pre-existing in 'Nature' as it would 
usually be understood. ^ 
To this end chapter 4 puts forward the claim that instrumental 
technologies produce phenomena through particular forms of interaction with 
the world. This claim is primarily defined by the way in which it recasts 
instrumental technologies as agents in the practice oiproducing ot framing the 
world rather than, as they are understood in the classical sense, to make what 
already exists perceptible to human senses. It does this in order clarify the 
relationship between instrumentation and phenomena that is applied to the 
discussion of the human body in the later parts of the thesis. 
As we saw in chapter 2, because of its development in, and a long 
association with scientific experiment, contemporary measuring 
instrumentation can be seen as an epistemological response to Francis Bacon's 
provocation: to construct devices and logical methods to aid and direct human 
beings in the acts of observation and record making. Until the last few decades, 
scholarship the Philosophy of Science and History of Science has tended (if at 
all) to depict instruments in a way that reflected this role as a solution to the 
epistemological problem of faulty or inadequate human perception. In this 
formulation, scientific instruments are considered only as technical devices 
invented to confirm scientific theories through experiment and demonstration, 
or devices through which the hidden aspects of the physical world might be 
accessed. In this view, instruments are tools to an end, and do not incorporate 
a value system or perceptual bias of their own. 
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With the invention of photography and other graphic methods of mark 
making, electrical registration and computerized data logging, scientific 
instruments have demonstrated increasing levels of sophistication in the 
mechanized process of transcribing nature directly onto a page or rendering it 
as an image, offering their users the appearance of mechanical objectivity. The 
discussion of the introduction of these aspects of instrumentation in medicine 
in Chapter 2 showed that the intention of gathering objective data using 
machines was a guiding concept for many users and inventors of instruments 
that measured the human body during the 19* century. However, the 
associations with a particular interpretation of the notion of objectivity - as 
referring to an authentic underlying reality - may preclude an understanding of 
the reciprocal interaction that instruments have with the world. 
This interaction is in part revealed by the constructionist literature of 
SCOT and ANT, which reminds us that instrumental technologies are 
'produced' by the interaction of forces that can be considered 'immaterial', 
with the more familiar problems of the inventor's laboratory and the 
entrepreneur's factory floor. What SCOT theory systematically reintroduced to 
the calculation and assessment of where technologies came from and the 
factors that determined them was the 'social' — whereby meaning and symbol 
might become factors that shaped technological form, both in its invention, 
manufacturing processes and diffusion, and interpretation by various 
constituencies of users. 
However, this notion of the 'social' a force, or collection of forces that 
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might have an influence on technological form is a concept later discarded as 
inherendy problematic by proponents of Actor-Network Theory (Latour, 
1999). For its critique, A N T retains the importance of the wide range of 
factors on the outcome of technological change, it attempts to maintain, a wide 
range of actors (human beings) alongside 'actants' (things) and variety of 
models from rhizomes to mangles^^ can and have been invoked to give a 
texture to this method of inclusive analysis^'^ 
This method of analysis has been applied to numerous kinds of 
technology, transport; bicycles, cars, engines, As was shown in Chapter 3, this 
way of thinking about technology is particularly relevant to a discussion of 
instrumentation because of the reciprocal effect on the material reality that a 
partial determiner of the possible forms that instruments might take. In its 
process of eventual (and only ever temporary) reification, the thermometer 
becomes a device that frames a reality in a particular way, making it perceptible 
in a particular way. Thus the thermometer can be said to produce temperature. 
''^ The 'mangle' is the model that Andrew Pickering (1995) uses to describe to give a 
sense of the complex 'dance of agency' that emerges in scientific practices, from the 
interplay of human, material and machinic agency. Here, in this "mangle of practice" 
the "contours of material and social agency are 'mangled' [...] emergendy transformed 
and deUnated in the dialectic of resistance and accommodation"(p.23). 
''^ The extent to which 'actants' can be considered to have an influence that is an 
integral function of their structure or action upon the world, to what extent they 
might be thought to exhibit agency has been hody debated, leading to some now 
infamous arguments between Gallon and Latour (who'support a notion of'nonhuman 
actors') and Collins and Yearly who critiqued their position a regressing from a strong 
program SSK position to one which repositioned material reality as a determining 
factor in science, rather than social factors. As Pickering's overview of the "Bath 
School' dispute picks out, CoUins and Yearly failed to respond to the radical rejection 
of the 'social' and 'material' as two dichotomous realms by ANT theorists like Gallon, 
Latour and Woolgar, who are no longer interested in the effects of one upon the 
other, but in the result of practices wluch produce the material (Pickering, 1992, p.21). 
172 
However, as this chapter wiU explore, this analysis can be extended to make a 
particular argument regarding what this production really means, an argument 
that is particularly relevant to how we might understand the interaction 
between instrumentation and the human body. 
As Latour (1993) reminds us, contemporary theorists may be more 
inclined to think of the material as a concept that has its roots in modernity, 
and as Barad argues, following in part the feminist theories of Donna Haraway 
(1991) and Judith Butler (1993), the materiality of the body that can be 
produced as an effect of certain practices^^ As the work surveyed in the 
following chapter suggests, instead of simply measviring and representing the 
forces found in nature, the use of instrumental measurement, particularly as 
part of experiments, can be seen an intervention on the world that actively 
engages in its description, as well influences its material configuration. 
The literature of instrumentation 
Instruments, apparatus, experiments and laboratories, have traditionally 
been considered peripheral to a philosophical understanding of the scientific 
project, which was to develop theories which could explain the inner workings 
of nature; technologies were a tool, or an epiphenomenon. In his Representing 
and Intervening (1983) Ian Hacking opens his chapter on experiment by 
observing that: 
'''' Butler's (1993) work develops the concept of gender zs performative in that it does 
not adhere to any pre-existing ontological category, but is produced through a range 
of practices and behaviours. 
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Philosophers of science constantly discuss theories and representation of 
reality, but say almost nothing about experiment, technology, or the use 
of knowledge to alter the world (Hacking, 1983, p.149). 
While the philosophy of Science as a field has existed for over 70 years, 
the philosophy of technology is a far younger discipline.^** Since the late 
1970's^' a number of sub-disciplines focussing on the study of science, often 
branches of Sociology and Philosophy, have developed. These sub-disciplines 
responded to the arguments of philosophers like Hacking and Ihde that the 
physical embodiments of science should no longer be overlooked, and are in 
fact central to a clear understanding of how the sciences operate (Ihde, 1979, 
p.xi). Laboratory technology was no longer considered to be an outcome made 
possible by scientific knowledge, or tools devised only for the demonstration 
of theoretical proof. Understanding scientific technologies, the way they were 
used, and their meaning, became crucial to a critical understanding of science 
(particularly the physical sciences). In fields such as science studies and 
sociology, the scientific laboratory became the site for an anthropological study 
''* In 1991 Don Ihde observed that the field (Philosophy of Technology) was "at the 
end of its first decade as an organised subdiscipline" (Ihde 1991, p.iv). 
''5 Prior to this period thinkers like Heidegger (2000) have drawn attention to the role 
of technology as a crucial phenomenon itself (rather than as a by-product of scientific 
knowledge). Heidegger's work has, and continues to have, a considerable influence on 
STS and philosophy of technology, particularly his tool thesis. This said, Heidegger's 
work and that of others in the STS phenomenology tradition such as Ihde, does not 
feature in any crucial in the argument maintained by this thesis, because of the 
emphasis of their work on an analysis of phenomenological understanding of 
scientific apparatus. While the phenomenological method has provided important 
ways to consider human interiority, it does not necessarily contribute to the alternative 
position with regards to an anti-representational model of instrumentation that the 
thesis aims to develop. This said, Don Ihde's specific philosophical contribution has 
influenced the research for this project (for example see Drayson, 2007). 
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of the processes by which knowledge of the laws of nature were arrived at.**" 
The new fields of Philosophy of Technology, Social Studies of Science 
and Science and Technology Studies*^ have tended to proceed from a 
philosophical background distinct from Philosophy of Science's heritage in 
analytic philosophy; as Ihde (1991) observes, Marxist, Phenomenological and 
Pragmatist traditions have all been far more influential in Philosophy of 
Technology (piv). This difference in background, often drawing on 
continental philosophical traditions rather that Anglo-American, has resulted in 
a different emphasis for philosophers of technology, and has given rise to the 
movements in Philosophy of Technology such as Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT) and Actor Network Theory (ANT) that were discussed in 
Chapter 3. The reading of technology and the general approach to 
technological artefacts as the outcomes of multiple and complex processes is 
deeply embedded in the understanding of technology that is held by this thesis 
and informs its interdisciplinary approach to understanding instrumentation 
and its possible relation to the human body. 
*•" The seminal book length study of this type was Latour and Woolgar's Laboratory 
Life (1979), which, even in its tide, made the somewhat provocative suggestion that 
'scientific fact' was a 'social construction', a position that the authors have since 
modified. 
*' One influence on this change was T.H. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific devolution, in 
which Kuhn called into question the way in which science was considered to be an 
incremental process of discovery and correction. Kuhn's analysis suggested that 
scientific history could be divided into epochs, where different 'paradigms' as Kuhn 
described them, acted as lenses though which scientists interpreted the results of their 
studies. Inspired by the need to understand and explain the processes by which these 
rupmres were produced, a new generation of historians and sociologists were 
emboldened by an understanding that the underlying assumptions of a scientific 
practice, the current 'paradigm' might be open to questioning. 
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It is important to note the somewhat complex role of terminology in the 
following discussion. When talking about instruments, it is necessary to do so 
with reference to the wider context of their use, as shown in the previous 
chapter's discussion of the thermometer. There is a particular reason why 
treatments of instrumentation as an abstraction are not to be found in these 
examples; instruments are always part of wider practices. Within the references 
that have been chosen to inform this account of instrumentation, the major 
focus of each is rarely instrumentation itself In Latour and Woolgar's (1979) 
work instruments are considered as actors within a sociological account of 
laboratory science. Hacking's (1993) analysis is based in the context of 
scientific experiment. In Vilem Flusser's Towards a Philosophy of Photography 
(2000) the focus of his writing is the camera 'apparatus'. What Flusser refers to 
as a 'deep analysis' of an instrument, cannot be maintained without concrete 
examples of the camera apparatus and its use to support his arguments. 
In talking about the kind of output, products of instrumental or 
laboratory apparatuses, a nvimber of terms are mobilized. Flusser (2000) uses 
the term 'technical image' (p.14) to refer to what Latour and Woolgar (1979; 
Latour, 1987) might describe as an 'inscription' (Latour and Woolgar, 1979, 
p.51) and Karen Barad (2007) as 'marks' (p.l76). Each refers to the output of 
instrumentation or experimental apparatus, and to the causal relations that they 
are taken to have with phenomena, each encouraging the relationship of 
measuring apparatus to world to mark to be re-examined. These terminologies 
are not identical or entirely commensurable, but they each serve the thesis to 
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provide a wider account, the details of which will be fixed in the following 
discussion. 
Instruments as embodied theory 
The classical dichotomy between scientific knowledge [episteme) and 
technological knowledge {techne) was grounded in the ontological 
distinction between their objects: scientific knowledge is about "things" 
that exist of necessity, things that are universal, eternal, ungenerated and 
imperishable: technological knowledge is about things that have their 
origin in their maker, "things" that are variable, generated and perishable 
(Boon, 2009, p.78). 
In the classical formulation, scientific reality and the technology that 
renders it knowable are fundamentally distinct. This apparent distinction leads 
to an epistemological question; how can technological devices, constructed and 
synthetic, generate true knowledge about the 'eternal' 'things' that are the 
objects of scientific knowledge? Instrumentation is constructed in order to 
make experiments that reveal underlying knowledge of the world, those 
'things' that are 'eternal' and 'ungenerated'. By focusing on the problem of the 
veracity of the representation of reality provided by instruments, an 
assumption about reality itself sUps in. This assumption is one that is inherent 
in classical physics, the notion that there is a fundamental difference between 
constructed scientific technologies, and the properties that they are intended to 
measvire, and that these things can be separated. 
Within this structure, the equipment of the laboratory maintains a role of 
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a 'techne' that is inherently separate from the 'things' that it might be used to 
investigate. An early critic of this notion of instruments as conceptually 
separable from the natural world that they are intended to aid in the 
investigation of was Gaston Bachelard*^ (1984), whose formulation of the 
instrument as 'reified theory' tuned this traditional relation between theory and 
experiment on its head. 
Gooday (2000, p.376) points out that a precursor to Bachelard's 'reified 
theory' is Pierre Duhem's description of instruments. Duhem, like Bachelard 
was a 'physicist-turned-plulosopher' (ibid.). He argued that the description of 
physical instrumentation could be exhausted in a theoretical, 'abstract and 
schematic representation which mathematical reasoning takes over' from the 
'concrete objects' from which instruments were composed. Duhem's reading 
of instrumentation as theory drew attention to the usually neglected role of 
instruments within scientific practices, however, it ignored the agency of 
instruments as independent physical objects; Duhem's account is ideaHst, 
instruments are placeholders for theoretical knowledge (p.377). 
In distinction, Bachelard's similar claim was a reversal of Duhem's; '[ . . .] 
instruments are nothing but theories materialized. The phenomena they 
produce bear the stamp of theory throughout' (Bachelard, 1984, p. 13) moved 
2^ Bachelard's psychoanalysis of the scientific mind was a provocation in its re-
examination of the minds of a group concerned with demonstration and maintenance 
of a supreme rationality. In performing an analysis he seemed to make the claim that 
something other than a distinct and mathematical rationality might be at work in the 
mind of a scientist, and in fact, might be of value to how we understand and produce 
scientific entities. Bachelard's ideas pre-date, and in fact, have a clear scholarly lineage 
to the social constructionist literature that we will introduce later in this chapter. 
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beyond the traditional dichotomizing of pure theory from physical objects, to 
produce a relation between these factors that was reciprocal. In his wider 
account of the tension between philosophical realism and rationalism in the 
scientific laboratory, Bachelard makes the practical work of scientists done 
with instruments themselves far more central to the formation of theory: 
Scientific observation... shows as it demonstrates.. .transcends the 
immediate... reconstructs first its own models and then reality. [...] 
Now phenomena must be selected, filtered, purified, shaped by 
instruments; indeed, it may well be the instruments that produce the 
phenomenon in the first place (Bachelard, 1984, p. 12). 
In considering instruments as the embodiment of theory, and suggesting 
that their role might be better understood as that oiproducers of phenomena, 
Bachelard's philosophy laid the ground for the work that informs the following 
discussion. This notion of instruments shaping, filtering and selecting, can lead 
to the claim that idea that scientific technologies are part, and a significant part, 
of the construction of scientific entities, the idea that without the intervention 
of technologies, certain phenomena would not exist, or at least not be tangible 
in the way in which we recognise them. 
Instruments as productive of phenomena 
As Ian Hacking argues in Representing and Intervening (1983), certain 
phenomena produced in laboratory settings, whist physical, are (arguably) 
never produced anywhere else in the physical universe and did not exist prior 
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to their creation by a particular arrangement of experimental apparatus. As an 
example Hacking describes the 'Hall effect', an electromagnetic phenomenon 
first created by Hall in 1879 as part of his explorations of electromagnetism 
(Hacking, 1983, pp.225-6). Another, more familiar example offered by Hacking 
is that of lasers, which whilst they are physical phenomena, are not naturally 
occurring, but now exist in ever increasing numbers. Lasers as devices, but also 
the phenomena produced by those devices, have been brought into being by 
the production of an apparatus (Hacking, 1983, pp.226-7). 
As Hacking explains, the idea that HaU 'created' his effect seems 
paradoxical, and while; 'The apparatus was man-made. The inventions were 
created. But, we tend to feel, the phenomena revealed in the laboratory are part 
of God's handiwork, waiting to be discovered.' (Hacking 1983, p.225) He 
suggests that this confusion is due to the way in which we tend to think about 
scientific theories and phenomena, the result of a 'theory-dominated 
philosophy' (Hacking 1983, p.225). Theoretical 'laws of nature', are maintained 
as distinct from the technological constructions or productions of human 
activities, the idea that they might be somehow a result of our actions is 
counter-intuitive. 
The discussion in this chapter wiU explore, following Hacking, an 
alternative to this dichotomy, the idea of phenomena as inseparable from the 
instrumental apparatus which creates them: '[...] the Hall effect does not exist 
outside of certain kinds of apparatus [...] The effect, at least in its pure state, 
can only be embodied by such devices.' (Hacking, 1983, p.226). This does not 
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deny that the phenomena produced in laboratories like Hall's are real, or that 
they are part of the natural world. However, it draws attention to the necessary 
complexity of understanding the relationship between phenomena and the 
instruments discussed this thesis, where phenomena cannot be thought of as 
essentially independent or prior to instrumentation. 
This chapter therefore aims to build upon the existing understanding of 
technologies as constructed, and analyses of the way in which technical 
descriptions of instrumental set-ups appear to offer a 'transduction' of 'nature' 
into legible inscriptions. It wiU also offer a critique of this view of instruments, 
based on its partial nature, in that it fails to sufficiently assess the role of 
instrumentation in the reconfiguration of the physical world. This 
reconfiguration or intervention has traditionally been the focal point of 
scientific experiment. The reason that this is important is that it makes a 
difference to how we consider instruments to interact with the world. This has 
an impact in later chapters, when the discussion turns to consider the concept 
of creativity in relation to instrumentation and bodies. Whilst not all practicing 
scientists, or users of instruments have a commitment to the notion of an 
underlying reaUty which remains physically unmodified by the interactions of 
instruments, there is a powerful distinction between the different 
epistemological standpoints offered by the various ways in which 
instrumentation, and more generally, experiments are considered. 
The following section of this chapter develops some general themes 
relating to instrumentation from the Uterature; the relationship between theory 
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and instruments; their physical embodiment; the concept of 'black boxing' and 
reification. It will then revisit the problem of the epistemological 
understanding of the way in which instruments operate as inscription devices 
or mark making devices and introduce the literature that describes how 
instruments produce marks that are related to phenomena from the work of 
Latour and Woolgar and Hacking. This notion of instrumental 'access to 
reality'- will be defined as the way in which an instrumental apparatus sets up a 
relation between physical reality and a marking (image or inscription). This is 
what Latour and Woolgar call 'inscription devices' (Latour and Woolgar, 1979, 
p.48). 
This notion of 'access to reaUty' describes the classical scientific view that 
scientific instrumentation gives privileged renderings of natural phenomena. 
The aim of the following is to give some sense of the nature of this relation, 
the way it is produced and maintained, enforced socially as well as logically, 
and most importandy, allows the discussion to move past the classical view of 
instruments making phenomena, to a discussion of the way in which these set-
ups can be argued to produce not just representations of a phenomenon — but 
the phenomenon itself. 
The second section will conduct a survey of the work of a number of 
philosophers of science whose work provides an account of instrumentation as 
productive of phenomena rather than revealing of a given world or reality. It 
will perform a close reading and reflection upon the work of key scholars who 
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have developed these ideas in their philosophical writings on science, Gaston 
Bachelard, Ian Hacking, Bruno Latour and Karen Barad. 
Inscription devices 
Latour and Woolgat adopted Bachelard's reversal of the traditional 
instrument-theory relationship in their ethnographic study of scientific 
laboratory practices, laboratory Life (1979). The study is based on Latour's 
observations made during his anthropological field-work in an immunobiology 
research facility and develops an account of the machinery of the laboratory as 
inscription devices. Through his study of the scientists he arrives at the idea of 
'inscription' as being the main activity of the laboratory. He teUs the following 
story; in recording**' the work of the scientists in the lab, he observes that the 
practices of the lab are particularly focused on and structured by writing; 
After several excursions into the bench space, it strikes our observer that 
its members are compulsive and almost manic writers [...] It seems that 
whenever technicians are not actually handling complicated pieces of 
apparatus, they are filling blank sheets with long Usts of figures; when 
they are not writing on pieces of paper, they spend considerable time 
writing numbers on the sides of tubes, or penciling large numbers on the 
fur of rats... The result of this strange mania for inscription is the 
proUferation of files, documents and dictionaries (Latour and Woolgar 
1979, p.48). 
Latour does point out that there are machines in the laboratory that do 
*' Latour and Woolgar point out that (naturally) some members of the laboratory were 
angry with his description of the laboratory as an "inscription device", and "scientists 
as readers and writers engaged in a form of "literary activity" (Latour and Woolgar, 
Laboratory Life, 1979, p.53). 
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not write, such as those which 'transform matter between one state and 
another', grinders, shakers, and centrifuges. However the 'operation of 
apparatus which provides some kind of written output' has a 'particular 
significance'. (Latour and Woolgar 1979, p.51) These written outputs, 
inscriptions, are the laboratory's main product and a primary focus for the 
researchers working there. According to these observations, in Science in Action 
(1987) Latour's description of instruments is formulated as a description of 
inscription devices: 
[...] an instrument (or inscription device) [is] any set-up, no matter 
what its size, nature and cost, that provides a visual display of any sort 
in a scientific text. This definition is simple enough to let us follow 
scientists' moves. For instance an optical telescope is an instrument, but 
so is an array of several radio-telescopes even if its constituents are 
separated by thousands of kilometers. The guinea pig ileum assay is an 
instrument even if it is small and cheap compared to an array of 
radiotelescopes or the Stanford linear accelerator. The definition is not 
provided by the cost nor by the sophistication but only by this 
characteristic: the set-up provides an inscription that is used as the final 
layer in a scientific text. An instrument, in this definition, is not every 
set-up which ends with a litde window that allows someone to take a 
reading. A thermometer, a watch, a Geiger counter, all provide readings 
but are not considered as instruments as long as these reading are not 
used as the final layer of technical papers [...] (Latour, 1987, p.68) 
(author's emphasis). 
Latour's use of inscription as the main concept about which to orient his 
definition is useful*'' because of the focus maintained on the results of 
**'* Latour's overemphasis on inscriptions as a device for explaining the whole of the 
laboratory, is somewhat limited. In his critique Hacking [1993] argues there is more 
going on when we use instrument, or in his account, when we do experiments, than 
inscription making. Latour and Woolgar themselves point out that not only does the 
account of laboratory work as 'literary' 'fail to distinguish [the scientists] from any 
other writers' (p.53) but also fails to make clear what they are writing about. 
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laboratory practices, rather than the material objects and machinery of the lab, 
or the particulars of their operation. The activities and intentions of those 
working in the laboratory are understood from a more pragmatic angle, in that 
numerous different methods, setups, and rationales might be combined within 
the laboratory practices in order to achieve the final goal of an inscription for 
publication. The reliance on inscription allows an account of instrumentation 
that avoids: 
[...] presuppositions about what the instrument is made of It can be a 
piece of hardware Uke a telescope, bit it can also be made of softer 
material. A statistical institution that employs hundreds of pollsters, 
sociologists and computer scientists gather all sorts of data on the 
economy is an instrument if it yields inscriptions [...] the whole 
institution is used as o«^  instrument**^ (Latour, 1987, p.68-69). 
Latour's definition is useful to us in some ways, but not in others. The 
intent of his definition of inscription devices is a particular one, motivated by 
and fixed around the resolution of his major research question regarding the 
social shaping of scientific facts. Defining instruments in terms of what they 
produce is a useful tactic to counter mechanistic (instrumental) descriptions of 
their interacting parts. Throughout his writings, following Bachelard, Latour 
consistendy refers to 'facts and machines' (1987) in the same breath, 
consistendy collapsing any apparent disparity between these two orders of 
85 He does also point out that whether or not a device counts as an instrument is 
historically contingent; "this definition of instrument is a relative one. It depends on 
time. Thermometers were instruments and very important ones in the eighteenth 
cenmry, so were Geiger counters between the First and Second World Wars. These 
devices provided crucial resources in papers of the time. But now they are only parts 
of larger set-ups [...]" (Latour 1987, p.68-69). 
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thing which might otherwise be held in an apparent dichotomy. 
Machines as windows on the world 
In Ijiboratory Life, Latour and Woolgar (1979) also describe the lengthy 
process of 'transformations' needed to produce a biochemical assay. Beginning 
with the taking of samples by syringe from laboratory rats, to the arrangement 
and processing of these materials in tubes, and their mixing with other liquids 
and refrigeration, tubes of samples 'undergo a radical transformation', they are 
placed in a piece of apparatus which produces a 'sheet of figures' (p.49) and 
the material in the tubes are then disposed of The data produced is then taken 
and input into computer system, alongside other data from similar 'assays' 
which then produces 'a data sheet [...] that was regarded as the important 
product of the operation. However, these sheets of figures are then merely 
filed alongside thousands of others like them in the library.' (p.50) This process 
continues when the technical staff use the data sheets to produce graphs using 
computer systems by technicians. The resulting graphs or charts, once 'neatly 
redrawn' might find their way into a paper published by the laboratory to stand 
as 'evidence' for the claims made within (p.50). 
In this account, individual instruments are distributed amongst an 
apparatus, and contingent on a variety of factors for their success and 
configuration. An instrument might be composed of appatendy non-material, 
but technical methodologies, or expand to inhabit the entirety of the 
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laboratory, just so long as it maintains its functional purpose: to 'transform 
pieces of matter into written documents ' (Latour, 1987, p.51). The graphed or 
tabular data produced by the laboratory is significantiy linked — 'regarded as 
having a direct relation' (p.51) to real things or phenomena. As is clear from 
his account of the bioassay (and supported by many other studies of laboratory 
practices which have followed Latour and Woolgar's) this relation between 
'pieces of matter' and 'written documents ' is in some cases maintained through 
very hard work on the part of the scientists; 
The whole series of transformations, between the rats from which 
samples are initially extracted and the curve which finally appears in 
publication, involves an enormous quantity of sophisticated apparatus. By 
contrast with the expense and bulk of this apparatus, the end product is 
no more than a curve, a diagram, or a table of figures written on a frail 
sheet of paper. It is this document, however, which is scrutinised by 
participants for its 'significance' and which is used as 'evidence' in part of 
an argument of article. Thus, the main upshot of the prolonged series of 
transformations which, as will become clear, is a crucial resource in the 
production of a 'substance'. (Latour and Woolgar, 1979, p.51) 
Latour and Woolgar's investigations regarding the workings of science in 
its production of facts, caU into question the veracity of this Unk, the tortvirous 
nature of the assemblage in question. Their project brings to the attention of 
those outside of science the extra work that does into the production of 
evidence that is often removed before pubUcation.*"" This 'sequence of 
*"> Joseph Dumit (2004) has made similar observations in his studies of neuroimaging, 
where the production of final images for publication is a complex process open to 
many interpretive variations on the part of those working with instruments, even 
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transformations', each a verified back box within a larger assemblage of 
methods and instruments, is what Unks a 'substance' (in the immunoassay) or 
phenomenon, to an inscription. These observations might appear dismissive, 
critical of scientific practices, but in fact (as Latour observes repeatedly) there 
are many checks and balances built into the practices of science (such as peer 
review, reproducibility) that mitigate any claims that Latour and Woolgar's 
work is an attack on the value of scientific practices. What their work does is 
expose is the complexity, and most importandy, the arbitrary, quotidian, social 
and meaningful aspects of scientific practice that are usually obscvired and 
hidden by the way in which 'facts' are presented for publication. 
Vilem Flusser's (1984) analysis of the camera apparatus contains an 
excellent description that returns the discussion to the notion of mechanical 
objectivity introduced in Chapter 2: 
Their meaning seems to impress itself automatically on their surfaces, as 
in fingerprints where the meaning (the finger) is the cause and the image 
(the print) is the effect. It seems as if the world signified in technical 
images is their cause, and as if they themselves were in the last link in a 
causal chain connecting them without interruption to their meaning: the 
world reflects sunlight and other forms of light which are then captured 
on sensitive surfaces - thanks to optical, chemical and mechanical 
processes — and the result is a technical image. It this seems as if they 
exist on the same level of reality as their meaning. It seems that what 
those highly developed and reified systems like MRI scanners, simultaneously, he 
observes that scientists are extremely conscious of the impact of the choices that they 
make on the possible reading of the documents they produce, and of the limitations 
of the studies that they undertake, as well as the sheer and huge effort and expense 
that is reqviired to produce MRI studies, the awareness of this massive amount of 
work and considerable concessions required to generate a results in these kind of 
experiments, which are entirely obstructed by the final images which are seen by the 
public. 
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one is seeing when looking at technical images are not symbols in need 
of deciphering, but symptoms of the world they mean, and that we can 
see this meaning through them, however indirecdy (Flusser, 1984, p.4).*^ 
Flusser's cautionary statement that describes how the camera apparatus 
serves to distract us from the artifice involved in the production of images, 
appearing 'automatically' as 'symptoms of the world they mean'. This 
"apparent non-symboUc, 'objective' character" of what he refers to as 
'technical images', which have the "observer looking at them as if they were 
not reaUy images, but a kind of window on the world" (ibid).** This mechanical 
objectivity is how we come to understand instruments as mechanisms that 
allow 'meaning [...] to impress itself automatically'. Instrumental images, which 
in reality represent multiple levels of mediation — appear to dissolve, remaining 
unremarked upon, and concealing - in Latour's words; the complexity of their 
production in an 'other world just beneath the text [...] invisible as long as 
there is no controversy' (Latour 1987, p.69), "the use of certain pieces of 
apparatus makes it easy to get the impression that substances direcdy provide 
their own 'signatures"' (Latour and Woolgar 1979, p.51). 
Hacking (1983) argues in favour of a realist interpretation of the 
*'' For Flusser, apparatus are different to machines, in that they are not intended to 
change the world, to 'pluck' 'objects' from nature, but to produce symbolical 
information. The 'work' of a camera is to 'produce symbols' — Flusser points out that 
this account can be generalized to other apparatus — by the execution of a program. 
The camera 'produces symbolical surfaces according to some prescription contained 
within it.' Each variation of this 'symbolical' surface is 'a realization of one of the 
virtualities contained in that program' (Flusser 1984, p.26). 
"•* An example of this discussed in Chapter 2, was that of the descriptions of body 
imaging technologies such as MRI, still often described by analogy to windows or 
photographs, or the ability to 'look inside' (Joyce, 2008). 
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perceptions made available through instruments. His position makes it possible 
to see that the theoretical descriptions of the working of instruments and their 
transformational descriptions have a more rhetorical than practical function. 
While he takes pains to estabUsh that the appearance of 'seeing' through a 
microscope is in fact iUusionary, and makes use of very different optical 
phenomena that usual sight, he claims that the causal relationships embodied 
by instrumental devices support a realist view of their representations. It is this 
causal relationship that validates a claim of 'seeing' with the microscope, as if it 
is a transparent tool: 
How far could one push the concept of seeing? Suppose I take an 
electronic paint brush and paint, on a television screen, an accurate 
picture (a) of a cell that I have previously studied, say, by using a 
digitized and reconstituted image (b). Even if I am only looking at a 
drawing of the cell. What is the difference? The important feature is that 
in (b) there is a direct interaction between a wave source, an object, and a 
series of physical events that end up in an image of the object... in case 
(b) we have a map of interactions between the specimen and the imaging 
radiation. If the map is a good one, the (b) is seeing with a microscope. 
(Hacking, 1983, p.207) 
This 'map of interactions' that produces an image of a specimen is 
recognizable as a 'good one' in Hacking's account because the same structures 
or set of 'two- or three-dimensional' relationships are discernable in the both 
the map and in the specimen. (p.208) In terms of scientific realism, he 
maintains that admitting that an entity is observable with a microscope does 
not necessarily lead to a position of realism, while a 'commitment to realism 
about microscopy' is a requirement of admitting that we 'see' with the 
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microscope. 
Instruments that cross modalities, for example, mechanical movement to 
electrical signals, are understood as 'transducing' one form of energy into 
another, evoking a causal relation between the AT?^?/phenomenon and its 
depiction or measurement. Some physiological sensing devices measure the 
'correlates' of the phenomena of interest; for example, a respiration sensor 
measures the extension of the chest cavity by means of an elastic band fastened 
around the chest. The measurement known as respiration is inferred from this 
other measurement. The biofeedback clinical literature offers a caution 
regarding how these correlated readings are understood, the phenomena 
measured is not the actua/tespkntion of the patient, only an instrumental 
reading which correlates with it. In the same way the expansion of mercury in a 
thermometer is a correlate with the local temperature of the body. While we 
are cautioned not to consider the instrumental measurement to be the same 
thing as the actual phenomenon it depicts, there is no question of the objective 
reality of the phenomenon, be it respiration or temperature. For some reason 
these things cannot be interfaced with direcdy, what is not suggested is that 
this might be because they are instrumental productions. 
An onto-epistemology of instrumentation 
The final section of this chapter wiU focus in more detail on Karen 
Barad's writing. Barad's work develops Neils Bohr's philosophy of 
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instrumentation. Bohr's development of a theoretical account of the 
relationship between scientific experiment using instrumentation, meaning and 
physical nature was a response to problems he and his colleagues encountered 
in the interpretation of quantum phenomena in experimental setups. Barad's 
reading of Bohr offers a particularly useful way in which to consider 
instrumentation. It offers an alternative to the traditional models of 
instrumental interactions with reaUty from the position of 'knowing subject' 
and 'world' to that of devices situated within and reconfiguring of, reality. 
This notion of instrumentation developed by Barad from the starting 
point of Bohr's work offers a rationalisation of the problem identified by 
Hacking above, where the difference between measurement or instrumental 
system is collapsed with the reaUty it is intended to represent. Barad describes 
Bohr's position thus: 
Bohr argues that classic physics seriously underestimates and 
undercounts the contribution that apparatuses make. Apparatuses are 
not mere instruments serving as a system of lenses that magnify and 
focus our attention on the object world, rather they are labourers that 
help constitute and are an integral part of the phenomena being 
investigated. Furthermore, apparatuses do not simply detect differences 
that are already in place; rather they contribute to the production and 
reconfiguring of difference [...] Accounting for apparatuses means 
attending to specific practices of differentiating and the marks on bodies 
they produce (Barad 2007, p.232). 
Bohr's formulation of the relationship between instrumentation and 
phenomena as analysed by Barad offers a more fuUy developed alternative to 
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the notion of instruments giving access to the real and producing a certain type 
of relation between knowing perceiver, world and instrviment. Barad calls this 
approach one of onto—epistem—ology 'the study of practices of knowing in 
being' (Barad, 2003, p.829). The focus is not on the way in which instruments 
produce inscriptions, representations of the world, but of their performative 
dimensions, which produce and enact difference in the world. 
Barad's work provides an alternative model of the instrument from that 
of an apparatus that produces representations, or translates the phenomena of 
the world into inscriptions that are legible for human understanding*^ (Barad, 
2003). This is because this model leaves the phenomena of the world 
untouched - treating them as self sufficient and fixed — and reduces the 
possible agency of instruments and anyone involved in the practices of 
instrument making, experimentation, measurement and representation. 
Philosophers and historians of science have analysed the way in which 
scientific practices represent the realities that they investigate. The thesis 
follows the scholarship what builds on these observations, arguing that 
representations have a material impact on the body's expression. Thorough the 
insight instrumental practices can be understood to produce phenomena, the 
question is: How could this idea be exploited in creative practices that use 
instrumentation to measure (or evoke particular phenomena of) the human 
body? 
"5 Barad (2003) offers an overview of the key responses in science studies to the 
understanding of science as a set of practices of representation rather than 
intervention. 
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In Meeting the Universe Halfway (2007) Barad develops a radical reaUst view, 
which incorporates an understanding of the way in which instrumental 
apparatus and produces phenomena, similar to the argument made by Hacking 
discussed at the very beginning of this chapter. Barad proposes a particular 
ontology of measurement, what she calls an onto-epistemologj, based on her 
reading of Neils Bohr's 'philosophy-physics'.'" Barad's work makes its own 
interpretation of Bohr's philosophy and offers an account of what she calls 
'agential realism' which attempts to explain the reciprocal nature of the 
relationship between meaning, measurement and phenomenon in scientific 
experiment. 
Indeterminacy 
As Barad explains, Bohr's philosophical investigations were precipitated 
by a set of thought experiments relating to measurement in the quantum 
science of the 1950s. During this time there emerged a set of problems in the 
50 I treat Barad's work as a primary text because of the amount of work that she does 
in order to make a reading of Bohr's ideas, and her contribution to their development 
and the description of agential realism makes them her own work, as she comments 
'my aim is not so much to provide a faithful representation of Bohr's philosophy-
physics as to propose a consistent frame work for thinking about important 
epistemological and ontological issues. In addressing these issues, it would be just as 
dishonest to attribute the full development of this framework to Bohr as it would be 
to deny that my thinking about Bohr's phQosophy-physics is everywhere present in 
my formulation'. (Barad, 2007, p.l23). While Barad's philosophy of instrumentation is 
the result of a long tern study of Bohr's work. She notes the continuing controversy 
over the reading of his work. In particular there are certain ontological implications of 
Bohr's ideas that are never fully spelled out which are part of her main focus. In order 
to extend his ideas, Barad takes the position that Bohr is a realist, but that a 
redefinition of the term is required to bring it in line with Bohr's position (ibid). 
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interpretation of a number of thought experiments in quantum physics.' ' 
Bohr's work attempted to explain the anomalous behaviour of matter on the 
quantum level, most particularly the fact that certain measurements covild not 
be appUed to the same particle, meaning that certain attributes of particles 
could not be measured at the same time as others. This was the same problem 
in quantum measurement that had inspired Heisenberg's description of the 
'uncertainty effect'. Heisenberg's resolution of the problem was epistemic, 
concluding that there was a limit to human knowledge of the attributes of a 
given particle, and that knowledge of two attributes of a given particle could 
not be known for reasons of a Umit to human knowledge, hence the famous 
formulation, 'the uncertainty principle'. 
As Barad explains, for Bohr the problem suggested a radically different 
interpretation, the concept of quantum indeterminacy. H e postulated this 
concept as caused by the relationship between scientific measurement systems 
and the physical particles they interacted with. Bohr's notion of indeterminacy 
'^  In one example of the 'Gedanken experiements' (thought experiments) which 
inspired Bohr's work, particles are sorted according to their 'spin' direction, depending 
on the 'axis' on which they are spinning, x, y or z. If there is a way to tell which 
particles were detected doing what, then the particles will continue to behave in the 
way in which they were measured. If there is no way of knowing what state the 
apparatus found them to be in, the particles maintain their quantum indeterminate 
settings, and are resorted differendy the next time the experiment is performed, even 
though they have aU passes through the exact same instrumental sorting system. 
Somehow, the mechanism of recording the state of a particle fixes it in that state. 
Various interpretations of this event have been suggested, that gravity (suggested by 
Penrose — according to Barad) or consciousness (Schrodinger thought that it was the 
conscious awareness of the taking of a certain state by particles that caused the 
coUapse) are two examples. It was a great centre of debate in the early field of 
quantum physics, which eventually settied on the 'Copenhagen interpretation' that 
Bohr was particularly instrumental in working towards. 
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suggested instead that the measurable parameters of a given particle were not 
decided until the measurement apparatus caused them to manifest as one 
definite form. Nature itself, prior to the intervention of measurement was 
indeterminate. Bohr's understanding of this effect was that there was 
something intrinsic about measurement that causes it to be more than simply 
'watching without touching'. For Bohr, an experiment cannot simply observe, 
because it categorises matter by causing it to adopt particular states. At a 
quantum level, that amounts to causing the indeterminacy of particles to 
collapse into 'mixtures of states' (p.346) (where all the different particles have 
taken on a specific state) rather than indeterminate states which are neither, 
both and aU. Based on this principle, Bohr's work radically re-examines the 
epistemology of scientific measurement, which is based on a model of a 
knowing subject and external and separated universe of physical phenomena 
that can be studied while remaining unaffected. 
Separating knower from phenomena 
Bohr's concept of quantum indeterminacy suggests a radical reappraisal 
of the way in which measuring apparatus are thought about philosophically, 
one that goes far beyond our understanding of them as human constructions, 
or as the products of mixed ontology networks. In an earUer paper Barad 
(1999) argues that ReaUst and Social Constructionist positions both fail to 
reassess the way in which we understand the relation of instrument and world 
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to be linked to a humanistic model of the knowing subject. She concludes with 
the suggestion that our bodily structure of brain behind eye has resulted in an 
intellectual heritage in which there is a tendency to, as Descartes did, separate 
inner knowing from separate outer realities, the thing that thinks and therefore 
'is' is separated and contained. 
Barad pushes her analysis further than Hacking's observation that 
experimental setups are constructed in order to evoke phenomena. She 
observes that: 
Bohr's insight concerning the intertwining of the conceptual and physical 
dimensions of measurement processes is central to his epistemological 
framework. The physical apparatus marks the conceptual subject-object 
distinction: the physical and conceptual apparatuses form a nondualistic 
whole. That is, descriptive concepts obtain their meaning by reference to 
a particular physical apparatus, which in turn marks the placement of a 
constructed cut between the object and the agencies of observation. For 
example, instruments with fixed parts are required to understand what 
we mean by the concept 'position'. However, any such apparatus 
necessarily excludes other concepts, such as 'momentum,' from having 
meaning during this set of measurements, since these other variables 
require an instrument with movable parts for their definition. Physical 
and conceptual constraints and exclusion are co-constitutive (Barad 2007 
p.l96). 
Barad's analysis of Bohr's work suggests that by understanding 
experimental apparatuses as physical-conceptual in a non-duaUstic sense, 
properties of objects are assigned to them through the process of 
measurement, not prior to it, the problem is resolved. He introduces a notion 
of what Barad calls 'quantum wholeness' (p.l96) that denies a distinction 
between the 'object and agencies of observation'. By applying this notion of 
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'wholeness', Bohr's philosophy reconceptualises the 'phenomenon' as 
something that is produced by scientific experimental setups; rather than 
something that is waiting in the world to be discovered and examined. 
[...] the measured quantities in a given experiment are not values of 
properties that belong to an observation independent object, not are they 
purely artifactual values created by the act of measurement (which would 
beUe any sensible meaning of the word 'measurement') [...] measured 
properties refer to phenomena, remembering that phenomena are 
physical-conceptual (material-discursive) intra-actions whose 
unambigious account requires [as Bohr described it] 'a description of all 
relevant features of the experimental arrangement' (Barad, 2007, p. 197). 
Phenomena are the products of 'cuts' that produce subject/object 
distinctions in the world. Measurement is the practice of 'objectifying', making 
objects. Bohr's notion of objectivity is also useful; the 'marks' made by 
phenomena are what are objective in his account. Marks are not the product of 
'inherent properties of independent objects' (p. 197) being made visible. But 
Bohr points out that 'permanent marks — such as a spot on a photographic 
plate, caused by the impact of an electron — left on the bodies which define the 
experimental conditions' are 'objective' (Bohr, 1963, cited in Barad, 2007, 
p. 197). As Barad points out, the result of this is that: 
[...] what is at issue is the very nature of causal relations: causal relations 
do not preexist but rather are intra-actively produced. What is a "cause" 
and what is an "effect" are intra-actively demarcated through the 
specific production of marks on bodies (Barad, p.236). 
The reason that Bohr considers these marks objective relates to the fact 
198 
that they can be read as an entirety, within the system that produced them. In 
addition to this, they are fixed and can be consulted in a collaborative and 
social context. An objective recording from an instrument or measurement is 
objective by its power to render and carry its meaning between social spaces 
(Barad, 2007, p. 199). 
Instead of accepting the chain of events model suggested by Latour, 
Barad gives us the opportunity to consider the working of instruments from a 
different position than the traditional scientific epistemological one of 
sceptically removed observer and privileged instrument. In Barad's 
formulation, experimental apparatus perform operations to produce/evoke 
meaningful difference. 
Summary 
This chapter has given an overview of scholarship that serves to clarify 
an understanding of instrumentation that provides a basis for the rest of the 
thesis. There are certain main aspects to the thesis' view of instruments. Latour 
and Woolgar's 'inscription devices' provides a notion of instrumentation that is 
not fixed by particular material systems, but instead by its function. At the 
same time it may also be comprised of larger setups or collaborations of 
instruments The chapter expanded on the discussion of mechanical objectivity 
begun in Chapter 2 by introducing Flusser and Latour and Woolgar's 
observations that instruments appear to offer a mechanism by which the world 
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can make authentic marks. This observation does not depart from Latour and 
Woolgar's notion of inscription. As Latour observes in his discussion of 
laboratory science — the ostensible use of instruments is to 'transform pieces of 
matter into written documents' (Latour and Woolgar, 1987, p.51). 
While Latour's suggestion is that inscriptions are the fundamental unit of 
instrumental production, this chapter went on to drawn attention to the way 
that instruments produce phenomena. The way in which they do this has been 
established by looking at Latour's descriptions of laboratory setups and 
Hacking's concept of a series of translations taking place in experimental 
setups. In addition and in development of these two perspectives, Barad's 
notion of instruments as performing 'cuts' between 'observer' and 'objects', 
making distinctions between entities that cannot be considered as fixed, 
enriches the discussion by suggesting that the relationship between instrument 
and reality can be radically readjusted, away from the classical position that 
informs a notion of mechanical objectivity, and links instruments to the real or 
authentic nature. 
Barad's argument, which builds on Bohr's philosophy, is that there is no 
difference between knowing and intervening. In order to measure something, a 
process of reification must take place in which the entity being measured must 
be made to exhibit one state or another, a state which was previously 
indeterminate ontologically, not just epistemically. Chapter 5 wiU return to 
Barad's work to examine her commentary regarding the implications of these 
ideas on how we might think about the technology of ultrasound scanning in 
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light of an idea of instruments as discursive-material objects; the a study of 
which can privilege or separate neither aspect, nor separate phenomena from 
device. 
The next chapter will set the scene for a discussion of Barad's 
philosophy which poses a number of the questions for the thesis, in particular, 
what is the limit of a constructivist position with regards to the 'mattering' of 
discourse? How do these discourses regarding instrumentation impact on an 
understanding of the body, and how different bodies and different body 
phenomena may be legitimately framed and produced. It does this by exploring 
the medical humanities treatment of the production of human body states in 
medical practices, and seeks to show how the notion of a performative and 
productive dimension is key to some recent analysis of the way in which bodies 
and disease phenomena are produced and managed. 
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Interlude; Materialising meaning 
As discussed in Chapter 4, instrumentation may be better considered as a 
technological form that produces phenomena. To materialise something is to 
make it tangible, to conjure it up from nothingness. When we use instruments, 
we do it in order to make visible things that we suppose to be already there. 
We measure attributes of matter that we suppose are underlying attributes of 
all matter, and all places in space, things that are pre-existing, waiting (given). 
This is the paradoxical nature of materialising that we find so difficult to deal 
with in our general thinking about using instruments, the fact that, as Barad 
points out, our measuring of things does not make them come into being in a 
strict sense, but it does make them 'matter' (p. 137) in that; 
Matter is neither fixed and given nor the mere end result of different 
processes. Matter is produced and productive, generated and generative. 
Matter is agentive, not a fixed essence or property of things. Matter is 
differentiating, and which differences come to matter, matter in the 
iterative production of different differences. Changing patterns of 
difference are neither pure cause nor pure effect; [...] spacetime is an 
enactment of differentness, a way of making/marking here and now 
(Barad, 2007, p.l37). 
Barad's description of matter and mattering as a conflation of 
terminologies stresses that action of instrumental measurement is inherently 
meaningful, in a way that is immanent to what is measured, while the matter 
itself does, of course, matter, the act of measurement involves the 'intra-action' 
of the act of measuring as a discursive practice, this producing the 
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phenomenon in question. Measurement is therefore a practice of imposing 
meaning upon the world, and it does this in a way that has a fundamental 
impact on the quality of the world. As we saw in Chapter 1, the human body, 
from a non-reductive materialist standpoint, is an embodied subject. 
Meaningful and symbolic behaviour are fundamental and pervasive aspects of 
the human body. 
The radiologist stands in front of a Ught box and demonstrates how he 
would read an x-ray of a patient who is suspected of having lung cancer. Back 
half-turned to his audience, silhouetted against the clean white light, he is a 
perfect image of the visual trope, the 'doc-at-box' (Saunders, 2008, pp.303-4) 
recognizable from stock photography and hospital literature. The film that 
hangs before him is an x-ray of a woman's torso, just discernable by the 
shadowed contours of her breasts. Her name has been erased; this film now 
serves as an example for teaching and demonstration. First, showing us how to 
read, he teUs us, a quick scan over with the eyes, to orient, check the position 
of the diaphragm, the size of the image. Is the body close enough to the film? 
Is it upright? He turns the film on its side, checking the ribs, turns it back, 
checking, fingertips moving over the film in a circular pattern, tapping out two 
semi-circles of points over the surface of the fUm, looking for spots over the 
white tissue of the lungs. He points out a few small patches of dark grey 
mottling, "there, there... another there", eyes scanning over, yes; the process 
of knowledge growing and connecting, the dots in the lungs leading to him 
looking back at the ribs for metastases; hunch hardening into certainty. "Yes," 
203 
he teUs us "something here and here". Through a process of trained looking, a 
diagnosis is arrived at. The final parts of the test are performed, routine checks, 
for other causes of concern, other risky looking organs, and masses, this a 
matter of form, since the clues would be there, a precaution against the 
obvious going un-noted.'^ 
Even as a demonstration enacted using the film of a patient who has 
likely long ago died of her illness, there is gravity to this moment, to the 
radiologist's performance. Not just the demonstration of the impressive nature 
of the technological feat, the powerful 'vision''^'' of the machine that allows us 
to look inside the living body. A potential has been verified. The possible 
diagnosis has become true. The extent to which it was true was dependant on 
how much is currentiy invested in the method of diagnosis by x-ray, more tests 
might be ordered, a CT scan to plot further x-rays images across the plane of 
the body, an MRI, or biopsy — a microcosm of dissection, to identify the 
possible intentions and behaviour of cells. 
Can we apply Barad's 'mattering' to our understanding of what happens 
in these tests? In what way is it possible to talk about the work of the 
radiologist, of the radiology suite as something that could 'materialise' a 
cancer? Surely it is pre-existing? If left unnoticed, untreated, a tumour would 
not fail to exist, but grow. But until the diagnosis is performed, the 'thing' that 
52 This text draws on an original description made by the author in notes from a 
workshop on Biomedical Imaging and Society at Warwick University in 2010. 
'^ 3 Joyce 2009 (pp.49-55) describes a number of 'tropes' relating to medical imaging in 
her study of MRI scanning, in particular the notion of the scanner as imaging 
technology that affords that ability to look inside the body. 
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is inside that patient's body is not one or another; it is a potentiality. How does 
the change in this knowledge possibly effect the existence of the thing itself, of 
the patient's body? Covild an artefact on one of these images make someone 
iU? There are cases of patients who have been killed by misdiagnosis, but that 
is part of the long tradition of iatrogenesis^'*, not necessarily something more 
mysterious. 
For aU its potency as a moment, the radiologist's diagnostic performance 
is part of a wider story, a set of evidence gathered by the clinician. It is one 
component in the alliance that demands action, treatment - the alliance that 
finally produces the 'bad news'. '^ In Barad's words it is the performance of a 
particular 'agential cut'. The 'cut' performed might at first glance be 
represented as a literal one, one which produces torso stripped down to bones 
and hard tissues, it shows - or claims to show - what is and what is not ' there' 
what is present within a given location, it recreates the ability to open the body, 
to look for a lesion in the time honoured tradition of pathological anatomy 
''• latrogenesis means roughly, caused by doctors — from the Latin. While the accidental 
killing of patients is well known in English history through some of the more lurid 
tales of British royalty being bled to death or poisoned by apparendy well meaning 
physicians. However, contemporary medicine has its fair share of medically caused 
death and sickness, and is a particular problem amongst the elderly. Whether through 
misdiagnosis, drug addictions or 'adverse reactions', malpractice, and 'psychological 
factors', such as patient expectations about the outcome of their illness (Slade, 1997, 
p.507). 
'5 At the same workshop Lui-Wen of Lancaster University brought up an interesting 
example of this from her sociological fieldwork in Korea with pregnant women and 
their perception of pre-natal screening using ultrasound scanning. One of her 
informants drew a lucky dip to symbolise her experience of ultrasound screening. Like 
Schrodinger's cat, until rendered visible, and then examined, prodded and probed, 
there is neither an unviable fetus or a tiny baby waving back, just a multiplicity of 
potentialities. 
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(Saunders, 2008; Joyce, 2009). But what it is cut from? In trimming down the 
object of study, the image stands in for the whole, the x-ray gives us an image 
of the material centre of the body, renders it transparent, but in order to make 
this legible, much else is removed, gases, liquids, head and legs, fatmly, voice, 
all but a ghost of flesh. Following Barad's train of thought, what the radiologist 
sees certainly comes to 'matter'; it matters to a number of people. It matters 
also within a complex of different things, some of which may refer to the same 
illness, while others do not, as described in Mol's analysis of atherosclerosis. 
Within the regime of treatments, drugs, radiation therapy, surgery, pain relief, 
all of these things may be left undecided as to the type of disease and 
prognosis, only further, different tests might setde this, perhaps a biopsy, or a 
blood test. The cancer is manifested by the x-ray as a series of marks on film 
and the trained eyes of an expert who reads them, but it is also present as many 
other forms, as a pain, or fatigue, weight loss, a drug regime, the shapes of cells 
on a slide, nagging fear, visits from health visitors and nurses, or a substance in 
the blood. The cancer is defined as a sequence of measurable objects, the 
objects that might confirm it count differently for whoever is counting, and 
why and what they need to know and what they need to do. Even within the 
hospital, it assumes different states at different sites, different weight at 
different times. There is not a patient looking out, feeling ill, and a doctor 
looking in, seeing a disease, there are many people constructing their own 
frames for an amorphous thing which comes to stand for many activities, 
many meanings. 
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Chapter 5. Constructing Bodies 
The previous chapter explored the relationship between instrumentation, 
experimental setups and phenomena in reference to philosophy that has 
considered the theme of instrumentation. This chapter makes use of examples 
of human body phenomena discussed in the medical humanities literature, to 
illustrate how human bodies can be understood as the products of medical 
practices. The theme of bodily production is explored with reference to 
disease, and the context of particular technologies, blood pressure 
measurement (as illustrated in a discussion of hypotension) and ultrasound 
scanning (with reference to foetal ultrasound). 
The chapter explores the relationship between medical practices and 
body phenomena, particvilarly those related to disease through a number of 
examples from the literature of the medical humanities. These examples 
caution us against the idea that certain bodily phenomena can be considered as 
eternal, wholly products of scientific discovery, or cultural forces. Instead, it 
presents the work of a number of scholars who examine the way in which 
different disease and body states are produced by the interrelated actions of 
political, discursive, biological and cultural dimensions. 
As we have already seen in the discussion of thermometer technologies 
in chapter 3, the production of a technical apparatus that allows physicians to 
make a particular measurement may encourage the conceptual development 
and reificarion of the particular type of illness, in the case of thermometry. 
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fever. In this account of the emergence of a relatively static and robust form of 
instrument, the phenomena that it manifests, and the diagnostic potential are 
co-constituting. Common to the following examples, included because they 
extend this idea, is a rejection of the idea that medical knowledge, and 
instrumental monitoring and imaging practices enable representations of an 
authentic body. Instead, an alternative vocabulary is described, drawing on the 
work of Anne Marie Mol (2002); one that is more concerned with bodies and 
their phenomena as enacted, produced and 'multiplied'. 
Embarking from a general overview of the scholarship that has taken as 
its object the historical and culturally relative nature of disease, the chapter will 
focus on some examples that illustrate the role taken by instrumental 
technologies in the production of bodily phenomena. By doing this it wiU show 
how certain theorists have conceptualised medical practices as active spaces in 
which instrumentation, meaning, and human action work to make manifest 
and comprehensible (as well as manage) the range of bodily phenomena that 
constitute disease. 
One of these texts is Anne Marie Mol's (2002) anthropological study of 
the disease atherosclerosis. In Mol's ethnography the actions of physicians, 
nurses, patients and administrators as well as their techniques of management, 
treatment and examination, in Mol's term 'enact' the disease (2002, pp.32-36). 
Mol chooses to use the metaphor of 'enaction' rather than 'construction' or 
'production' because these other terms give an impression that the activities of 
which she speaks create or generate the disease as an independent object. They 
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reference the 'workshop' rather than the more appropriate 'theatre'. The 
disease 'does not stand by itself (pp.31-2); it is, and is part of, the practices that 
frame its materiality and perform it, as she puts it, the way in which it is 'done'. 
In Mol's account, the disease is never separated from the practices that 
manifest it, the ways in which it is known, measured, acted upon. 
Another example is offered by the historical account of the emergence 
of a new disease category, clinical hypotension, enabled by the development of 
blood pressure measurement technology (Postel-Vinay, 1996). A further 
example of medical instrumentation will link back to the previous chapters 
discussion of Karen Barad's philosophy of measurement by introducing her 
analysis of fetal ultrasonography. 
Other examples in this chapter regard the changing nature of disease. 
Diseases sUde in and out of existence. In Lovers and Livers (2005), Jacklyn 
Duffin uses two main examples to demonstrate the historically relative nature 
of disease, the first of these is lovesickness, the second, hepatitis C. Duffin's 
contrast between an historical (and to the modern reader psychological) 
'illness' and a contemporary, in fact arguably 'new' disease, allows her reader to 
develop a broad concept of how diseases are produced by particular 
conditions. 
As Duffin describes, the case of lovesickness, the malaise is at first 
metaphorical - found in the metaphorical palette of the poets of the ancient 
world. However, much later, in the 18* century, lovesickness became a medical 
problem, for which specific treatments are prescribed and diagnostic criteria 
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are described, before a further transformation, where it becomes the concern 
of the new discipline of psychology. Hepatitis C is shown to be the product of 
a variety of political, and legal concerns as well as technical issues relating to 
diagnosis such as the problem of differentiating between hepatitis C and 
already defined categories of the virus, A and B. 
Duffin is not alone in arguing that it is simpUstic to think of diseases as 
things that are simply out there, waiting to be discovered. Bruno Latour's 
Pasteurisation of France (1993) deconstructs the famous myth of Louis Pasteur's 
discovery of the microbial agents of disease. Latour describes this history 
afresh, taking care that the microbes are considered as agents in their own 
discovery alongside the work of social health movements, medicine, and 
numerous other actors. All of these different collaborating forces and in 
Latour's terminology, 'alliances', (1987, p. 126, 138) were what made the 
concept of microbes meaningful and worth acting upon. As Latour notes, the 
microbes were 'not much at first', (1993a, p.261) but through the assemblage 
of a network of different groups and objects that supported the understanding 
of their particular operation, form, constitution and meaning they were reified, 
and methods and instruments for their management were developed and 
supported. 
Latour's account of the development of a science and medicine of 
disease causing microbes shows how it is possible to understand a network of 
determining factors as giving rise to a particular discourse or entity. Rather 
than claiming that an entity has been 'constructed' by a particular discourse. 
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social context, or set of research — or, in contrast, assuming that the entity itself 
has been discovered because of the distinct form it takes, it is possible to 
consider these entities as emergent forms of sense making, but sense making 
that is not only constituted by conceptual structures provided by language, but 
also material practices. These practices, as similarly described by Mol's concept 
of enaction show that this process is temporal and active, and as wiU be shown 
in the next few chapters, easily incorporates an account of instrumentation. 
Illness and disease 
A particular duality has long been a feature of the philosophical 
scholarship around health and medicine, the distinction between illness and 
disease (Canguilhem, 1989, p.91). While the notion of illness as the subjective 
counterpart to disease, its organic, bodily counterpart might make it appear to 
be the less fixed of the two. The idea that a disease can be considered 
separately from the circumstance of a particular illness that it causes, and 
therefore have an appearance of an independent existence from the body in 
which it is found is what gives diseases the appearance of having a soUd and 
inscrutable aspect. However, Duffin suggests that the way in which illness is 
experienced is far more abiding than the categories of disease that we think of 
as 'objective': 
In general, illnesses change slowly — the constancy of human suffering 
is a medical longue duree. The human organism has always suffered from 
pain, swelling, thirst, hunger, anorexia, sneezing, cough, trouble 
breathing, fainting, fever, sweating, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea. 
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bleeding, loss of movement or sensation, and sudden death — and 
various combinations of them (Duffin, 2005, pp.5-6). 
By invoking this difference between the constancy of ULness and disease, 
Duffin seems to suggest that there is a more timeless set of human body states, 
those that are experienced subjectively by the patient, as illness. However, it 
might be argued that distinction is not so simple, many phenomena of illness 
we can readily imagine which would be experienced as negative or unpleasant 
in a medical context, might, outside of this negative and threatening context, 
loose much of their negative meaning. Loss of movement or sensation is 
something that has been sought after or experienced as a side effect by people 
using narcotics, but would be frightening if it appeared without explanation. 
The hvmian organism does not necessarily suffer from these states: crucial to 
how they are experienced is the context, sometimes a diagnosis of the cause of 
that state and an awareness of what it means that influences how it is 
experienced and what its meaning is. 
We might argue that to vomit is to vomit - but culturally and historically 
relative arguments like Duffin's bring evidence to Ught that this is half the 
story. The meaning of vomiting changes with time and with context; there are 
as many ways to vomit as there are to say "hello". While there are ways to 
stimulate vomiting, this does not mean that the human body is a mechanical 
device with a single 'vomit function'. Also, in the same way bleeding; its 
meaning is dependant on context, and might have highly different valence 
depending on circvmistances, as it was used as a medical treatment for a 
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considerable period of history (Porter, 1999). 
Therefore it is worth mentioning that it is not just the case that more 
complex understandings of different diseases as discussed below change over 
time; concepts and experience of illness are also open to a recaUbration by their 
meaning. As apparendy prenoetic, conscious experience of bodily events, 
Duffin's symptoms are influenced by meanings that relate to them. 
This discussion, and possible objections, can be unpacked by referring to 
a psychological figure, Joseph Jastrow's duck-rabbit 'illusion'."^ The duck-rabbit 
'illusion', still used in psychological testing today as a 'reversible' or 'ambiguous 
figure' (Long & Toppino, 2004, p. 748), was originally used by Jastrow in order 
to illustrate the way in which the mind can switch attention between two 
interpretations of an image. In the context of the current discussion of bodily 
experience, it offers an analogy for the changing phenomenal experience of 
bodily symptoms. What ambiguous figures demonstrate is the interaction 
between 'sensory and cortical processes' in the perception of forms (ibid): 
showing that prior knowledge of a form is not phenomenally separable from 
the act of looking. The reading of the image is shaped within the act. It is 
impressive that there is an image at aU; the duck and the rabbit exist through 
collaboration between the marks on a page, and in the mind of the viewer. 
''' This figure is best known for its adoption from Jastrow by Ludwig Wittgenstein in 
Philosophical Investigations. Jastrow had originally discovered the image as an amusing 
cartoon in a German newspaper (Kihlstrom, J.F., 2010). The duck-rabbit and similar 
devices, such as the necker cube, wife/mother-in-law and vase/faces are all still a 
feature of contemporary psychological research. Long & Toppino (2004) provide a 
survey of the broad range of uses that these kind of ambiguous figures are put to — 
and provide a deeper analysis of the sometimes competing claims for what they mean. 
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Similarly, the meaning of a symptom might transform its experiential 
characteristics. 
Duffin suggests that it is possible to make a distinction between the 
aspects of iUness as they are experienced bodily, and disease, as a historically 
contingent set of structures for understanding and treating illness. However, 
this is shown to be complicated by an understanding of embodied perception, 
as it is demonstrated by the duck/rabbit illusion, as well as studies of medical 
experience from medical anthropology which show that the experience of 
iUness as a something that is, at its core, modified by and interrelated with 
cultural values, meaning, knowledge and prognosis." Instrumental devices that 
measure the state of the body enter into this interplay between knowledge, 
meaning and perception and provide structures for understanding experiencing 
bodies. 
Lovesickness 
Diseases can shift between organic and psychological status, and are 
dependent on the availability of possible treatment, demand for treatment, and 
other negotiations for their status as medical problems. Duffin (2005) charts 
the history of lovesickness. From ancient medicine to the present day, 
'''' Exemplary of this argument, and already discussed in the thesis are the work of 
Byron Good (1994) and Daniel Moerman (2002) on the relationship of knowledge 
and meaning to the experience, and in Moerman's work, the outcome, of disease. The 
possible integration of instruments into the phenomenal landscape of illness is 
speculated on further with reference to findings in health psychology in Drayson 
(2009). 
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physicians concerned with understanding lovesickness and dealing with it were 
often concerned with the establishment of criteria for what was or was not a 
bodily disease. By the majority, lovesickness was held to be the result of a 
problem of the soul, rather than an organic disease of the body, but one that 
was stiU accompanied by bodily symptoms, such as a racing pulse. However, as 
Duffin shows, lovesickness also was able at one point in history to become a 
diagnosable and problematic disease state. 
Lovesickness appeared as a popular metaphor in antiquity, from ancient 
Egyptian love poems, to the poetry of the Greeks and in BibUcal stories. 
(Duffin, 2005, pp.43-5) However, it was considered not to be the preserve of 
physicians. In the 2nd century AD, Galen was concerned to make clear that 
the pulse might be altered by strong emotion as well as by other physical 
imbalances in the body - such as the excess of 'black bile' that was responsible 
for melancholy. Galen argued that feeling the pulse made possible the 
diagnosis oi the. false disease of lovesickness. 
Later, in the 4th century AD, Oribasius of Pargamum (326-403) 
designated love as a particular and organic disease, with diagnostic criteria and 
treatments (Duffin, 2005, p.49). Love was, for Oribasius, unlike his 
predecessors, no longer a metaphor for an emotional state that might interfere 
with the diagnosis of'real' diseases (ibid). Later physicians considered love to 
be a cause of mental illnesses such as melancholy and mania (p.50). By 1724, 
medical writers like Sauvages (1706-67) were writing medical theses on the 
'diseases of love', of which there were a growing number, lovesickness, what 
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he called 'amorous melancholy', and other related mental disorders such as 
'nymphomania' and 'satyriasis' (p.60). Duffin notes that, during the 18th 
century, influential physicians Uke William Cullen (1712-90) and Carolus 
Linnaeus (1707-78) identified erotomania as a class of melancholy. However, 
the dangers of love to the body were not forgotten; Napoleon's personal 
physician described the circumstances where erotic love strikes at the heart of a 
lover in a 'paroxysm of passion', others Ukened the effects of love that of 
'malignant fever' (p.60). 
Duffin identifies the period of the 16th to the 19th centuries as one in 
which the concerns with isolating anatomical 'seats' for the source of various 
diseases within the body, rather than 'identifying diseases by their symptoms' 
eventually led to lovesickness and its related maladies, of which there were an 
increasing number, to be redefined as psychiatric illnesses. There was a need to 
identify an observable organic change that related to lovesickness in order for 
it to be considered as a medical condition. Maladies that could not be resolved 
to specific sites or legions in the body became the territory of psychiatrists 
(Duffin, 2005, p.60). 
The effect of a concern with anatomical identification was that 
lovesickness became once more a malady of the mind rather than body, 
equated with a number of psychological categories of perversity. Abnormal 
forms of infatuation are now thought to be forms of mental illness; in the 
present day the numerous psychological disorders can be considered as related 
to lovesickness as an illness (p.61). During the 20th century, many forms of 
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sexual behaviour remained which were identified as illnesses, one example is 
that of homosexuality, which historians have mapped as making a long 
transformation from its identification as sin, to crime, to illness (Duffin, 2006, 
p. 62; Hansen, 1992, p.l07). 
Duffin (2006) refers to Bert Hansen's (1992) historiography of the 
'discovery' of homosexuality by the medical profession in the 19* century. 
Hansen's argument extends past the idea that a pre-existing homosexuality was 
'medicaUsed' or 'morbidified' (Hansen, 1992, p. 107). Instead Hansen suggests 
that homosexuality itself was not discovered, but came about through an 
interaction between new urbanised Uving arrangements, social formations and 
new medical ideas and disciplines, such as neurology (p. 110). In addition to 
patients seeking advice about urges and behaviours with which they were 
uncomfortable, physicians were encouraged to develop diagnostic criteria and 
treatment methodologies. 
Hansen argues that homosexuality, as understood in the modern 
context as an attribute of a person, was not discovered, but that prior to this 
period, along with many other forms of socially 'abnormal' behaviour, such as 
steaUng, was an act, at times considered dirty, sinful or criminal, but not a state 
of mind, predisposition, or type of person. As he observes; 'People's thoughts 
today commonly proceed, for example, from the observation of a theft to the 
recognition of a thief, from a crime to a criminal, and from a homosexual act 
to a homosexual' (p. 107), but this way of thinking about people as inherentiy 
composed of their own acts and having certain predispositions is, as Hansen 
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reminds us, a modern one. In the period of history that his essay maps, pardy 
through collaborations between patients and their physicians (p.122), 'sexuality' 
comes to 'stand for something other than a person's sexual behaviour' (p. 109) 
and instead became related to procUvities and urges, cultures, identity and 
subjectivity, and ultimately, to a 'fundamental aspect of being' (p.121). Hansen 
cites evidence from physicians' notes of the time, which describe in detail the 
process of description and re-description through which a diagnostic category 
of 'the homosexual' emerged.'* Interactions of these types can be the 
interactions that contribute to the process of disease 'framing', not just as a 
form of identification of a pre-existing entity, but the way in which through a 
range of factors and processes, it gains shape. 
However, both lovesickness and homosexuality can be argued to be 
behavioural, psychologically based phenomena, and in a sense, self-reinforcing. 
As this thesis is primarily concerned with understanding how this argument 
might extend into the realm of the physiologically, and therefore instrumentally 
verifiable. T o this end the following discussions will extend to Duffin's second 
historical case study, hepatitis C, as well as the other examples; Clinical 
Hypotension, its relationship to blood pressure measurement and ultrasound 
imaging, and the assigning of gender specific pronouns to fetuses within the 
medical context 
'* Hansen also sets this process within the wider historical context of new forms of 
medical specialisation, particularly neurology, and increasing urbanisation, which made 
possible the formation of new social groups and sub-cultures in way previously 
unavailable. (Hansen, 1992, pp. 105-6). 
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Hepatitis C 
Duffin (2005) also develops an account of the emergence of the virus 
hepatitis C. Since ancient times a well-developed descriptive criterion for 
inflammatory liver diseases, 'hepatitis', has been in use (p.87). Through the 
establishment of a range of diagnostic methods 'hepatitis was teased out of a 
tangled morass of Uver ailments [and] with the advent of autopsy, microscopy, 
cell theory, and biochemistry' (p.88) the boundaries of the disease were drawn. 
The different forms of transmission that forms of hepatitis can take, such as 
infectious hepatitis A, compared with hepatitis B, which is transmitted by 
serum - bodily fluids, only added to the confusion about how best to 
understand the etiology of the disease (pp.89-90). 
One of the reasons that it became necessary to develop a criteria for 
hepatitis C was the increasing demand for blood transfusions needed to carry 
out new forms of surgery and methods by which screening of blood could be 
carried out were in greater demand (p.92). Even with the development of 
screening methods for serum infectious hepatitis B, a percentage of patients 
were still developing 'post-trans fusion' hepatitis (p. 96), meaning that there was 
another, unknown virus which was being passed on silentiy by blood donors 
that was causing 'unexplained chronic liver diseases' (p. 104). The ensuing 
search for hepatitis-C took 15 years, during which time it was referred to as 
'hepatitis non-A non-B' (p.97). 
Duffin's account draws attention to a recurring feature of medical 
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testing. One result of the ability to screen possible blood donors for viruses 
was that a 'whole host of symptomless people would be classed as dangerously 
iU' (ibid). The need to detect the disease-causing agent prior to the 
development of symptoms was not considered necessary until the demand for 
clean blood increased. Patients and surgeons demanded that blood products be 
available, even when their possibly iatrogenic properties were well known, the 
short-term benefits of using blood and blood products were a powerful 
motivation to continue taking these risks. However, the result was increasing 
pressure on hospitals from litigation brought by the victims of disease spread 
by transfusion, which had come under increased scrutiny as it had become 
associated with the transmission of AIDS via blood transfusion (p.102). 
The knowledge of the cause (some forms of hepatitis are more usually 
associated with transmission by blood transfusion; others by sex), the 
treatment and the prognosis were crucial in the long process of development 
of criteria for different forms of the virus. An awareness of the choices that 
had to be made through this process of negotiation which arrive at these 
criteria show us that they were not foregone conclusions, in a similar fashion 
to the animal or plant kingdom; the difference between different forms of the 
virus, between closely related forms of similar viruses, could be decided and 
influenced by a range of factors. To decide the most useful and pragmatic way 
in which to identify and deal with variants of disease, a lot of time and work 
and if not arbitrary, then contingent decisions in order to construct that disease 
as a particular detectable entity are required. 
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It might appear that a question emerges from Duffin and Latour's 
descriptions of the emergence of these phenomena, regarding whether entities 
such as 'hepatitis C existed before their diagnostic criteria were established. 
How can real things, material, independent phenomena such as hepatitis C be 
constructed? Is a comparison between that and something so medically trivial 
and antiquated as lovesickness valid? By introducing us to the many 
contentious debates relating to hepatitis C and the circumstances by which it 
emerged as a distinct disease, Duffin makes it clear that, Uke temperature and 
lovesickness, hepatitis C is a condition identified within a particular milieu and 
a particular set of practices. She does this by showing the history of the illness, 
which through a long process of negotiations, was defined in distinction to the 
other forms of the hepatitis virus. Central to this activity was the availability of 
diagnostic criteria and instrumental apparatus that made possible the 
identification of different types of the virus using laboratory techniques, which 
made it possible to test treatment forms on different variants. 
Instruments and technique in the production of disease 
The notion of medical construction in the medical humanities literature has its 
history in the work of scholars who were interested in the workings of what we 
might call medical perception. Early works that dealt with these issues in 
philosophy were Michel Foucault's Birth of the Clinic (2003) and Canguilhem's 
On the Normal and the Pathological {\9%9). Both raise questions about medical 
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epistemology and the conceptual problems and methods that have guided it. 
Ideas such as Foucault's 'cUnical gaze', and Canguilhem's discussion about how 
notions of health and normality are established, both reference the decreasing 
role of the patient's subjective testimony in medical assessment — which Reiser 
imports into the argument of his Medicine and the Reign of Technology (1978) (as 
discussed in chapter 3). Instruments are implicated in the developing medical 
approaches mapped in these histories, and in the move away from illnesses to 
diseases, from experience and subjective testimony to observations and 
measurable facts. 
The ^irth of the Clinic (Foucault, 2003) charts the history of the emergence 
of clinical medicine in 19* century France in order to explore the development 
of medical perception. In it, Foucault talks not about the patient as medicine's 
object, but states that the new cUnical medicine makes the patient, as a subject, 
the object of a scientific enquiry. In the new clinic, the patient is observed, 
catalogued and rationalised, aU the parts of his case are gathered together, 
allowing 'the patient's "bed" to become a field of scientific investigation and 
discourse' (2003, pp. xvi-xvii). In Foucault's description, cUnical medicine is 
not reductive in its use of instrumental measurement, rather than the blind 
cataloguing of figures and weights, he describes a more complex form of 
rationality, which 
[...] plunges into the marvellous density of perception, offering the grain 
of things as the first face of truth, with their colours, their spots, their 
hardness, their adherence. The breadth of the experiment seems to be 
identified with the domain of the careful gaze, and of an empirical 
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vigilance receptive only to the evidence of visible contents (Foucault, 
2003, p. xiv). 
In particular, Foucault stresses the relationship between the practices of 
'pathological anatomy' (2003, p. 2) the making of anatomical adases from 
dissections, and the mapping of visible signs of disease in the interiors of 
corpses with those observed in the previously Uving patient's body. In the new 
clinic, the space of disease is localised to the space of the body. 
He also offers another insight, when he discusses the evocation of the 
patient's symptoms, in particular the use of percussion (tapping the chest with 
fingers or a small hammer-Hke device and listening for changes in sound 
caused by variations in density, which modify the resonant properties of the 
chest) to find out the degree to which the chest is filled with liquid (p. 119). 
According to Foucault, the method by which this could be done, and the 
rationale between the perceived differences in sounds and the state of the 
interior of the body were known. However he states that the technique was 
ignored by 'cUnical medicine at the end of the eighteenth century' because it 
'made a sign appear artificially where there had been no symptom, and solicited 
a response when the disease itself did not speak: a clinic as expectant in its 
reading as in its therapeutics' (pp.199-200). This questioning was 'prompted' 
later by 'pathological anatomy' in which the 'idea of a technical artifice capable 
of surprising a lesion becomes once again a scientifically based idea' (p. 200). 
The reason for this was the growing awareness that causes of death could be 
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linked back to earlier, instrumentaUy detectable, states of the body. This 
concept is one that is central to the use of instrumentation in contemporary 
medicine. Charles Rosenberg (in Rose, 2007) has referred to the way in which 
technologies enter into the 'boundaries of disease' (p. 83) in this way as a form 
of 'technocreep' where 'diagnostic tools elicit signs that are taken as evidence 
of pathologies that were previously invisible' — generating what Rosenberg 
terms 'protodiseases' (p. 84). 
The emergence of clinical hypotension again fulfils the promise of the 
development of a medicine that uses instruments for early detection. The 
diagnostic practices of hypotensive medicine start work on the body before 
discomfort is felt, they intervene medically in order to prevent. Like hepatitis 
C, hypotension is asymptomatic, the product of Foucault's 'expectant' clinic 
(2003, p.199). When its symptoms are found, treatments, and health enhancing 
behaviours are prescribed in order to prevent the disease emerging. 
As Postel-Vinay's (1996) history informs us, hypotension was discovered 
because of the increase in the practice of taking blood pressure, it is itself not a 
disease in the traditional sense of the term, because it is not something that is 
suffered from. This move toward prevention however was not entirely 
motivated by humanitarian efforts, particularly in the case of the development 
of hypertension, an argument regarding its history and the relationship 
between the opportunities seen in the development of certain instruments, and 
the insurance industry, created the specific diagnostic category of hypotension. 
In the insurance industry, good forecasting results in financial gain, and 
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protection for the insurer, against unforeseen risks (Postel-Vinay, 1996). 
Concurrently, the pool of investment against future difficulty, the insurance 
premiums paid by subscribers, could be easily turned toward the end of 
assessing the risk more and more accurately, and supporting the further 
development of scientific techniques that could do that. It is this relationship 
between large populations, statistical prediction and the provision of medical 
treatment through the insurance industry that has contributed to the 
development of statistical medicine and epidemiology (ibid). 
Technological testing sidesteps the sufferer in the detection of disease, 
invoking a disparity with the Hippocratic oath, which describes the importance 
of alleviating suffering. An argument can be made in support of preventative 
medicine, but the ability to accurately predict the outcome of interventions (or 
lack of intervention) upon the body, and the possible development of disease 
are problematic. There are ethical considerations that are raised by these 
interventions. Both for patients on an individual scale, in the case of 
hypotension, but also with regards to larger populations, with technologies that 
detect contagious disease. One example that shows the discord between 
individual interests and preventative medicine is the debate about widespread 
voluntary HIV testing and treatment. Questions regarding the possible 
applications of advance testing of the possible benefits of a utilitarian approach 
to therapy show the complexity of the effects of developing and using these 
types of technologies.^' Other diagnostic methods have also presented 
' Recent debates about AIDs prevention strategies that might involve the 
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problematic aspects and become open to public debate, such as breast and 
cervical cancer screening.'"" AU of these diagnostic practices carry possible 
benefits as well as dangers. In particular the way in which embodied experience 
is modified for the patient, as the interpretation of bodily feeUngs as possible 
symptoms are related to possible illnesses, the risk of unnecessary or ultimately 
damaging treatments is another, as well as the tension between the interests of 
the wider population and the individual. 
Instrumentation producing bodies in hospital 
Anne Marie Mol (2002) has made an ethnographic study that explores 
prescription of drugs to those infected with HIV but not symptomatic reveal a tension 
between ethical concerns and epidemiological motives. Granich et al. (2009) have 
estimated that widespread testing and the prescription of antiviral drugs to carriers 
could dramatically lower the spread of the virus, as antiretroviral drug therapy (ART) 
can almost completely remove the risk of transmission. However, as they note, there 
is a deeper ethical problem with the prescription of drugs to individuals who would 
not benefit on an individual basis from the provision of anti-viral drugs until later, 
when their symptoms appear. One tactic could be to change the definition of disease 
symptoms, so that a lower rate of CD4+ cell count would be the standard at which it 
is beneficial to provide treatment with ART. This may become possible — researchers 
have been conducting a study that currently suggests that pre-symptomatic and earUer 
treatment with ART can prevent heart and kidney disease that seems to be caused by 
the previously unnoticed effects of the virus during its 'silent' phase within the body 
(Garnett & Baggaley, 2009). However, as Granich et al. note there is an inherent 
conflict of interest between individuals and society as a whole, between individualism 
and utilitarianism in the move towards widespread testing and early start drug 
treatments which carry the risk of 'over-testing, over-treatment, side-effects, 
resistance, and potentially reduced autonomy of the individual in their choices of care' 
as well as 'increased danger of stigma and coercion' for certain populations where 
these measures where treatment was resisted. 
"^0 Singleton (1998) has published an fascinating laboratory ethnography that delves 
into the experiences of workers whose job it is to examine test samples during cervical 
screening and the insecurity and ambiguity that faces those engaged with the 
examination of cell samples, and the way in which hospital and lab culmre work 
together to maintain a level of critical engagement with the technological testing 
apparatus that allows this ambiguity to remain a functional part of the diagnostic 
process. 
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how hospital practices, with different levels of consistency, maintain disease 
objects. This makes a useful example of how instrumental clinical practices 
might be understood as giving form to those objects in an ontological rather 
than epistemological sense. As Mol follows the disease atherosclerosis'"' 
through the different departments of her research site, 'Hospital Z', her 
account is concerned with the 'enaction' of the disease as an object by the 
various practitioners, such as nurses, physicians, radiographers, pathologists 
and patients whom she encounters. Because her focus on the activities that 
render the disease perceptible, Mol describes her ethnography as a 
'praxiography'. Her account explicitiy includes technology and bodies as they 
relate in practices of production and revealing, she stresses that hers is an 
ontological claim regarding the material reality immanent and necessary to 
these practices, a reaUty that is produced and shaped by these acts. Her account 
is concerned with practices and pragmatics. 
As we might expect, Mol's text details a number of instrumental and 
other forms of measurement - such as interview - used in Hospital Z by her 
informants, patients, nurses, surgeons, pathologists, and technician, to gather 
information that might aid the diagnosis and management of atherosclerosis 
which she finds spread throughout the hospital. This leads to a particular 
concern for her work; to understand how the range of knowledge types about 
1"' Atherosclerosis is form of arterial disease that involves the loss of 'lumen' (which 
gives arterial walls their flexibility) in the blood vessels causing loss of blood to the 
extremities (Mol, 2002, p. 54) The condition is sometimes referred to as 'hardening of 
the arteries' and can cause severe leg pain, preventing patients from walking more 
than short distances. Mol's description stresses the flexibility and shifting definitions 
of the disease between different sites of the hospital. 
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patient's bodies gathered by the instruments and practices that she finds are 
made commensurable with one another in a way that makes medical 
interventions possible. 
As Mol observes, in the sociology of medicine, the principle, which is 
often appUed to understanding the apprehension of the 'objects' of medicine, 
is to assume that practices which make those diseases and bodies perceptible 
are organised around a single disease object, a 'lesion' in the body of the 
patient. Diseases are either understood as lesion based, organic, and caused by 
particular entities, or systemic, relating to a disorder of a particular system of 
the body. The disease, as constructed by these practices, as a lesion within the 
body, is the underlying cause and focus of the multiplicity of techniques that 
are mobilised to detect, categorise, measure and manage these entities. 
A major contribution of Mol's 'praxiography' (p. 31) is that it leads her 
to reject this account of the lesion as a singular entity below the skin, viewed 
from the multiple positions of different interested parties, a 'crowd of silent 
faces' (p. 12) assembled around it, looking in upon a singular object. Instead, 
Mol finds that in the case of atherosclerosis, the practices that enact it do not 
all point in to one underlying thing, but to a disease that is a 'multipUcity': 
The manyfoldedness of objects enacted does imply their 
fragmentation, although atherosclerosis in the hospital comes in 
different versions these somehow hang together, a single patient tends 
to be supplied if not with a single disease then with a single treatment 
decision, cUnical findings, pressure measurements, social enquiries, 
duplex outcomes, and angiographic images, are all brought together in 
the patients file, together they support the conclusion to treat 
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invasively, or not to do so. This then is what I would Uke the term 
multiple to convey, that there is manyfoldedness but not pluralism, in 
the hospital the body singular is multiple many. The drawing together 
of the diversity of objects that go by a single name involves various 
modes of co-ordination (Mol, 2002, p. 84). 
Mol describes how, in Hospital Z, these multiple observations, all 
operating under the same name, are brought into line with one another as a 
cogent reality. The atherosclerosis that Mol describes is sometimes part of the 
patient's body, at others an element of day-to-day Hfe, sometimes a slice of 
material on a slide taken from an amputated limb (p.54). It is not even a 'body 
multiple' that Mol seems to describe, but a multiplicity of disease framings, the 
patient's body itself does not appear to require a framing that would maintain 
it. What Mol points out is that the disease of 'atherosclerosis' changes form 
depending on the way in which it is evoked or experienced. Sometimes it is a 
function, or loss of it, sometimes it is a feeling; other times it is a piece of 
matter. While these differing aspects could be simply seen as the same entity 
viewed from different points of view, Mol suggests that the different 
'enactments' or 'performances' of the disease produce multiple parallel but 
often very different disease phenomena which require considerable work in 
order for them to be brought into line and considered to as the results of a 
single cause. The praxiographic nature of her study demands that an 
ontologically specific adherence to actual phenomena and situations prevents 
the creation of generalisations of the disease, the 'praxiographic "is" not 
universal, it is local. It requires a special specification. In this ontological genre. 
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a sentence that tells what atherosclerosis is, is to be supplemented with another 
that shows where this is the case' (author's emphasis) (p.54). 
Mol's study signals something particular for the thesis' account of 
instrumentation, the question regarding this multiplicity of disease practices 
might be Where do the instruments begin?' When we look for instruments in 
Mol's account we find that technologies are not explicitly mentioned as a 
category of activity. Also, instrumental activities go far beyond physical 
devices, like machines and sensors, and describe data gathering techniques, 
charts, graphs, correlations, logical inferences and relationships between 
patient states, prognosis, treatment, the elements of a particular form of 
knowledge making, and a system for structuring, implementing, specifying and 
recording practices themselves. Instruments are spread throughout Hospital Z, 
as part of the practices and protocols that are used to fix different forms of 
disease in different places, to produce it as different entities at different sites. 
Ultrasound and constructing subjectivities 
One further example of an instrumental sensing apparatus, this time in 
the science studies literature, is ultrasound imaging. Drawing on the Uterature 
from the medical humanities and feminist scholarship, Barad explores her 
concept of 'mattering' previously referred to in Chapter 4 using the example of 
ultrasound, an 'apparatus of bodily production' (2007, p. 212). In her account 
of ultrasound scanning, the apparatus and the discursive structures that 
230 
surround the practice of using it, work together to make objects and life forms 
visible in very particular ways. Barad reminds us that the things that are 
revealed by the scanner may mean very different things, and can be treated in 
very different ways: 
[...] in spite of ultrasonography's origins in sonar technology developed 
in World War 1, ultrasonography is not an ideaU2ed surveillance 
technology, a merely physical instrument that provides a view of a fetus 
as it exists independendy of observational apparatuses. Rather, 
ultrasound technology designates specific material-discursive practices, 
constraining and enabling what is seen and produced in accordance with 
its iteratively intra-active technoscientific, medical, economic, political, 
biological, and cultural development as an ever-changing phenomenon 
[...] (Barad, 2007, pp.211-2). 
As Barad observes, the meaning and effect of fetal ultrasound 
technology vary hugely depending on context and circumstances. In China, the 
sexing of fetuses as female using ultrasound results in, around 60 percent of 
the time, abortion or killing at birth. These acts of identification and 
termination are 'economic practices' necessitated by political and financial 
imperatives (p. 194). In Western societies, where there is no explicit 
governmental control on population, the terminologies used to refer to fetuses 
are stiU varied according to their treatment and expectations regarding their 
future. Barad introduces Monica Casper's work on experimental fetal surgery, a 
domain where the fetus is constructed as 'a potential person with human 
qualities' (p.215). She refers to Casper's observation that foetal patients are 
'routinely referred to as "the kid," "die baby," and "he"' (ibid). These 'human' 
terms which reinforce the sense of 'personhood' attributed to the fetus are 
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supported by the use of ultrasound technology which make it possible to sex 
the fetus, but also to make portrait style images and real time videos at high 
resolution (ibid). The use of the scanner to produce visual images rather than 
(for example) sonifications, serve to further encourage the production of pre-
natal 'portraits'. 
Barad points out, that these kinds of images contribute to a situation in 
which the fetus takes the role of patient; the mother's body becomes the 
environment for the fetus's treatment: 
[...] technological improvements in foetal imaging, particularly material 
concerns such as increased resolution, magnification, and real-time 
images, encourage the patient and the practitioner to focus exclusively on 
the fetus, whose moving image fills the entire screen. Such material 
rearrangements both facilitate and are in part conditioned by political 
discourses insisting on the autonomy and subjectivity of the fetus. This 
has been accompanied by the objectification of the pregnant woman and 
the exclusion of her subjectivity. Material-discursive constraints and 
exclusions are inseparable- a fact we cannot afford to ignore (Barad, 
2007, pp.211-2). 
This is not to conclude that the effect of the instrument is so clearly 
calcvilated to give a sense of the fetus as person, or even potential person, but 
to observe the way in which instruments can come to support certain 
discursive structures and choices over others. The existing concern to look for 
evidence of the sex of the may be social, cultural or even medical imperatives. 
However, they all inform the way in which the technology is used, for example, 
the move towards 3D ultrasound scanning can be seen as less directed by 
diagnostic potential, and more for its popularity with patients in maternity 
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units. The ultrasound scanner collaborates with ideas and institutions to 
perform its meaning on the patient's body(ies). As Barad describes it, the fetus 
is produced and maintained as an entity with specific properties by the intra-
actions of various material-discursive practices: 
[...] the fetus is not a preexisting object of investigation with inherent 
properties. Rather, the fetus is nphenomenon that is constituted and 
reconstituted out of historically and culturally specific iterative intra-
actions of material-discursive apparatuses of bodily production. The 
fetus as a phenomenon 'includes' the apparatuses or phenomena out of 
which it is constituted: in particular, it includes the pregnant woman (her 
uterus, placenta, amniotic fluid, hormones, blood supply, nutrients, 
emotions, etc., as well as her 'surroundings' and her intra-actions with/in 
them) and much more. The object of investigation is constructed 
through the enactment of particular cuts and not others [...] It is not a 
given that the object is a self-contained, free-floating body located inside 
a technomaternal environment; rather, this identification is the result of 
particular historically and culturally specific intra-actions of material-
discursive apparatuses (Barad, 2007, p.217). 
As Barad points out, the results of understanding the effects of 
technologies such as ultrasound through agential realism as material-discursive 
practices rather than practices of representation, is that it 'makes clear the need 
for an ethics of responsibility and accountability not only for what we know, 
how we know, and what we do but, in part, for what exists' (p.243). 
Summary 
This chapter has discussed literature from the medical humanities and 
science studies literature that offers examples of the way in which the human 
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body is reframed by differing explanations of disease phenomena, made 
apparent through a variety and mixture of human and technological practices. 
Discussions of the formation of the disease categories of hepatitis C, 
lovesickness and hypotension demonstrate how diseases exist within a space 
between bodies and technologies. 
As these histories also show, the space and form of diseases within the 
context and cause of body or mind may wax and wane with the differing 
notions of what and how body and mind are constituted in differing historical 
settings. The variations in how lovesickness was considered are testament to 
the fact that there is no fixity to how these things might be considered, how 
they relate to one another. Hypotension and hepatitis both demonstrate that 
there are a range of imperatives and technologies that shape the appearance 
and framing of diseases. 
Mol's example of atherosclerosis in Hospital Z demonstrates the 
multiplicity of practices that materialise disease phenomena. If one is to 
understand the phenomena that are made apparent by instruments and 
practices as anything more complex than sets of numerical measures, then 
instruments must be understood, as they exist as integral parts of systems 
incorporating multiplicities of meanings and variance. Finally, Barad's 
commentary on foetal ultrasound offers a reading of relationships between 
bodies and instrumental practices, stressing the interrelated nature of settings, 
bodies and apparatus which gives rise to 'phenomena' such as the fetus. 
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Chapter 6. The Controlled Trial and the Imagination 
The following section describes the early history of the controlled trial, 
a form of instrumental testing used to assess the efficacy (usefulness) of new 
medicines and sometimes to prove the value of traditional ones. This example 
is useful as it demonstrates how instrumental logic can serve to delineate the 
effects of the imagination, separating them from bodily phenomena that can be 
understood to have biological causes. 
The controlled trial is familiar from the earlier parts of the thesis 
because of its relation to the 'meaning effect' described by Moerman (2002). 
Here it is discussed in more detail in its incarnation as part of the 'placebo 
response' as manifested by controlled testing used in clinical trials (most often 
used to assess medical treatments). What the discussion of controlled testing 
shows is the way in which the instrumental construction of the controlled trial 
does is produce the placebo effect as an anomaly, and denies a causal 
relationship between meaning and biology, one which is repaired by the 
arguments discussed in this thesis. The controlled test is a usefial example in 
this discussion as it shows a way in which the logical inferences of testing 
situations and apparatus creates a managed body from which the active and 
biological effects of knowledge, experience and meaning may be, and 
sometimes may need to be, subtracted. The controlled test may be neither 
cause, nor symptom, but simply a part of the development of medical science 
into a practice that neglects the role of meaning and symbol in human biology. 
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The effects of these aspects of human Ufe have been left to the less embodied 
practices of psychology and psychoanalysis, where instrumentation is not 
nearly so prevalent as in biomedicine, the realm of the extended and the fixed. 
The origin of the placebo effect 
In the account of instrumentation developed in Chapter 4 the range of 
different forms that constituted experimental set-ups and that could be 
considered to be instruments, (whatever their material form) was discussed. 
Latour and Woolgar's (1987) definition of inscription devices as forms of 
instrumentation need not necessarily include physical machinery (such as a 
'statistical institution' that gathers information using a range of methods). 
Central to the function of the instrument is its production of an inscription 
that is linked to the material world. The inscription comes to be the marking 
of, established by argument and demonstration, a state of the material world. 
Central to the this account of instrumentation is the understanding that, it is 
not a function of the material device that qualifies a system or activity as an 
instrument, but its arrangement as a rational structure, incorporating protocols 
and logical inferences regarding the causaUty and relatedness of phenomena. 
It is with this understanding of instrumentation in mind that the 
controlled trial is discussed in the following section of this chapter. What 
characteri2es the controlled trial is the particular protocol that it puts into 
practice in order to establish the relationship between changes in the hviman 
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body, and things that might affect it (chemicals, medicines, food or exercise for 
example). The controlled trial is discussed in the thesis because it has been 
identified by authors such as Moerman (2002) as a site of discord that creates a 
tension between how different forms of biological causality are understood. 
The controlled trial serves to exemplify how instrumental apparatus and 
protocols can be used to demonstrate, or obscure, organic aspects of human 
physiological function, the human body's responsiveness to meaning, the 
symbolic, and the subjective. Integral to the controlled trial, is the use of 
'placebo', deceptive dummy treatments. This has led to the coining of the term 
'placebo effect', used to refer to the healing experienced by trial subjects who 
are not treated, but respond instead to the meaningful circumstances of 
receiving the placebo.'''^ 
In controlled testing, the 'placebo effect' has come to stand, by 
synecdoche, for a range of unwanted bodily changes or experimental anomalies 
that may affect the outcome of a cUnical trial. It has been the subject of 
ongoing dispute between alternative medicine and allopathic medical 
practitioners since the 1950's about the effects of 'mind over body' and the 
relevance of this knowledge to medical practice. The alternative medical 
critique of allopathic medicine is that it takes an engineering (mechanical and 
chemical) approach to the discovery and treatment of disease and its 
interactions with the patient. In this discussion, the placebo response comes to 
102 PQJ. a good explanation and a number of examples of the placebo effect in action, 
see Moerman (2002). 
237 
signify what is denied by biomedicine. However, the 'placebo effect' is 
produced by the instrumental logic of the controlled trial (Frenkel, 2008). As 
the following description of the history of the controlled trial will show, the 
idea that biomedicine denies certain aspects of the human, subjective 
experience of treatment for example, is somewhat inaccurate. The alternative 
suggested by the following, as weU as the discussions of medical practices in 
chapter 5, is that it is not the purpose of instrumental protocols designed by 
biomedical science to separate these aspects of human response in order to 
deny them, to dismiss their objective reality. Instead it seems more Kkely that 
this is done because they are considered external to its realm of interest and 
intervention. 
Whatever the reason the placebo effect tends to be discarded by 
orthodox medical practice, the Unk between biology and meaning, and the way 
in which it has been worked upon in different ways using instruments, shows 
part of the history that explains the way in which the instrumental has become 
closely linked with the production of accounts of the human body where the 
meaningfiil and the symbolic and the material and biological are brought into 
contrast, or separated from one another. It is the argument of this section, and 
the next chapter, that tests Uke the controlled trial and other forms of 
instrumental apparatus can be used to either deny or to materialize aspects of 
the immanent interior of the subjective body, such as the imagination. 
It is the position of the thesis (as clarified in chapter 1) that an extended 
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materialist interpretation of the body as an embodied subject means that the 
human body might be less accvirately described as responding to meaning, and 
better thought of as itself inherently meanin^ul It is worth re-iterating Moerman's 
point that the meaning effect is no more paradoxical than 'smiling when we see 
a puppy' or 'crying at a sad movie' (2002). Smiles and tears are just as biological 
as the immune system and pain receptors: sadness and sentimentality are still as 
mysterious and difficult to see connecting to facial anatomy and tear ducts as 
to any other cellular or organ system. This interpretation means that there is no 
longer a need for a conduit or explanation for the process of meaning to have 
an effect on the body, such as classical conditioning or expectancy theory.'"^ 
1^5 The concept of classical conditioning best known through Ivan Pavlov's well-
known experiments with dogs conducted in the 1920's. The animals were trained to 
saUvate at the ring of a bell by repeatedly accompanying feeding time with the sound 
of the bell. B.F. Skinners experiments in the 1940's with rats similarly used food 
rewards to train them to undertake certain actions - for example, pressing levers. The 
behaviors that were instilled in these animals were explained by the theory of 
conditioning, which offered a basis for an early behaviourist account of learning. 
Many of the early descriptions of how conditioning related to learning and cognition 
in animals are now considered to have been overly simplistic, and the theory is now 
generally considered as an anachronism (Gregory, 1987, pp.159-6). In terms of the 
placebo effect, conditioned responses appear to offer some explanatory power in 
terms of the unconscious bodily responses to stimuli observed in some placebo 
responses. 
An account of the placebo response based on conditioning might reasonably propose 
that the act of taking a tablet or being given an injection could be related to a specific 
treatment outcome by repeated linked experiences of the phenomena, a patient might 
come to associate an injection of morphine with relief from pain. However this neat 
causality becomes less firm when other stimuH that elicit placebo effects are 
considered, could this simplistic account of conditioning explain the differing 
responses to differendy colored tablets, to knowledge about a condition, or 
expectation of the content or action of a specific treatment which have not been 
conditioned by previous experience. Evidence that patients do respond to this kind of 
information show that while conditioning might offer an explanation for some 
placebo effects, it is inadequate to account for many of the characteristics of the 
phenomenon. 
Contemporary Psychology has responded to this deficiency in classical conditioning to 
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Through an examination of the early history of controlled testing, its 
rationale, and structure, this section demonstrates how an instrumental system, 
and a philosophical conception of the human body, its subjectivity and its 
materiality relate to one another, and to an extent have become co-defining. 
This section will look at some key points in the history of the emergence of 
controlled testing as a methodology, with reference to its use in clinical trials of 
medicines, and at the way in which the instrumental 'cuts' invoked by the 
original interpretation of these trials appear have produced pervasive effects 
upon what is considered to be meaningful in medical practices. Controlled 
medical trials produce a circumstance in which the imaginary and symbolic 
power of objects and actions, and the experience of them, is intentionally 
suggest expectancy theory as an alternative account that can incorporate the cognitive 
aspects of patient responses to, and experiences of, treatment situations. Expectancy 
theory posits that conscious awareness, cognition and expectation regarding the 
outcomes and effects of treatments allow patients to put into action stimulus 
responses from existing conditioning. What expectancy theory lacks is a mechanism 
for its influence on physiology, as it incorporates a psychological cognitive model of 
the patient as they formulate an expectancy based not only on prior experience but on 
conscious knowledge. Classical conditioning avoids this problem by neglecting an 
account of the psychological realm, the relationship between stimulus and response 
are contained within a simplistic account of the organism, and therefore the 
conceptual and causal breach between psychological expectations and physiological 
actions is not dealt with. However, as Oron Frenkel asks; 'But how do you get from 
mental state to body?' (Frenkel, p.63). 
Frenkel's paper, The Phenomenology of the Placebo Effect (2008) recasts the placebo effect 
as a bodily affordance. He distinguishes his notion of affordance from Gibson's in 
that Gibson's affordance is a cognitively derived reading of an object's design, 
whereas Frenkel is more concerned with a phenomenological notion of an affordance 
being the meaning of a particular thing in a particular circumstance, far more 
contingent. Frenkel responds to this failure of psychological accounts to explain 
meaning response phenomena - conditioned responses cannot account for the full 
range of effects of the meaning response, and that expectancy - in that the patient 
expects a certain medical outcome from an intervention - simply invokes a conscious 
awareness of a situation, but does not provide any model of how this awareness might 
impact upon the patient's physiology. 
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divorced from the chemical or mechanical aspects of a treatment. This is done 
because the imaginary and symbolic count amongst a number of external 
aspects of receiving a treatment that might affect the biological outcome and 
physiological behaviour of the body. However, as will be discussed below, the 
way the results of these experiments have been interpreted shows how 
instrumental systems and apparatus can be used to connect or disconnect 
certain aspects of human subjectivity and experience from the objective, 
material and instrumental realms. 
Structure of the controlled trial 
In contemporary medical research, the 'gold standard' is 'evidence based' 
medicine, which aims to extensively test medicines and medical procedures 
prior to their adoption in clinical practice. Experimental verification as a 
practice arose in the new sciences of the late 18* and early nineteenth century 
Europe.'"'* In medicine this represented an intellectual move away from earlier 
traditions of more dogmatic physicianship (Harrison, 2004, p.48). 
Clinical trials are usually split into a number of groups or 'arms'. One is 
'"'' Until very recently in history, within the last century, the efficacy of a medical 
treatment was more often than not established through a process of reasoning, in line 
with particular models of the body's organisation and its tendencies. Many models 
which explained the body's structure and function, such as the Greek system of 
humeral medicine, which foregrounded a physiological and balance centered medical 
perspective, persisted - mainly unquestioned - in medicine from antiquity up to the 
16th Century (Porter, 1999). 
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the treatment group, who receive the new drug or other treatment being 
assessed (sometimes called the Verum' - Latin for true). Patients in the 
treatment group can be subdivided into further arms that receive different 
doses of the medicine being tested such as 10, 50 or lOOmg of a drug, or other 
variations of the treatment. Traditionally there is also a control arm, the 
members of which serve as a comparison. Subjects in this arm are given the 
existing medicine for a condition, or a placebo, such as inert tablets. In 
contemporary trials, the dispensing of the drugs and placebos is done 'bUnd', 
so that neither the doctors nor the patients are aware of who is being treated 
with what, or how much of it. Throughout the trial the patients are usually 
monitored and assessed and tested in various ways in order to assess the 
effects of the medicine. When the trial period is over, the study is 'unblinded' 
and the true details of the medications they are receiving are revealed. The aim 
of this process is to prevent bias in either the patients or medical staff assessing 
them. In some studies there is also an untreated group, referred to as a 'natural 
history' group, who receive no treatment at all.^ "^ Sometimes there is a marked 
difference between the outcomes for natural history (untreated) groups, and 
the placebo group, which is understood to be the result of a response in the 
patients to the experience of treatment, rather than the physical effects of their 
'°5 Moerman (2002) and others have pointed out that the effects of regular interaction 
with medical staff and assessments using technologies, for instance the reading of 
blood pressure done regularly, has been shown in trials to have the effect of lowering 
the blood pressure of patients. This effect would be similar to that of "white coat 
hypotension' — 'the phenomenon of having a high blood pressure when it is measured 
in the clinic by a physician but lower blood pressure levels in everyday life' (Steptoe, 
2007, p.700). 
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'inert' medicines. 
Mesmer. Lavoisier and Franklin 
In 1784 Louis XVI, responding to pressure from the Parisian medical 
community, ordered a Royal Commission to investigate the medical claims of 
Anton Mesmer. Mesmer's medical treatments were devised around the notion 
of a magnetic 'subtle fluid' that he and his disciples manipulated in the bodies 
of patients, according to his theories of 'animal magnetism'. Mesmer's 
interventions claimed to restore the natural balances of this magnetic flviid in 
the body. His treatments used a variety of methods, metallic instruments, baths 
of iron filings, magnetized iron rods and powdered glass which were rubbed 
upon or held onto the patient's bodies, and the exertion of animal magnetism 
over the patient was effected by trained practitioners, often by touching with 
the hands. Mesmerism become extremely popular in Paris in the five years 
after Mesmer arrived there in 1778. The authorities had refused him a Ucense 
to practice medicine when he first arrived, but to circumnavigate this Mesmer 
set up practice with one of his disciples, Charles Deslon, who was an already 
registered physician. His practice became exceedingly popular amongst Parisian 
society, both Mozart, and Mary Antoinette counted amongst his clientele 
(Herr, 2005, p.347). 
The Royal commission consisted of a team of eminent experimenters, 
most famously Benjamin Franklin, who at the time was serving as the 
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American Ambassador to the French King's court, and Antoine Lavoisier. 
Working together to establish their aims and method, the commission set up 
and embarked upon a number of experiments, with the cooperation of Charles 
Deslon. Many of these experiments used deceptive measures intended to 
confirm or disprove the existence of the force of 'animal magnetism' which 
Mesmer claimed was at the centre of his treatments. 
The Commission explained its logic in the document it produced on the 
results of the study, Keport of the Commissioners Charged by the King to Examine 
Animal Magnetism (Franklin, 1837); "Animal magnetism might well exist 
without being useful, but it cannot be useful if it doesn't exist". The intangible 
nature of animal magnetism initially meant that the team's attempts to establish 
or disprove its existence or not were thwarted, as they tried to measure its 
presence in the tools that Mesmer used. Both an electrometer and a compass 
found no electrical force or magnetic fields. They also attempted to sense the 
effects of animal magnetism themselves, by being subjected to the treatment, 
but felt nothing. It was Mesmer's response that the force could only be 
measured through its effects upon living organisms. 
Performing trials where the various possible causes of the effects of 
mesmerism were separated and independentiy tested, the commissioners 
concentrated its efforts on establishing the circumstances that generated 
episodes in the patients called 'crises'. These crises were characterised by 
fainting, fits and convulsions in patients during treatment, which had been 
explained by Mesmer's disciple Deslon to be signs of healing. Mesmer himself 
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refused to assist in the study, as he disagreed with the Commission over which 
effects of animal magnetisms would be useful to test. Mesmer suggested that 
the experimenter's attention should be focused upon the beneficial effects of 
the treatment - upon the cures effected by it, rather than its apparent 
immediate effects upon the patients which could be observed in during the 
treatment sessions. The commission disagreed, maintaining that cures by 
mesmerism could not be separated from other effects external to animal 
magnetism, such as the natural effects of healing. 
The hypothesis of the commission was that the crises might be either 
caused by the effects of Mesmer's subde fluid, or by psychological suggestion, 
and set out to differentiate the effects of these two in a series of 16 
experiments. In one, a blindfolded woman was told that she was being treated 
with mesmeric power by Deslon, and she accordingly demonstrated the effect 
of the crisis, they repeated this test without a blindfold, and she suffered 
another crisis when told that Deslon was treating her from outside of the 
room. In both cases, Deslon was not present at all. The crises were considered 
to have been caused by the power of suggestion of mesmeric treatment rather 
than actual mesmeric treatment. The Commissioners also performed 
experiments where subjects were magnetised by Deslon without their notice or 
given magnetised water as if it were normal water. In these cases the patients 
did not respond with crisis symptoms or other awareness that they were in 
contact with objects containing mesmeric power. 
Satisfied, the commissioners concluded that; 
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Crises are caused by suggestion, no t a shred of evidence exists for any 
fluid, and animal magnetism, as a physical force, must be firmly rejected. 
The practice of magnetization is the art of increasing the imagination by 
degrees (my emphasis) (Franklin, et al., 1785, p.349). 
There are a number of reasons that the commission's conclusion might 
have been premature,'"* however, what is important to consider here is the 
106 PQJ- example, while the suggestion was causing the crises in these experiments was 
logical, the failure of Deslon's attempts to magnetise subjects without their 
iaiowledge, and through magnetised materials could be attributed to his own 
shortcomings as a mesmerist. More importandy, as Mesmer appeared to have 
understood, the commission's interest in crises rather than cures only established that 
crises were caused by su^estion — not that the claimed cures effected by mesmerism 
were bogus. The commissioners conveniendy accepted the relationship that was 
suggested between crises and the effects of animal magnetism, but while this link 
might be reasonable to assume, it is not logically necessary for there to be a physical 
relationship between these phenomena. Mesmer may well have healed patients as well 
as having the showmanship to provoke an unrelated faint or fit. 
Equivalendy — as shown by psychological expectancy theory (which is often evoked 
in discussion of placebo phenomena) a tablet which regularly makes a patient vomit 
may well, if an inert version given, still cause them to vomit. The emetic qualities of 
the tablet however, may be entirely unrelated to its other medical properties. In the 
same way, crises could be a psychological side effect of the social simation and events 
where mesmeric treatment takes place. Mesmer's — and indeed Deslon's — treatments 
might well have still effected a beneficial healing change in the bodies of patients, 
perhaps one that was not immediately apparent. While the commission's experiments 
were certainly extremely damaging to Mesmer's claims, what they ultimately proved 
was not the non-existence of animal magnetism, as they claimed, but that crises were 
not caused only by the intentional actions of the mesmerists, but that the responses of 
the patients to the idea of treatment by mesmerism were crucial to the precipitation of 
these crises. Crises in themselves might only represent the wilUngness of the patient to 
be healed, and the responsiveness of the patient to the act of healing, the active desire 
of the patient in the process of healing, rather than the manipulation of the patient's 
body through the effect of a force which could be measured with a compass or 
electrometer. It is also illogical to conclude that the failure of the commissioners to 
measure Mesmer's magnetic power using these instruments signifies its non-existence, 
there are numerous phenomena which are considered objectively real, light for 
example, which cannot be sensed magnetically or electronically. What these attempts 
demonstrated was that Mesmer's description of his force as 'animal magnetism' was 
misleading as a choice of terminology, not that it was necessarily non existent. 
Understandably, regardless of these criticisms, a number of academics, 
including Stephen Jay Gould, have described the commission report as — in 
H.W.Herr's words, 'a key document in the history of human reason' (p.348). It may 
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commission's immediate denial of any possibility of the imagination being 
related to healing. In the contemporary view, dismissing the effects of the 
imagination might seem an established and orthodox way in which to respond. 
However, as the following sections of this chapter wiU show, at the time of the 
commission, other experimenters and physicians were still willing to consider, 
and impressed by the results of the power of the imagination as a healing force. 
The Tair triaF 
James Lind, physician and pioneer of naval medicine, was another 
innovator of controlled testing, what he referred to as a 'fair trial'. Lind's 
'Treatise on the Scurvy' (1753) reported the results of his test of a number of 
scurvy medicines and cures on his crew whilst at sea, which he undertook 
while working as a ship's physician. These tests included a trial in which sailors 
who were clearly suffering from scurvy were given one of a range of 
treatments, seawater, elixir vitriol, vinegar, oranges and lemons, and a mixture 
of nutmeg, garlic and horseradish (BoUet, 2004, p.178). While Lind's test is 
noteworthy as an important innovation in medical history, his attitude to the 
results of these tests and the mechanisms of cure that he discusses in his 
treatise on the work are worth noting. 
In his treatise, which is commented upon by Haygarth (1800), Lind 
have been groundbreaking for its time, but while the commission's report puts a good 
case against Mesmer's claims, it certainly fails to refute the healing effects of his 
practice, and operates on a number of assumptions, the first of which, it appears, that 
Mesmer was a charlatan. 
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relates Dr Van Der Mye's report from the siege of Breda in 1625, at the end of 
the Eighty Years War, where the Prince of Orange's garrison were reported to 
have been healed by; 
[...] three small phials of medicine [...] not enough for the recovery of 
two patients. It was pubUcly given out [...] The effect, however, of the 
delusion was really astonishing; for many were quickly and perfectly 
recovered. Such as had moved their limbs for a month before, were 
seen waking the streets sound, strait and whole. They boasted of their 
cure by the Prince's remedy [...] 
Lind continues; 
[...] an important lesson in physick is here to be leaned, viz. the 
wonderful and powerful influence of the passions of the mind upon 
the fate and disorders of the body. This is too often overlooked in the 
cure of diseases; many of which are sometimes attempted by the sole 
mechanical operation of drugs, without calling in to assistance the 
strong powers of imagination, or the concurring influences of the soul. 
Hence it is, that the same remedy wiU not always produce the like 
effect, even in the same person, when given by different hands (Lind, 
in Haygarth ; 1800, pp.28). 
Whilst Lind was notable for his innovations in the modern practice of 
medical testing, his comments about the 'powerful influence of the passions of 
the mind upon the fate and disorders of the body' (ibid) are worthy of note. 
Franklin, Lavoisier and the other commissioners not only used placebo (sham) 
treatments in their trial, but they also dismissed the alternate efficacy of these 
treatments by relating them to 'convulsions' but not to cvire. Their approach to 
the Mesmer trial was therefore not only an innovation in 'rationality' but was 
also notable for its dismissal of a force that was a commonplace aspect of 
medical treatments at the time. 
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Early modern physicians: empiricism and placebo 
Lind was by no means exceptional in his acceptance and interest in the 
role of the 'powers of the imagination' in healing. Many physicians who 
performed the early experiments to empirically test medicines knew and made 
use of the effects of placebo in their day-to-day medical practice. An early 
appearance of the term 'placebo'"^^ in a medical context is in the late 18th 
century, in 1772, in the transcripts of lectures made by a popular physician of 
die time, WiUiam CuUen (1710-1790) (Kerr, et al., 2007). Whilst die term is 
relatively modern, the practice to which it refers, of prescribing inert 
preparations, and the idea that those 'sham' medical interventions might have 
an effect upon the body via the passions, sympathies or imagination of the 
patient and so stimulate healing - or at least the illusion of it, are ideas which 
are centuries old. Family doctors have given placebo medicines such as bread 
or sugar piUs, coloured aspirin tablets (Porter, 1999, p.681), saUne injections or 
drops of coloured water as commonplace and harmless palliatives, to difficult 
patients, or when there was no better alternative available ; providing placebo 
was considered an entirely defendable and humanitarian act, in fact, to offer 
ones patients what comfort was available a duty of the paternalistic physician 
(Kaptchuck, 1998, p.l722). 
Historically, placebo treatments have been considered as a 'benevolent 
deception' to calm patients and offer those whose conditions were chronic. 
'^ '' The word placebo, from the Latin 'I shall please' dates from the 14th Century, and 
originally referred to hired funeral mourners, who the deceased's family members 
would pay to lament on their behalf (de Craen, A. J. M., et al., 1999, p.511). 
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untreatable, or whom needed the comfort of a deceptive treatment. The effect 
was often considered to be consistent with and attributable to the credulity of 
the patient (de Craen, A. J. M., et al., 1999, p.511). However, a number of early 
modern physicians who observed their patients and performed small scale 
empirical tests during the course of their clinical careers made observations of, 
commented on, and exploited the effects of mental phenomena on physiology 
in their clinical practice. The way in which they incorporated the notion of 
psychological assistance in medical treatment, as they observed what would 
nowadays be referred to as placebo effects or responses is an interesting 
mixture of attitudes that accepted these phenomena as simple common sense. 
CuUen developed and wrote about a treatment methodology that he 
called 'active placebo'. This treatment used pharmacologically active 
substances, such as mustard, which he judged would be conducive to an 
improvement in the patient's temperament — and suited to the particular 
malady from which they were suffering. While these treatments were not a 
proven treatment for the disease being treated, by their use, Ciollen aimed to 
generate what he called a 'sympathy' between himself and his patient. In this, 
his approach to medicine combined what we might now consider to be 
physiological and psychosomatic medical approaches. 
John Hunter (1728-1793), who has been referred to as the 'father of 
modern surgery' (Moore, 2005) was another innovator in the use of 'natural 
experiment' to assess the efficacy of many treatments of his day. His work is 
notable pardy because of the attention he paid to other aspects of healing 
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which are associated with placebo groups in controlled trials (not only the 
'meaning effect' noted by Moerman, [2002] which relates to symbol and 
knowledge) such as regression to the mean, and the natural tendencies of the 
body to heal unaided. 
Hunter began his investigations whilst a surgeon in the British army. 
Taking a sceptical attitude to received medical theory regarding the removal of 
bullets and shrapnel from wounds. He, unlike his contemporaries, left musket 
balls and other debris in place, and found that his patients recovered better 
than those who underwent surgery to remove them. This improved prognosis 
was most likely due to the soldiers whose wounds went untreated not being 
exposed to the risk of infection in the highly unsanitary environment of the 
batdefield hospital (Moore, 2009, pp.1-2). Throughout his later career as a 
private surgeon and lecturer on anatomy in London, Hunter continued to 
experiment on himself, his patients and animals, remaining a firm proponent 
of experiment and observation as the best route to reliable knowledge. 
In her commentary on his A Treatise on the Venereal Disease (1788) Wendy 
Moore (2009) has explored Hunter's views regarding the effects of a patients 
mental state upon illness (pp.1-2). At his private surgery Hunter specialised in 
the treatment of these iUnesses and undertook to test on his clientele the 
relative effectiveness of mercury and bread pills (a commonly prescribed sham 
medicine) as a treatment for gonorrhoea. His investigations showed that while 
mercury was known to cure syphilis, it was a no more effective treatment of 
gonorrhoea than bread piUs. He wrote that 'time alone will effect a cure' 
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(pp.69-70), concluding that the eventual resolution of the illness that 
sometimes appeared to be the result of patients taking mercury was in reaUty 
due to the disease running its natural course - the illness being self limiting in 
nature. He observed; 'The patients always got well, but some of them, I 
believe, not so soon as they would have done, had the artificial methods of 
cure been employed' (ibid). Moore points out that while the term placebo itself 
does not appear in Hunter's writings, 'he was well aware of what we now refer 
to as "placebo effects" - both in orthodox medicine and folklore alternatives' 
(Moore, 2009, p.3). Hunter's early modern commitment to an empirical 
approach, experimentally confirming the efficacy of treatments, led him not to 
dismiss, but to observe the effects of mind as a medically relevant factor in 
treatment, asserting that; 'as the state of the mind is thus capable of producing 
a disease, another state of it may effect a cure' (Lind, 1788, cited in Moore, 
2009, p.3). 
Haygarth's trial of metallic tractors 
Another notable test of a medical treatment that claimed to use 
mesmeric power was performed by John Haygarth in 1800. Haygarth's 
experiments were possibly the first to use a deceptive 'sham' placebo 
treatment. His trial was a test of a popular medical device known as 'Metallic 
Attractors' or 'tractors'. These tractors were an offshoot of Mesmer's medical 
claims, and had become popular in health spars at the end of the 18'"' century. 
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During the treatment, the metal-pronged implements were run along the skin 
of the patient as a treatment for a number of maladies, often arthritis and 
rheumatism. The beneficial effect of the tractors was held to be a form of 
mesmeric power or animal magnetism exerted by the metal components upon 
the body. 
Haygarth's comments on the results of his placebo treatments are 
revealing when compared with those made by the commission involving 
regarding the comparable trials they made to investigate Mesmer. In both 
studies the experimenters observed what would be considered, in a 
contemporary setting, to be a placebo effect, which they refer to as the effect 
of the imagination. The Commission dismissed these effects because they were 
only caused by the influence of the imagination. In contrast, Haygarth 
concludes that while the tractors themselves were a sham, the powerful effects 
of the imagination are clearly very important. 
Haygarth's findings led him to write and publish his pamphlet Of the 
Imagination, as a Cause and as a Cure of Disorders of the Body; Exemplified by Fictitious 
Tractors, and Epidemical Convulsions (1800). Here he reports the method he 
devised to test the tractors, which involved the substitution of a set of metal 
tractors for wooden replicas, a variety of different kinds were used. The sham 
tractors were used in the same fashion as the regular ones, by doctors at Bath 
Hospital and Bristol Infirmary to treat a number of patients, who were mostiy 
suffering from rheumatic illness, in Haygarth's words, 'a very obstinate and 
permanent disorder' (p.5). Despite this, in the first trials of the 'false Tractors', 
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three of the five patients treated were 'remarkably relieved'. The experiment 
was then recreated by a contemporary of Haygarth's, Richard Smith at Bristol 
Infirmary, first with pieces of wood carved to appear Uke the Perkins tractors, 
and then later - in Smith's words, 'to render the trials the more ridiculous' 
'pieces of bone', 'pencil' and a pair of'tobacco-pipes painted' (p. 13). In all 
cases that Smith reports, patients that are unable to Uft limbs, or suffering from 
considerable pain, aU are remarkably relieved by the applications of the 
fictitious Tractors. Haygarth's response to this is noteworthy; 
The facts above related are sufficient, and more than sufficient, to 
discredit the supposed virtues of metaUick Tractors; but the success of 
the trials, both at the Bath Hospital and Bristol Infirmary, brought 
more important objects into view. They prove to a degree which has 
never been suspected, what powerful Influence upon diseases is 
produced by mere Imagination [sic] (p. 16). 
Haygarth's reaction to the effect of these placebo devices is interesting 
in that he does not attempt to make a distinction between the observation of 
an improvement in the patient made by the medical professionals present and 
the patient's subjective imagined expenences of treatment and recovery. Instead, 
he points out the importance of bearing these kinds of effects in mind. 
Summary 
It was the confluence of a number of factors which meant that during 
the 17* and 18* centuries, changes in ideas about human physiology led to 
physicians spending more time developing material and mechanical 
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explanations for diseases. The acceptance of the theory of the circulation of 
the blood, and the popvilarity of approaches such as iatrochemistry (a school of 
medicine which aimed to explain disease and design treatments based on the 
developing techniques of analytical chemistry) led to a medical attitude which 
attempted to provide more detailed causal accounts of disease (Brockliss, 1978, 
p. 238). During this period, as scientific materialism became popular, the idea 
that the actions of what Haygarth called the 'imagination', might be of any 
value for medicine lost popularity, replaced by increasingly mechanistic 
explanations. It appears that as forces such as this imagination lost their 
physical, if somewhat amorphous nature, and no longer considered immaterial 
or pseudo-physical, a vocabulary for a common sense explanation of mental-
physiological interaction became increasingly unavailable. 
When enlightenment models of mechanistic causality came into fashion 
physicians still openly discussed and admitted to using placebos but they were 
mosdy understood as a sham rather than as any mechanism by which healing 
could be achieved. It was not until the 1950's that a concept of placebo 
comparable to the early modem ideas of CuUen, Hunter, Lind and Haygarth 
regarding the power of the imagination re-emerged.'"* 
These examples show the interdependence of the experimental 
conditions of any trial with the possibility of meaning or imagination having an 
effect on the body. Lavoisier — pioneer of the new mechanistic chemistry — 
'"^  Henry Beecher's influential paper The powerful placebo (1955) reintroduced the notion 
of a 'placebo effect' as a problem for medical testing. A fuller account of the effects of 
Beecher's work is included in appendix. 
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disavowed the imagination without a thought. Haygarth and Lind, in 
distinction, interpreted the results of similar trials as showing the importance 
of the imagination in medical treatment. CuUen and Hunter were also alert to 
its existence through their own clinical studies and made use of its effects in 
their medical practice. 
It is the position of the thesis, as explained in chapter 1, that immaterial 
phenomena such as culture, meaning and the symbolic are not only partially 
implicated as shaping factors in the formation of the biological body, but are 
ontologically inseparable from it. Meaning, experience and physiology are 
coextensive. The placebo effect appears to offer evidence of the relationship 
between meaning and biology in the arena of medicine, and also that its is not 
just longer term effects of cviltural norms for example, that shape human 
bodies, but that in the short term, the way in which human bodies manifest 
responses to meaning can be recorded. Commentators on the placebo effect 
like Moerman and Frenkel hold that the placebo effect is only a paradox if an 
unnecessary distinction between the materiality and the meaning are 
maintained. Combining an extended materialist ontology with the evidence 
from studies of the placebo effect, as well as Moerman's synthesis to define the 
meaning response, suggests an extra dimensionality to the way in which we 
conceptualise the relationship of objects and instruments to the body. 
Instrumental testing, if viewed in a certain way, allows the body to expand 
beyond the boundaries of those phenomena that we consider to be physical, it 
simultaneously endows the symbolic and the physical with new properties. 
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Chapter 7. Measuring meaning and the imagination 
This chapter extends the themes of chapter 6's discussion of the 
controlled test and the imagination. It introduces two further examples of 
instruments, the Ue detector test, which is performed using a polygraph 
machine, and the automatograph, a 19* century psychological instrument 
invented by a well known American psychologist named Joseph Jastrow. These 
examples, and the discussion that frames them, illustrate the argument of the 
thesis regarding the relationship between instrumentation and the body. The 
discussion will particularly seek to clarify the thesis' notion of the way in which 
instruments can be seen to materialise both interiors and exteriors of the 
human body, a subject that was introduced in the previous chapter's discussion 
of the way in which controlled trials produced or discarded the imagination as 
an active force within the body in early modem medical experiments. It does 
this in order to write the apparatus into the definition of bodily materiality and 
meaning that is established in chapter 1 and complete the work of the thesis. 
Certain aspects of instrumentation and its relation to the body are 
revealed by these two examples. In particular they stress the material-discursive 
nature of instruments and also their ability to materialise or frame phenomena 
by setting up certain experimental protocols. These examples exemplify and 
offer a further grounding for understanding instrumentation and its 
relationship with the human body established in chapters 4 and 5. In chapter 5, 
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a survey of some examples from the medical humanities literature offered an 
insight into way in which the sense of reality of the body wavers, bringing into 
being, or metamorphosing certain phenomena. In the production of various 
body phenomena, instruments are important agents. It is examples of how 
different kind of human phenomena can be created by instrumental practices 
outside of scientific settings that this chapter seeks to flirther elucidate, by 
turning to another field where instrumentation is applied to the body, 
jurisprudence. 
The rationale for using deception detection as an example is pardy that 
it offers another setting for understanding instruments in use, in addition to 
the medical applications already discussed in the earlier parts of the thesis. It is 
also, Hke the placebo effect, a site of controversy, it is considered by many as 
untrustworthy, unscientific, and overused (Andreassi, 2006, p.420). However, 
lie detector testing remains a major area of applied psychology, particularly in 
the United States, used in both law enforcement and personnel and security 
applications, privately and by federal government organisations"*'. Despite the 
prevalence of the practice, these tests are currendy inadmissible as evidence 
within the U.S. Supreme Court. Within academic psychology, lie-detection is 
the subject of controversy, with much scepticism towards its value. While a 
number of meta-analyses of studies investigating Ue-detection have been done, 
they take varying positions on its value (pp.420-3). 
'05 Andreassi (2006) notes the F.B.I, (Federal Beaureu of Investigations) C.I.A. 
(Central Intelligence Agency) and N.S.A (National Security Agency). 
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Lie-detection testing uses a number of protocols to create particular 
settings and inferential links between physiological response, knowledge and 
behaviour. Therefore, like the randomised controlled trial, it offers an insight 
into how different aspects of test subjects are included or excluded from 
different testing situations, how different phenomena, both subjective and 
objective, are framed and materialized by instrumental practices. The reading 
and interpretation of lie-detector tests is a skilled job, and a practice that 
attempts, rather boldly, to infer interior knowledge or emotion, from a 
complex of clues, not simply the output of the machine. In a sense, the 
protocols that surround the test provide a foil within which it is possible to 
explore the relationships with the subjective, meaningful, and the symbolic 
found in applications of instrumental measures of human bodies. 
Using the example of controlled testing, and the placebo effect that it 
produces, chapter 6 illustrated the way in which instrumental systems can be 
used to generate and exclude certain aspects of subjective, psychological reality 
from the causal and material reality of the body. A discussion of the history of 
placebos and the understanding of the role of meaning and imagination in 
medical treatment showed the interplay of scientific and epistemological 
agendas with the understanding of medical cause, legitimacy and ontological 
categories. 
The automatograph wiU serve as an example that links the history of 
experimental psychology with Ue detection, but will also serve to link in a 
speculative fashion, back to the denied history of the placebo effect, and the 
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role of the imagination as a force in the human body. Jastrow described it as a 
device that could be used to show 'the direction of the imagination' marked in 
the form of an inscription on smoked paper or cylinder. The second part of 
the chapter wiU discuss, in a somewhat provocative fashion, how Jastrow's 
words might be understood, in their reference to this technologically simple 
device, allowing very different interpretations to the intentions of its inventor 
based on an alternative ontology of the human body. The influence of 19* 
century scientific materialism on Jastrow's thought, as well as its more general 
effect on the development of experimental psychology, has been charted by 
historians of science (Daston, 1978). A discussion of the automatograph wiU 
give an opportunity to consider the continuing influence of decisions and ways 
of thinking about instruments that were established during this time. 
Using the examples of the Ue detector and the automatograph, this 
section will show that an onto-epistemological reading of instrumental 
apparatus allows the construction (production or evocation) of phenomena 
that are not tied to the concept of bodily materiality that is traditionally 
associated with instrumentation. All three of these examples are ones which are 
surrounded by certain levels of controversy, as we have already discussed the 
way in which certain instrumentation such as thermometers and blood 
pressure measurement are successfully incorporated into the production of 
phenomena which can be seen to be less than materially soUd, as well as 
historically contingent. In this section we wiU look at examples which are 
contested, as this chapter wiU argue, because they each appear to incorporate 
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some element of meaning within the phenomena which they demonstrate, and 
are therefore open to a critique regarding the material relation of the 
phenomenon they produce to the instrumentation that measures it. 
The lie detector test 
The following discussion of the use of the polygraph machine for Ue 
detection explores the role that can be taken by deception as part of, as well as 
the object of, an instrumental system. The Ue detector test is incongruous, in 
that it requires the use of deception in order to detect a deception. The term 
'Ue-detector test' refers to the test rather than the instrument used to perform 
it, the polygraph machine. The test itself may make use of a set of protocols 
and methods for variously establishing incriminating knowledge or gmlt on the 
part of the test subject. During a lie detector test, a polygraph machine is used 
to record the physiological responses of the test subject to various stimuU. 
Literally, 'polygraph' covild refer to any machine that records more that one 
type of data (Andreassi, 2006, p.421). The test is must be performed and 
assessed by a trained professional, because the test is not performed by the 
machine alone; some scholars, such as Bunn (2007) consider the 
instrumentation to serve littie more function than as a prop. 
Detecting deception has a long history. The ancient Chinese gave 
suspects rice powder to chew during questioning, as intense fear inhibits 
salivation, Hindu medical texts from 900 BC record that signs of falsehood 
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were the touching of hair or blushing (Andreassi, 2006, p.421). William 
Marston attempted the first instrumental detection of deception using 
measurement of systolic blood pressure in 1917 (Cappicio, 2008, p.688). His 
work attracted the attention of two poUce officers, Larson and Keeler, who 
between then developed the 'Keeler Polygraph', which measured electrodermal 
activity, blood pressure and respiration (Andreassi, 2006, p.421). These 
responses are all understood to correlate more generally to the state of the 
autonomic nervous system, involved with physiological excitement and fear, 
therefore understood to response to the stressful nature of lying. 
While automatic software systems are available which give a probability 
reading of the truthfulness of a subject's statements, tests are still hand scored, 
for reasons that wiU be discussed in the following (Cappicio, 2008 p.688). 
Tests are usually for one of two reasons, in criminal investigations, 'specific 
incident tests' may be used, which refer to specific events being investigated. 
'Screening procedures', in contrast are more speculative, and are used to gage 
the level of security risk posed by a potential employee for example, and 
attempt to ascertain the likelihood of test subjects harbouring undesirable 
inclinations, intentions or predispositions. There are a number of testing 
protocols that have been developed by the various law enforcement agencies 
and companies which use polygraph testing. In forensic investigations there are 
three prevalent methods for performing the test 'control question technique' 
(CQT), 'directed lie technique' (DLT) and 'guilty knowledge test' (GKT) 
(Cappicio, 2008). 
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Each of these testing protocols, incorporates hardware components as 
well as these methods by which the test is performed. The readings of the 
polygraph machine have no meaning until they are cross-referenced with the 
test protocol and the stimulus which the subject is being exposed to. In a sense 
deception testing has similarities with Randomised Controlled Trials and the 
way in which they are performed, there is a protocol, or a number of 
protocols, which are the set of actions that control the particular situation in 
which readings are taken from the subject. In the case of the lie detector test, 
the distinction between the appearance of a scientific experiment and the 
authority of the technological apparatus becomes a crucial part of the way in 
which the subject is prepared for the performance of the test. 
In the 'Guilty Knowledge Test', subjects are shown an array of items, or 
key words, one, or some of which are linked to the crime for which they are 
accused. If the physiological records show a response to one of these stimuli, 
the subject is considered to have shown that they recognise the object in 
question, (which may count against them if it is the item implicated in the 
crime). Other forms of test use control questions designed to eUcit a 'flat 
response', or to make records of the subject lying about other unconnected 
information before the start of the test. These preparations and setups make it 
clear that the way in which the test operates is much wider than the apparatus. 
The subject must be carefully prepared and managed within the context of the 
experiment. Countermeasures, such as 'wiggling a toe' or 'imagining being 
slapped' (Cappicio, p.697) can be used by (and taught to) subjects of these tests 
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in order to make their responses to incriminating stimuU appear normal. 
Lie detection as performance 
Bunn's paper Spectacular Science: The Ue Detector's Ambivalent Powers (2007) 
surveys 20th century news, magazine, movie and comic and television and 
advertisement references to the Ue detector. He argues that the representation 
of the lie detector as a formidable technology was instrumental to its 
functionality as an instrument. The instrument is; 
[...] on the one hand, an automatically functioning machine, the epitome of 
science. But on the other hand, the Ue detector is also a totemic object that 
requires the skiUs of a charismatic magician to work at aU (p.l56). 
In Bunn's formulation, through its recognition in popular culture and 
news media as an infaUible technology that produces a certain proof of gmlt or 
innocence, the Ue detector exerts a 'spectacular mode of governance'. As one 
news report he cites reports 'a Ue detector was carried into the death cell and 
scientists, lawyers, jailers and witnesses stared at tiny needles tracing on a 
slowly moving paper ribbon what proved to be mute lines of doom." (my 
emphasis) (Bunn 2007, p. 156) Here we see described the tracings of nature 
marking out, what must be, to the trained eye of the Professor performing the 
test, incriminating evidence against the convict. This description, and the 
machine it describes, is without quaUfication, the machine does not speak, 
there is no discourse between the test subject and the instrument, which as a 
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'mute' witness, draws out inscrutable tracings what is nothing less than 'doom'. 
However, as Bunn puts it the 'Ue detector had an air of menace about i t - and 
deliberately so', he, Uke contemporary supporters of the lie detector test, 
suggests that the test might be more accurately considered as a form of torture 
(p. 161). Hugo Munsterberg (whose early experiments with the physiology of 
deception were picked up by Marston) was supportive of the use of the 
machine as an alternative to the 'third degree' (pp.160-1) the practice of 
torturing suspects until they confessed. The polygraph was seen as a welcome 
non-violent alternative. 
As Bunn notes, this inbuilt threat, and the way in which it was supported 
by the theatrical nature of the test is central to understanding why Leonard 
Keeler, who pioneered the use of the polygraph in detecting hidden 
physiological responses that might signal guilt, would have suggested that those 
performing tests with the machine should prepare subjects by giving them a 
short talk at the outset that assured them that the machine was 'quite safe'. 
This kind of talk can be seen to operate in a number of ways, to prepare the 
authority of the test giver, to introduce the — if not already sensed - concept of 
the machine as a possible source of danger. Being told that something is safe 
references the notion that safety might, or might have in other circumstances 
been an issue, even ii thztparticular va&chmc is now considered safe (this is 
similar to the way that a nurse might say 'don't worry this won't hurt a bit' is a 
preparation for a painful procedure). In addition to this preamble about safety, 
assurances about the accuracy of the machine would also be made. This system 
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of codified practices and recommendations regarding the way in which the 
tests were carried out are testimony to the theatrical nature of the procedure. 
Its being likened to the third degree also shows how the machine was 
considered most useful for its ability to extract confessions without letting 
blood, as subjects became more and more convinced that their guilt was being 
laid bare by the device, their fear and agitation would eventually lead to them 
voluntarily admitting their gmlt. Bunn's argument is that while the symbolic 
function of the test is central to its usefulness, this was because its function is 
that of torture — forced telling - rather than as a method for 'reading'; the lie 
detector test is sham science. 
However, there is no reason to suppose that the subject of the test, as 
well as the device are read together. Attempting to resituate the discussion of 
the Ue detector alongside Barad's work on measurement, and her description 
of measurements as practices which perform a 'cut', deliniating what is, and what 
is not of interest, what parts of the world are, and are not measured. The 
suspect's response is the phenomenon that is produced by the test, the 
question that this begs, is how to interpret the meaning of the response, both 
that observed by a human and that observed by the device drawing out its 
'mute lines'. 
The test might be understood as a staged performance of difference. 
The lie detector's dual status as a machine, and also as a piece of theatre, 
illustrates the mixed nature of instrumental setups, and the way in which 
instrumental practices incorporate and impose meaning onto matter. This 
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insight allows the discussion to develops a number of themes, particularly that 
of the roles of imagination and meaning within the realm of the instrumental. 
This description of the lie detector test shows how the technical 
authority and symbolic power of a device can be seen to function as part of its 
workings, as an integral aspect of its functioning as an instrument. The 
discursive and performative dimensions of the device are central to the effect 
that it produces, not only a side effect. As Bunn observes, the test is more 
ritualistic than scientific, however perhaps we might extend his argument, to 
claim that this ritual is central to the device rather than essentially different to 
what it pretends to be. Even when it becomes clear that the test is reUant on 
deception, it retains its instrumental structure, and renders visible its reliance 
on its own meaning in order to function. 
PlistoricaUy, the rhetoric attached to the use of the polygraph for lie 
detection described the machine as 'writing'. It produced an inscription that 
was considered to be a legible, fixed and unambiguous evidence of guilt, 
similar to the clarity and revealing window-like nature of the MRI scanner of 
the popular imagination. The objective machine speaks for itself. Here, as is 
the case with many technologies, the work of scientists and lawmen to 
decipher the meaning of these inscriptions is overlooked in favour of 
presenting the apparatus as self reliant and infallible. While users of complex 
technical systems are more than aware of the challenge of gaining reliable 
information from complex scientific apparatus, the fact that these devices are 
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difficult to use is seen by outsiders as further confirmation of their 
technological complexity and sophistication. 
The importance of the symbolic dimension of the lie detector test to its 
instrumental function offers an example of how instrumentation can be 
understood to function outside of the 'objective' and material dimensions to 
which instruments are usually thought to belong. Thus the polygraph offers an 
example of a tool that does not show the body as it 'really is', does not, 
'enlighten', but instead infers and suggests, that offers links between the 
unseen knowledge of its subject, the subjective dimension of the experiencing, 
embodied subject. The lie detector test is a technology that invokes interiors, 
truths and relations and knowledge are pulled into material being like threads 
of evidence. The performance, meanings and knowledge themselves form part 
of the bodily technology that may not be separable from the material and 
mechanical aspects of the machine. 
Lie detection technology has been very strongly critiqued as being 
unreliable and unscientific. However, the set-up and experimental protocols of 
these devices could be understood to exist on a continuum of reliability 
alongside other experimental and instrumental practices. The Ue detector 
experiment is more unreliable, and also attempts to infer the unverifiable. The 
thesis is not concerned with the question of whether the technology is 
sufficiendy robust to be used in real world applications such as law. However, 
the Ue detector test can be seen to operate on the body in the way the 
Wittgenstein's philosophy suggested was possible, a body where the interior is 
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legible, because the psychological and subjective are an integral part of the 
material body and indivisible from its behaviour. 
Joseph Jastrow's Automatograph 
The final section of this last chapter will turn to a device called the 
'automatograph' - a psychological instrument devised in the late 19th century 
by the experimental psychologist Joseph Jastrow. The device itself is simple, 
made from two wooden frames containing panes of glass laid horizontally one 
on top of the other. Between the two panes sit 3 brass bearings of VA of an 
inch diameter. The top of these panes of glass is attached by a thin metal arm 
to a glass scriber, the scriber is positioned over smoke blackened paper or glass 
onto which it marks a graphic recording of the experiment.'"' 
In order to use the automatograph, the subject places his or her hand 
gently on the top pane of glass, and lets it rest there lightly. They are instructed 
to try not to move their hand. The instrument and the hand are screened from 
the subject's direct view by a curtain. Then the experimenter conducts their 
test, one devised by Jastrow involved the subject looking at items moving 
around the laboratory in front of him, or thinking about objects in different 
places. As the subject does this, his hand moves involuntarily, the smooth 
nature of the glass and the bearings in between mean even very tiny 
''" Smoke blackened paper or glass was a common laboratory material in the 18* and 
19* centuries and was used to make graphic recordings as part of a range of 
apparatuses. 
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unconscious movements are translated to the blackened paper of glass via the 
arm and scriber. The movements of the subject were then recorded in the 
form of an inscription on the surface of the glass or paper, which could be 
studied at leisure. 
Manifesting the inner: the inscription of thought 
In a popular science magazine of the time, Jastrow' explained the value 
of the automatograph via the claim that 'thought is repressed movement' 
(Jastrow, 1891-2, p.398), experimental psychologists used the device to make 
graphic recordings of what Jastrow described as the 'unconscious movements' 
of the subject's hands. As an experimental psychologist, Jastrow had a 
particular interest in the detection of deception (Pettit, 2007). The 
automatograph offered a way in which to render visible the unconscious and 
involuntary movements of the subject, and could be used in a similar way to 
the lie detector to discover whether a subject had prior knowledge of the 
position of an object hidden the laboratory, for example. 
Jastrow's description is beguiling, the idea that the automatograph 
records the 'movements of the imagination' seems to suggest, with a non-
reductive interpretation, that there is something more subde that can be 
deciphered from the inscriptions made with the automatograph, as if they were 
a form of abstract expressionist gesture. If it can be considered that the act of 
imagining a particular place internally can be translated to an inscription, then 
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perhaps hidden within the images created by the device are other aspects of the 
imagination's expression in the body, even in its most tiny form. 
While this interpretation would have been exacdy against Jastrow's 
views of the importance of rational and empirical science in psychology, the 
device, it can be argued, makes clear a mechanical relation between the 
subject's subjective interior, to use Jastrow's own term, the unconscious, and 
inscriptions produced by the machine. This relation to the interior is both an 
obvious, and oddly overlooked aspect of the relationship between machine 
based graphical output and the internal subject-hood of the subjects of 
measurement. ImpUcit in the automatograph's apparent mechanical simplicity 
is a claim to render visible the unspoken and interior life of the patient. 
Therefore it is possible to situate the automatograph in a broader discussion of 
types of human function, signs and behaviour and their manifestation in 
material instrumental practices. 
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Summary Imagine being slapped' 
In the earlier description of the lie detector test it was noted that certain 
methods, known as 'countermeasures' could be used in order to fool the test 
during the calibration process. Alongside 'muscular movements', such as 
'wiggling a toe', 'changes in breathing', or 'self induced pain' a subject of the Ue 
detector test might 'imagine being slapped' (Andreassi, 2007, p.242; Cappiccio, 
2008). Whilst all of the other countermeasures involve some direct 
manipulation of the bodily physiology, "imagine being slapped" seems to stand 
out for its reference to an imaginary state. The basic clarity of this Unk between 
an intentional, if imaginary state, and its use to fool a instrumental device 
suggests that the direct relation between the imagination and the device, and 
the ability of the human mind to produce physiological states though the 
exercise of that imagination might be described, rather simply. 
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Chapter 8. Understanding instrumentation as creative 
practice; poetics and the physiology of the imagination 
This final chapter clarifies the intention and contribution of the thesis by 
making clear the impact of the ideas that it surveys and synthesises from the 
history and philosophy of science and technology, and the medical humanities, 
on the use of biosensor and biometric instrumentation in creative practices. It 
explores the implications of the concept that bodies and instruments emerge 
together from a process of co-construction, and how such a concept might be 
exploited using a method already central to artistic practices, the poetic. Such a 
notion provides a context to explore how the creative arts themselves are 
already equipped with a methodology to act on and make use of the 
opportunities for reimagining practices which incorporate bodies and 
instruments as creative, and that the thesis has assembled a convincing account 
of instrumentation and human physiology which support this claim. By 
showing that the concepts of instrvimental 'mechanical' objectivity, that are 
commonly ascribed to automatic measuring apparatus, are not the only model 
for understanding what biosignaUing apparatus offers, the thesis instead offers 
a synthesis of theoretical literatures that supports an alternative model of 
instruments that incorporate the imaginary, symbolic and meaningful as active 
participants in the evocation and description of physiology. This alternative 
model offers a clear theoretical scaffold and examples (such as the symbolic 
aspects of polygraphy) to support practices involved in the construction and 
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imaginative use of biosignalling technologies. 
The following discussion of poetics and the physiology of imagination 
will show how the thesis builds upon the observations of the philosophy of 
science and technology, and history of medical technology to show that the 
change to how instruments might be understood has a material impact upon 
how we might understand physiology within creative practices. The following 
provides the final move of the thesis, framed by a question that emerges from 
the thesis' discussion of instrumentation and bodies; what ontological models 
might now direct how creative practitioners approach the use of biosignaUing 
instrumentation? 
As the thesis' review of the literature of philosophy of science regarding 
instruments has shown, remaining open to an understanding of 
instrumentation as reconfigurable as well as productive suggests that using and 
creating measuring instruments might be seen as an active intervention in how 
the body is experienced and thought about, both on a cultural and an 
individual level. This can be considered as a broadly relativist approach to 
understanding scientific instruments and medical practices, the way the world 
appears depends upon who you are, and where you are standing, and also, why 
you are looking. The devices that we build to aid in our practices of 
measurement are just as likely to incorporate certain 'lenses'. The contribution 
of the thesis Ues in how this position is responded to, in that it generates an 
account that might be meaningfully applied as an argument for certain 
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approaches to understanding instruments. The thesis assembles and explores 
concepts of instrumentation that do not separate the material from the 
meaningful, drawing on examples of actual practices — which while not 
themselves within the arts - can be seen to use instruments in ways that go 
beyond the understanding of them as devices for objective and scientific 
measurement. 
If we are to understand instruments as frames for the way in which we 
come to experience and think about the body, then it follows that by creating 
them, we make certain decisions about how to depict the body and what is 
important about it, what to draw into the fore by the construction of certain 
devices. Making use of technologies most usually associated with the sciences, 
and scientific medicine, artists may find themselves adopting and reinforcing 
the rhetoric associated with the scientific and medical practices concerned with 
establishing their method for making use of instruments, as well as the systems 
of psychology and physiology that these devices are used to monitor. In 
revealing that doing this involves certain responsibility in that it has certain 
effects, the question is then raised — how might these practices be understood 
and acted upon as creative? How might the effects of meaning on the body 
discussed above be successfully incorporated into a way of thinking about the 
creation of instruments for measuring and representing the state of the human 
body? By offering this discussion of instrumentation and the body, the thesis 
contributes a position from which creative and cultural practitioners might 
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reconsider their own relationship with instruments - particularly biosignalling 
technologies. 
The thesis assembles its answer through a synthesis of ideas from the 
history of medicine and accounts of the co-construction of medical 
instruments and body. It draws attention to particular themes, in particular the 
imaginative and poetic aspects of the body, and the way in which scientific 
techniques and technologies can be understood to interface with it. 
The following chapter is primarily concerned with exploring a possible 
analogy between instruments, as ways in which we might re;present the body, 
the experiences of embodiment and language - in particular poetic language. 
The following passages therefore aim to suggest that applying the ideas that 
inform poetics to the understanding of instrumentation previously developed 
in the thesis might offer a way in which to conceptualise the potential of 
working with and using instrumentation in a relationship with the body that 
suggests more complex intra-actions and creative interventions and inventions. 
Chapter 8 clarifies how the thesis has built an alternate way of 
understanding instruments - but it also offers a way of understanding the 
method of poetry as an existing response to understanding the co-construction 
of embodied experience through practices of describing (and reifying) 
phenomena. Therefore poetics and the imagination exist as an excellent model 
with which to consider instruments that offer experiences such as biofeedback, 
offering a method for practice (both in the arts and outside) and points 
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towards and existent - and rather convincing manifesto for the pursuit of this 
way of thinking which wiU impact both on how artists use sensing equipment, 
but also other potentially creative uses of instruments to measure human 
bodies'", such as by medics and technologists working in HCI. 
Poetics as a way to deal with constructedness 
As described in chapter 2's discussion of scientific epistemology, a 
rhetoric of objectivity has traditionally accompanied thinking about 
instrumentation. The following section will offer the notion of poetics as an 
alternative method for conceptualising creative uses of instruments. As we will 
see, Richard Rorty, an important informant for the discussion in chapter 2 of 
the way in which philosophy has been associated with particular models of 
truth that have impacted upon the epistemology of science, proposed poetics 
as a possible approach made possible by the rejection of a concept of 
philosophy as a search for accurate language in which to describe reality. 
Rorty's pragmatism compels him instead to use poetics to remind us that of an 
alternate understanding of language from that proposed by positivist 
philosophy. He argues against the notion that philosophy should be concerned 
with the use of language as a device that reflects (mirrors) the world around us. 
11' It is not necessarily the case the observations of this thesis should be limited to a 
modification of our understanding of body sensing in human, and not animals, or in 
fact, beyond physiology in biology as well. A discussion of this type is currently 
beyond the author's knowledge, however, Evelyn Fox Keller's (2002) work regarding 
the use of models and metaphors in the life sciences is an excellent start for readers 
who would pursue this topic. 
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a device that through successive revisions might come to more and more 
closely reflect the true reality in which we find ourselves. This project has been 
adopted by the sciences, and similar models — discussed in chapter 3 — inform 
thinking about instruments, proposing that they are devices which can give 
access to an authentic body, that techniques such as automatic data registration 
offer a greater 'accuracy' to reality. As an alternative to this, we might adopt 
Rorty's tactic of developing an account of poetics that stands against a model 
of language and 'truth', and instead proposes that the co-constructed nature of 
instruments and bodies, as described in medical anthropology and history of 
medicine, might be considered to be an opportunity for practice. 
Poetics can be understood as a method for dealing with the commitment 
of language to invention, and to the generation of new ways of speaking that 
might be understood not only to describe more accurately the experience of 
Ufe, but the potential, through inventing new descriptions, of changing the 
possibilities for experience itself. The following discussion of poetics will 
primarily draw upon Richard Rorty's synthesis and exploration of poetics as a 
method for responding to the potential opportunities offered by philosophical 
pragmatism - which Uke constructivism, considers there to not be a best way to 
describe the world or one's own experience of being, but that instead there are 
a multiplicity of ways in which the world and ourselves might be described, 
and that one outcome of this is that the innovation of novel vocabularies 
provides an inherent human freedom, and responsibility. Rorty's 
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understanding of this project is inherendy political, and this is not a point that 
should pass the reader by in reference to the discussion of instrumentation. 
Instruments, through their automaticity, apparent objectivity, naturalness and 
scientific authority, by becoming associated with a 'true' body that we must 
learn to understand ourselves by, for example understanding the body as a 
genetic machine, or as a set of organ systems, allow ideological structures that 
inform the designs of systems made for particular purposes, to come to stand 
for the truth of those experiences. Poetics not only shows us that in the same 
way that language has been critiqued by philosophers for being a structuring 
and inherited system that reinforces particular ways of making sense of the 
world, so these devices might do the same to our experience of embodiment. 
Poetics then, is the practice, the method, for breaking out of this relation. 
The commitment to a poetic interaction with the world is therefore the 
result of a particular aspiration on the part of the speaker/writer. As described 
here, this desire is two fold in its analogy with instruments that depict the body 
through measurement practices. First, when we speak, it is understood that we 
use language that already exists, unless we invent new words or ways of 
speaking. This process is always linked to history and to our existing language 
practices, but the poet's aim is to break out, to innovate, upon the inherited 
and inherent way of speaking that we each acquire as part of our heritage. The 
second idea is somewhat more profound, and explains the deep importance of 
the first. This is that when we speak, and most particularly, when we describe 
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the state of our internal experience, of what it feels, subjectively, to be alive, or 
even, to be dying, we use, and therefore shape and reinforce, aspects of our 
experience. Description and experience are understood to be reciprocal. 
If, we think about instruments and the phenomena that they manifest as 
co-constructed in a similar way to language, then the principles that are 
suggested by an account of poetics in language might also have relevance to 
instrumentation. Instruments, particularly those used for biofeedback, describe 
the body to us by the phenomena that they demonstrate as part of it. This is 
not simply that instruments register and signal change in the body to us, but 
that certain aspects of the body come to attention, to 'matter' in Barad's 
terminology. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the thermometer is an exceptionally good 
example of this, as the device was slowly reified, the notion of bodily heat 
changed and metamorphosed, and with it, the potential for explaining, and 
measuring aspects of experience and embodiment, and, as my argument holds, 
experiencing a particular aspect of embodiment. The analogy with language is 
therefore clear. Instruments can be seen as analogous with words, they are 
forms that we use to make shapes of the world. "^ 
"2 These changes in the possible nature of bodily experience are not only a concern 
for those of us who are interested in describing a phenomenology of instrumentalised 
experience. While this is certainly interesting area of interest, and one that is being 
explored variously in the philosophy of technology, health psychology etc. It can 
already be understood that technological invention and medical interventions that are 
introduced into our lives do not constantiy add to a stream of modifications of the 
'lifeworld'. This thesis has consciously avoided responding too closely to this set of 
issues, while as a research topic these issues have been of interest and have informed 
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Rorty's discussion of poetry 
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1980) Rorty talks about Gadamer's 
development of the notion of 'edification' as a form of 'self-making'. He 
describes it as a; 
[...] project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways 
of speaking. The attempt to edify (ourselves or others) may consist in the 
hermeneutic activity of making connections between our own culture 
and some exotic culture or historical period, or between our own 
discipline and another discipline which seems to pursue 
incommensurable aims in an incommensvirable vocabulary. But it may 
instead consist in the 'poetic' activity of thinking up such new aims, new 
words, or new disciplines, followed by, so to speak, the inverse of 
hermeneutics: the attempt to reinterpret our familiar surroundings in the 
unfamiliar terms of our new inventions. (p.360) 
While some tactics of edification include reflection on other cxiltures or 
histories, or the reflection upon an outside discipline with incommensurable 
aims, a final method for making new and 'fruitful ways of speaking' is to take a 
poetic approach, and to attempt to innovate and reinterpret. The notion of 
poetry as an approach to making sense of a world that does not take reality as a 
given but something that, pragmatically, we must develop a language - and one 
of many possible languages, to deal with, was explored by Rorty in a number 
the work. The aim of the thesis has been address instrumentation from a more 
external perspective, not only focussing on the role of experience. The reason for this 
is the thesis' goal in providing an analysis of instrumentation itself, when we enter the 
phenomenal world as the site for an investigation, the apparent importance of the 
objectivity and world representing natare of instruments is lost, and this is something 
that the thesis has sought to maintain, mainly in order to demonstrate that there are 
alternatives to this way of thinking about instruments. 
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of the texts he wrote throughout his philosophical career. He uses the notion 
of the poetic as it has been explored by a number of philosophers to suggest 
how one might live productively in a world where there is no 'best' way to 
describe reaUty, in a world where reality, and the self, is part of an interaction, 
and one that must be treated as an opportunity for creating the world afresh. 
Rorty's discussion of poetics provides an alternative to what he calls the 
'classic picture of man' in which; 
The notion that our chief task is to mirror accurately, in our own Glassy 
Essence, the universe around us is the complement of the notion [...] 
that the universe is made up of very simple, clearly and distinctly 
knowable things, knowledge of whose essences provides the master-
vocabulary which permits commensuration of all discourses. (1980, 
p.357) 
The model of the world that makes this possible is one that is knowable, 
graspable in its fixity and simplicity. However, Rorty concludes that this notion 
of the world is absurd. Language, and I would advance that also, technologies 
- cannot, and should not be considered as capable of being commensurate 
with a fixed truth about the world. 
In Contingency, Irony, Solidarity (1989) Rorty re-introduces his earlier 
critique of analytical philosophy's tendency to consider language as something 
that might reflect nature - providing a medium for the 'Mirror of Nature' that 
he critiques as a model for how human knowledge relates to 'authentic reaUty'. 
These themes of mirroring and authenticity can be seen throughout the 
literature regarding instrumentation and mechanical objectivity, demonstrating 
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a realist position with regards to these technologies. It is here that Rorty offers 
poetry as a way to think about the possible alternative model for the project of 
philosophy, not as an epistemological project to describe how true knowledge 
is arrived at, but to explore the edges of what is possible to think and do. He 
suggests, following Nietzsche, that poetry is the one way that man can break 
out of a trap made by his own culture, to 'make himself to be truly different 
and that without having achieved (or at least attempted) this, Ufe is truly futile 
(pp.23-9). 
A particular understanding of reality is necessary to allow us to apply 
Rorty's idea about language to our discussion of instruments — although the 
ideas area already historically linked by particvilar scientific epistemologies. 
Crucially, the thesis understands language as any form of meaningful structure 
or valence that shapes experience. It understands that a notion of a 
'prenoetic'"^ interaction with reality is essentially an impossibility, because this 
kind of 'prior to language' supposes that there are parts of human beings that 
do not structure the world. 
In this, the discursive can be understood as part of a wider way in which 
human beings are situated within the world, and respond to it in human, and 
meaningful ways. Language is often considered to be more clearly understood, 
it gives the appearance of having a meaning that is separable from the physical 
"5 The term prenoetic is used within phenomenology and cognitive science to 
describe the structuring aspects of consciousness that happen 'before we know it' 
(Gallagher 2005 p.2). Such a structuring is seen as inaccessible the reflective 
consciousness, as such it is maintained that both conscious and cognitive processes; 
perception, memory, imagination, beUef and judgement, are shaped or structured 
prenoetically. (ibid) 
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body and the world that produces it, an apparent quality of abstraction. This 
separation is hard won, it is carefully constructed, not a simple thing. The 
human body and the world have as many different noetic interactions as there 
are organs of the body, cell systems, families, ideas. The body is part of an 
embodied and embedded complexity, not the support system for a being that 
internally represents the world using language as a sign system.'*'* 
With the discursive and meaningful fundamentally in the material, as 
established in chapter 1, we are led to consider the concept of the poetic, its 
relevance to understanding instrumental descriptions of the world, and the 
meaning of the phenomena found within it. If we take the position that 
language is fundamentally embodied, this modifies how the making of poetry is 
considered. Poetic creation is not an abstract activity, the re-description of the 
world, and the body, becomes, in the schemes of theorists like Barad, Schleifer, 
and Mol, an utterly material practice which is part of wider practices of human 
performance and action. 
Poetics and instrumentations^^ 
A speculative view of how instrumentation can be developed as a 
^^'* As discussed in chapter 1, Wittgenstein, Rorty, Grosz and Schliefer offer critiques 
of this model. 
"5 The temptation to use the phrase 'instrumental poetics' here is strong, however, 
there is not the scope for an investigation of what this concept might mean in the 
space available in the thesis. However, Schleifer's conceptions of the materiality of 
utterances combined with an analysis of Winch's discussion of instrumental action 
might, in future be an interesting area for speculation on the materiality, intention and 
use of spoken language. 
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creative practice might also make use of Rorty's notion of the poetic, 'new 
aims, new words, new disciplines' (p.360) might offer us a change to create our 
'familiar surroundings' of the body as 'unfamiliar'. The discussion opens up 
some philosophical territory that shows how the thesis suggests a return to a 
consideration of the relations between instruments, language and human 
concepts of reality, and leads back to phenomena and marks. By making the 
analogy between the making of instruments and the writing of poetry, a space 
is opened up that seems brimming with potential for a way of dealing with 
instruments which is informed by the definition of instruments produced and 
supported by this thesis. Instead of instrumentation being useful input and 
connection devices allowing artists to represent bodies by making multimedia 
applications controlled by biosignals, or by producing visualisations based on 
data from the body, this way of thinking about instruments suggests that a far 
more radical intervention into the experience of embodiment is enabled by the 
development and use of these kinds of devices to make artworks. In particvilar 
it suggests that the representation of the body by these devices should not be 
tied to a pre-existing anatomical or physiological 'truth' that exists prior to the 
development of instruments, models, or other representations. The model of 
technological co-construction of devices and bodies allows those working 
creatively with technology to reconsider their relationship to these technologies 
as essentially innovative and productive. The concept of a poetics of 
instrumentation is not offered as a final solution, but more as an articulation of 
an alternative approach to understanding what is enabled by these practices. It 
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can be seen as a suggestion of a far more developed and analogous practice 
that instrument making might be compared with, which stresses its potential 
creativity as a radical break from predefined concepts of the world, and yet still 
maintains its existing technical forms. 
Poetics and the Imagination 
Richard Sha's 2009 paper, Toward a Physiolog)i of the Romantic Imagination 
'seeks to recover a physiological imagination' (p. 197) overlooked in the history 
of the Romantic period. This recovery, mirrored by the research of the thesis 
discussed primarily in chapter 6, does not only suggest something that might 
be returned to, by way of an anachronism, a return to a now out -of-date 
thinking. Instead it can offer a freeing up of the possibilities associated with 
instruments, an opportunity to recover perspectives lost in the formation of 
disciplines that may make more sense to practices like the arts. 
Many of the historical accounts discussed in the thesis Sha's, Daston 
and Galison's, and my own historical discussions of the placebo effect, take 
into account the historical contingency of the psychological and physiological 
sciences formation in the early modem period — as practices committed to the 
development of scientific methods of enquiry, such as controlled testing — stiU 
retaining models of the imagination as a physiologically and medically active 
force, and therefore one which was open to the influence of instrumentation as 
well as detectable by it. As pointed out in chapter 6, the invention of the 
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controlled trial marks a historical point at which the active nature of the 
imagination was both constructed as, and first made separable from medical 
practices, a move which later led to the formation of a concept of the 'placebo 
effect' which construct meaning as a separable and unimportant aspect of 
embodiment. The following wiU provide further weight to the concept of the 
poetic as a method for reinterpreting arts practices using instrumentation by 
reiterating and recovering the mechanism for this. 
Sha's discussion of the 'romantic imagination' provides a further link 
with the imagination of the romantic poets and his observation that the 
imagination transforms 'materiality into a site of possibility'. While his 
discussion is focussed upon a particular historical position — there are aspects 
of it that suggest that the imagination is one aspect of the bodily that provides 
a link between the material and the ideal. Many of Sha's observations about the 
role of the imagination in romantic period physiology encourage a reading of 
the dual potential of uncovering an ideal and poetic approach to understanding 
the way in which instrumental technologies might be used on the body. He 
returns to the nascent science of physiology and the way in which imagination 
was incorporated into physiology; 
Even as physiology attempted to make a science out of the living as 
opposed to the ideal, it turned to concepts like Ufe, predisposition, and 
potentiality to give the imagination a curious immaterial materiality, 
one that made materiality as site of possibility rather then determinism 
(p.197). 
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Sha seeks an alternative, as prior to this, historians have considered the 
ideological aspects of the romantic imagination, and that its association with 
physiology was generally held by scientist's and medics writing during the 
period, who, Sha observes, considered the imagination to be entirely 
'pathological'. The historical literature on this theme of imagination also takes 
on these ideas, in distinction, Sha points out that "while these studies 
emphasise pathology, [he is concerned with] physiology, pathology's double." 
(p.198) 
What Sha is interested in is the way in which the imagination was used 
to render the material potentially vital and a 'site of possibility', and the way in 
which romantic poets responded to certain ideas about physiology with their 
exploration of the powers of the imagination as much as this exploration might 
have been prompted by ideological concerns."' ' 
Rather than dismiss the imagination as littie more than 'ideological 
escapism',(p.l98) Sha points out that tales and warnings of the pathological 
consequences of excessive imagination function more to suggest a reading of 
the imagination as intended by Haygarth and his contemporaries, whose 
identification of imagination as active upon pathology, rather than 
undermining its objective status, instead cements it, "making unassailable the 
imagination's ability to change matter. Even when diseased, the imagination's 
'"^ Sadly there is not the space or time in this thesis to fully develop the potential links 
between the ideological function of the imagination and its relationship to not only 
the emergence of new sciences (shown in Sha's work and also in the problems 
surrounding early experimental psychology) but also the emergence of new 
technologies, all of which demand a resistance against determinism. 
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hold over the body paradoxically gave it powers of trans formation" (reQ. The 
imagination, therefore - cannot be discarded as simple fantasy, but in fact, the 
acts and creations of the poetic imagination ate materially and physiologically 
effective. 
The thesis' discussion in chapters six and seven regarding the effects of 
the imagination upon the body — and its role in eighteenth century 
constructions of instrumental objectivity and rational systems for body 
measurement, relate a conception of the imagination as an active and material 
force (for example that it produces the placebo or meaning effect) is mirrored 
by Sha's history of the imagination in physiology, as opposed to what he 
considers to be a general concern with its status as ideological force within 
Romantic thought, or as pathology. Sha argues, that the importance of the 
imagination in medical thought is as a faculty that, by its disorder might 
produce disease, provides an undeniable Unk to the physiological qualities of 
the imagination in these systems of thought. In addition to its powers for 
producing pathological, and bodily symptoms - amongst them the 
malformation of the fetus according to the mother's imagination - or even her 
belief in the power of her own imagination to effect such malformation, the 
imagination also provides a positive explanatory force for the healing effects of 
placebo treatments for physicians such as Haygarth and Lavoisier — regardless 
of their interpretation of its potential use. 
We might, of course, be cautious of the convenient flexibility of the 
concept, which may be moved between ideal and conscious states and physical 
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functions such as digestion with a lose ease. As Sha notes; " the imagination 
has always rushed in to fiU the gaps between materiality, and what technology 
can deliver as materiality, making the imagination inseperable from physiology" 
(p200), it is the imagination's "ambiguous ontological status"(p.204) that 
prevents us from having a clear conception of the physiology of the 
imagination. While it encourages caution, the relations of a poetic and 
imaginative realm of instruments might be faithfully reinstated. These might be 
considered vaUd criteria for the rationalisation of instrumental qualities of the 
body. There is an idealism therefore open to how we work with instruments — 
which - through the positioning of physiology and imagination as intrinsically 
and materially Hnked - we achieve validation of different outcomes and 
processes 
The physiologically active imagination therefore complements the 
poetic notion of instruments. Both offer a break from the overly rationalised 
and instrumentalised understanding of the role that measuring instruments 
might play in their interaction with the body. There are critiques of this idea, as 
discussed above, it might be perceived that language, unlike the hardware of 
biosignalling equipment, is unfixed and flexible in how it is combined and 
innovated. However, the concept of poetics developed in the thesis 
(particularly with reference to Schleifer) counters this reading of language as 
distanced or separable from the body, and in order for it to have bodily 
meaning, it must connect and resonate with embodied Ufe. Instruments 
themselves, we might argue, are capable of being demateriaUsed much more 
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than we might consider (as discussed in chapter 4 with regards to Latour's 
concept of instruments). Thus the thesis proposes a possible flexibility 
afforded by instrumental protocol, meaning and body. Much of this flexibility 
can be recovered in the Romantic notion of the imagination as physiologically 
active. As Sha observes that: "Such flexibility within physiology allowed the 
material to be about conditions of possibility, and once again aligned the 
material with Romantic idealism (p.207). 
The accusation of idealism could appear to undermine the account that 
the thesis assembles; however, an idealism of physiology might also be 
interpreted as a useful tactic to 'free up conditions of possibility' as Sha puts it. 
As shown in the history of 20* century medicine and onwards as one of 
defining and seeking the normalisation of the body's state (Canguilhem, 1989) 
it appears necessary to rebel against this understanding of particular 'natural' 
ideals or forms that are the ideal to be sought after, with the aid of medical 
technologies that might monitor and remind us of how far we are from those 
norms. Instead, the idealism of the thesis is concerned with encouraging the 
imaginative exploration of the possible bodies that might be created, and 
reminding us that the way in which these technologies are involved in the 
reinforcement and seeking of norms is in itself an imaginative practice, there is 
no 'normal' or 'natural' body. If the account within the thesis is therefore to be 
critiqued as being idealist — un-tethered from the brute facts of human 
physiology, there is an underlying goal to this, which is that it is intended as an 
antidote to the effects of the rhetoric of scientific epistemologies which have 
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claimed instruments as objective devices which afford us a mirror in which to 
see our 'true' nature. What it in fact represents is an antidote to materialist 
understandings of the response of the body to meaning and offers a 
resurrection of the Romantic imagination as an active physiological force. 
Hence the discussion shows that a poetic approach to instruments is enabled 
by these links between physical devices, imagination and meaning, and the 
physiology of the body. 
Summary 
Rather than being a solution to a particular problem in human 
body instrumentation, poetics is invoked in order to draw attention to the 
potentiality which is evoked by the construction of instrumentation, which in a 
universe where the phenomena of the world are not given, but are evoked by 
actors, human or otherwise, it might be more useful for some of us to think of 
instruments as material forms of poetic and creative practice. 
By applying an account of poetics to a discussion of instrumentation and 
the imagination, this chapter has shown how we might suggest, instead of the 
instrument as analogue of the real, the instrument as practice, a practice with 
creative potential as a form of intra-action with the physiology of the body. It 
addresses the issue regarding what values might shape our actions, and 
attempts to draw attention to the poetic potentials of understanding how 
practices using mediums other than spoken language might invoke the 
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imagination to impact on physiology. Discussing Sha's historical observations 
on the historical understanding of the imagination allows it to be made clear 
how the thesis recovers a particular way of thinking about human physiology 
in order to exploit the creative possibilities of instrumentation. 
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Conclusion: Overview of the thesis 
Philosophers should free themselves from scientist's scepticism, and 
instead conceptually anticipate the final goal (Gustav Fechner, in 
Heidelberger, 2004, p. 144). 
The underlying goal of this thesis has been to assemble and develop a 
theoretical account of human body measurement technologies that can support 
creative practices that use those technologies. The thesis builds on 
philosophical projects that reject the orthodox scientific understanding of 
instruments as devices that can 'reveal' the world and instead explores how 
instruments can be considered as technologies that allow human beings to co-
construct aspects of the physical world - with particular reference to the 
human body. The thesis develops a number of key ideas relating to how this 
co-construction can be understood, and upon which a number of approaches 
to understanding human body sensing instrumentation as an artistic practice 
can be formulated. 
To do this the thesis identified relevant theoretical sources in order to 
explore the meaning of instrumental technologies in a way that is relevant to 
arts practice. Drawing attention to alternative ways of thinking about 
instrumentation to the orthodox epistemology of science which positions 
instruments as objective, the thesis provides a synthesis of the neglected role of 
the imagination and poetics in the physiology of the body. Exploring examples 
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of how these forces can be identified in instrumental practices, such as in 
placebo experiments and the lie detector test, provides a key to understanding 
how a poetic and essentially creative approach might be applied to 
understanding the use of instrumentation in the arts and in the creation of 
artworks as well as the creative development of technologies. 
Instrumental sensing and the arts 
As the following sections wiU show, many of the arguments developed in 
the thesis are highly pertinent to arts practices that aim to make use of 
biosignaUing technologies as well as other instrvimental systems that measure 
the body. The thesis provides a necessary transfer and synthesis of scholarship 
from many relevant fields, to the arts."'^ It is envisaged that the ideas 
assembled, recovered and synthesised by the thesis wiU offer an interpretative 
lens for researchers and artists working with instruments that interface 
computers with the body (for example in Human Computer Interface research 
- HCI). Many artists have, and continue to use, biosignaUing devices and other 
forms of sensor as controllers in new media art installations and performance 
"'' It is worth keeping in mind that the problems and opportunities revealed by these 
discussions of creativity and human representation and categorisation are by no means 
limited to the kind of mechanical instruments discussed by the thesis. In fact there is 
more literature (some of it drawn upon here) that focuses up on the human science's 
production of categories and their effects upon experience and concepts of self 
(readers might refer to Hansen's 1992 work on homosexuality discussed in chapter 5). 
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(for a review of these practices see Brouse, undated). The ideas collected in this 
thesis offer a framework that situates these practices with reference to a range 
of other disciplines, particularly the philosophy of technology, and provides a 
transfer of scholarship from the history and philosophy of science and 
technology that might be useful to artists seeking to examine the 
epistemological and ontological context of the technologies with which they 
are engaged. 
In particular it is envisaged that the thesis might offer insights that will 
aid emerging arts practice concerned with the exploration of technologies and 
the way in which they can be used to modify human Ufe as their medium. The 
increasing ubiquity of sensors and mobile computing power is likely to lead to 
fiirther opportunities for artists to make use of these technologies - the thesis 
offers a description of potentials — illustrated by the thesis' recovery of ideas 
from scholarship in the history of medicine and medical construction as well as 
a development of the concept of instrumentation as creative and unfixed. 
These offer a ways of reinterpreting and conceptualising possible practices that 
use instruments to measure the human body. They remind us of the rhetoric 
that has historically been attached to scientific technologies such as human 
body sensors and provide conceptual tools for the assessment of concepts of 
instrumental objectivity, reality and authenticity which should enable critical 
approaches to sensor technologies in the arts. 
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This approach to technology also impacts elsewhere, scientists and 
technologists need to be aware that the activities in which they are engaged are 
creative — Richard Rorty's critique of the 'mirror of nature' in philosophy is 
therefore applicable to our contemporary sciences and may serve to remind us 
that if we move to a model of co-construction rather than of revelation using 
scientific technologies, these ideas also impact on the production, design and 
application of sensor technologies for HCI. By arguing that Rorty's 
observations about poetic language can be extended to the instrumental, the 
final chapter of the thesis chapter clarifies how the poetic might offer a 
method for practices using instruments that understands them as engaged in 
the construction of experience through practices of describing (and reifying) 
phenomena. Therefore poetics, and the imagination, offer conceptual tools 
with which to consider instruments that offer biofeedback as a method for 
practice (both in the arts and outside). What poetics also offers is a rather 
convincing manifesto for the pursuit of this way of thinking that wiU impact 
both on how artists use sensing equipment, but also medics and technologists 
working in HCI. 
The thesis reviews the history and philosophy of science and medicine, 
in order to contextuaUse these discipline's approach to instrumentation as 
linked to particular requirements of practice rather than essential to their use. 
The thesis also proposes poetics as an existing methodology central to arts 
practice as a method to deal with and understand the possibilities (poetic and 
constructive) enabled by creating systems that human represent bodies. As 
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articulated by the thesis, 'romantic' and 'imaginative' approaches to thinking 
about instrumentation and the bodies which may be produced by it do not 
invalidate the use of instruments, instead, the synthesis of relevant scholarship 
in the history and philosophy of science and technology provided by the thesis 
supports the argument that there are in fact dimensions of instrumentation 
which are intentionally obscured in scientific practices. For example, the 
placebo effect is manifested by the need to manage the body's response to 
meaning in experimental testing. Rather than consider meaning and symbol as 
external to the intended 'work' of instrumental technologies, it may be more 
useful to consider that 'work' as being context specific, in some practices, such 
as the arts, the role of meaning and the ability for it have an effect upon 
instrumentation could be central. 
In the first chapter the thesis provides a review of philosophical 
perspectives regarding the human embodiment of, and response to, meaning 
that give shape to this observation about instrumentation. This theme is 
revisited throughout the thesis in its discussion of the role of meaning and 
imagination in the placebo effect; as it is manifest in contemporary medicine; 
in discussions of, and research into the placebo effect and lie detector test; also 
historically, from both primary and secondary literature, regarding the 
establishment of early research into empirical medical testing and the way in 
which the imagination was considered to be physiologically active in a material 
sense. The understanding that the body contains an active material imagination 
serves to inform how the physiological possibilities of sensing are themselves 
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imagined by potential users. The result is a creative, poetic approach to body 
sensing, rather than one that is constrained by existing phenomena or 
interpretations of them. 
The aim of this discussion has been not to contribute a prescriptive 
guide to particular outcomes, but to offer a set of arguments and examples 
which taken together builds an alternative account of the instrument and its 
interaction with the body that in might offer certain advantages as a theoretical 
underpinning for artistic practice. 
Non-determinism and technology 
One important outcome of the thesis is that it argues for an approach 
to sensor technologies, their use and design, that is non-determinist. It does 
not lead creators using or innovating with sensors to rely upon particular 
concepts — but stresses the creative potential for generating novel analyses of 
body state. When looking at the way in which technologies have developed in 
relation to the phenomena they manifest, it is easy to rationalise what they do 
post-hoc, and to consider those phenomena as pre-existing, rather than, as 
aspects of the world that are evoked and co-constructed in collaboration with 
instruments. The effect of this is that it is necessary to remind ourselves that 
the outcomes of instruments and the development of these technologies is not 
necessarily dependant on what is already waiting to be discovered about the 
body — but is more radically constructed. 
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There are a number of ways in which the thesis supports this idea. 
First, it provides an overview of the medical humanities observation that 
bodily pathologies and states are constructed rather then pre-existent 
phenomena. Work Uke Duffin's histories of disease concepts is explored, to 
examine how instrumental and medical setups produce disease as phenomena 
in many different forms. Drawing on Duffin's account of two apparendy very 
different diseases, that of lovesickness and hepatitis C, the thesis gives an 
account of the historical and instrumental contingency of disease and other 
bodily and cognitive phenomena that, it can be argued, are the result of forms 
of instrumentation. By doing this, the thesis unUnks the practice of sensor 
design and use from already identified bodily phenomena, and instead suggests 
that these instruments themselves are central to the apparatus that produces 
phenomena. 
Historical contingency and technology 
Non-deterministic approaches to technology suggest other ways of 
thinking about the development of instruments. They allow the thesis to 
discuss alternative ways of understanding the development of instruments to 
that offered by the 'whig historical' approach of people like Silas Mitchell, who 
was dismayed at the length of time that it took for physicians to adopt the 
practice of pulse counting. Both SCOT and ANT approaches allow creative 
thinkers to move away from the assumptions that technologies change along, if 
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unpredictable, lines of constant development leading to one 'best' way of 
dealing with reality. As the histories of pulse reading and thermometry attest — 
such as Reiser's observation that doctors were disinterested in thermometers 
because they could not give an account of the 'qualities' of heat, and were 
therefore an inferior form of patient monitoring — this taken alongside Terry 
Castle's observations regarding the romantic and poetic treatment of 
thermometers and barometers devices which were interpreted considered to be 
highly sensitive devices for measurement, which had access to the sensibilities 
of those who made the measurement — the alternative possible outcomes of 
the development of an instrumental system might be better understood as 
different rather than better. 
An awareness of the alternative understandings of instruments offered 
by historical studies of technology and medicine therefore provide an 
important 'freeing up' of creative space, reminding artists of the alternative 
possibilities written into the history of any technology. In showing the 
complexity of influences that can shape a device, (exemplified in the 
thermometer) ANT scholarship is particularly effective at reminding makers 
that the reification of devices in certain forms are the restilt of particular 
theoretical and practical needs specific to particular user communities. 
Historians of media and technology have argued that technologies such 
as the cinema and the telephone remain in a state of flux, only appearing fixed 
when a large enough system of users and 'protocols' for their use are built 
around them in order to reinforce and make static (reify) their form. Instead of 
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developing a fixed notion of instruments, an awareness of the historical 
contexts in which instruments are developed shows that it is possible to 
consider body sensor instruments as a class of technologies that might mutate, 
evolve, or regress productively. 
Instrumentation and immateriality 
The thesis also impacts upon what we might imagine instruments to be 
interfacing with. This observation is particularly important for artists concerned 
with the phenomenological aspects of human embodiment, who might wish to 
understand instruments as connecting with human beings without 
'objectifying' them. Chapter 1 sets the stage of the discussion by drawing on 
the work of a number of philosophers who argue in favour of a particular 
position regarding the ontological status of the 'inner' to the material body. 
This impacts upon how the physiology of subjects who are being monitored 
using instruments is understood to relate to their interior state, a theme 
developed through the thesis discussion of physiology, imagination and poetry, 
which offer an account of the body as a materially manifest subject (extended 
materialism). What this does is offer an argument for understanding that 
instrumental interaction is possible with the 'immaterial' aspects of the subject, 
by examining how the subjective, imaginative and the poetic, are embodied 
through physiology. 
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Particularly central to this is the way in which the thesis develops the 
theme of the imagination, the thesis argues that aspects of physiology that are 
accessible to instruments and suggests that it is also possible to consider the 
imagination as present within physiology, as a physiological object or potential. 
As discussed in chapter 8, the imagination offers a spanning of the material 
and immaterial. By drawing attention to the role of the imagination as a 
creative force — the thesis stresses the way in which instruments can be seen as 
interventions that shape their subjects through their own imposition of certain 
meanings — particvilarly palpable in the meaning effect/placebo response. This 
reading of instruments enables one to understand them as devices that might 
constitute a method for the creative production of forms of embodied 
experience. It might be argued that biofeedback artwork, which makes use of 
real-time physiological data to control or visualise creative representations of 
body state may offer one conduit for the creation of these kinds of 
experiences, which in the light of the thesis can be considered to have 
profound material and visceral effects on the body itself, as well as the 
experience of the user. 
Examples 
One research aim of the thesis has been to explore the philosophical 
implications of investigating the understanding of the possible phenomena 
accessible by human body sensing instrumentation in settings outside of 
303 
scientific measurement. In the case of each instrument a poetic history might 
be reclaimed. These histories offer the opportunity to revisit the time before 
instruments became reified and to re-imagine those aspects that the imperative 
for (hard-won) objectivity drove out of them. These examples also serve to 
fulfill a range of different functions within the thesis, demonstrating different 
aspects of the effect of the thesis' argument. 
Revisiting these instruments through the historical scholarship around 
them has allowed us recover the symbolic and poetic aspects of their 
operation. The lie detector, for example, is operated using a placebo effect. 
The incorporation of the symbolic or meaningful into its protocols for use — 
mixes the ontology of instrumental machine and the imaginary aspects of the 
meaning of the technology and context in which it is used. These frighten 
users into producing certain physiological effects, and the use of questioning 
and different set-ups (protocols) provide circumstances that allow 
experimenters to define a difference between familiarity and unfarruliarity, guilt 
and innocence, knowledge and ignorance. The use of the instrument to detect 
and evoke these concepts collapses subjective psychology and imagination with 
the material physiology of body (al la Wittgenstein) allowing us to tiick the test 
if we 'imagine being slapped'. 
If the polygraph is not discarded as a pseudoscience, we are left with an 
interesting performative practice. One might argue that lies do not have any 
'objective existence' but as shown in Barad's and Hacking's discussion of 
phenomena, the way in which experimental set-ups are arranged to cause 
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rather than simply capture particular phenomena - suggests that in the case of 
human psychology, the lie might well be a artificially created, but no less 
recordable object — if we are willing to define it in particular instrumental terms 
— rather than in those of the folk psychology which we might usually associate 
with the terminology. 
The example of the controlled trial first offers an account by which it 
can be understood how instruments as both material devices and symbolic 
objects can have an effect upon the body as it is measured: a placebo response, 
or perhaps more accurately meaning response, to instrumentation enters into 
the experience and meaning of recording the states of bodies. 
By situating the discussion of the controlled trial with the early 
development of the trial as an instrumental tactic, the thesis supports and 
develops its understanding of the historical relationship of concepts of the 
inner and subjective landscape, (in these examples the role is taken by that of 
the imagination) which show how aspects of the body - such as the 
imagination, can be specified as part, or not part, of the active medical body. 
These might be defined in distinction to - or as integral - to the outcomes of 
medical encounters as observable and active. This has implications for art 
because it leads us to reconsider the physical impact of imagery, ideas and 
simulated experiences on the material body, and it is therefore possible to 
argue, building on the placebo effect, for far more fundamental, material and 
measurable effects of artistic works to exist than are usually given credit. 
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The example of the Ue detector test extends this discussion one step 
fiirther by turning this observation on its head and suggesting that knowledge 
and the imagination might be understood as central to the operation of some 
devices: the explicit aims of lie detector testing are to measure the knowledge 
and intentions of a test subject. This type of testing uses a model of the interior 
of the subject (thus remaining contentious as a form of reliable evidence - and 
being considered bad science) in order to infer what is, and is not known, and 
to infer the risk of unforeseen or unpredictable behaviour or hidden motives 
on the part of the subject. Thus the lie detector test in part interfaces with the 
imagination and the imagined, causing it to 'matter' in an instrumental sense, if 
not in the strictiy metrological one which medical science has invested in 
during the last century. 
Discussions of instrumental systems Uke the randomised controlled 
trial and the placebo effect, and the lie detector test, all therefore stand as 
examples of the material-discursive formations that might arise, particularly 
with reference to the separation of the meaningful and symbolic from the 
realm of instrvimental causality by experimental arrangements. These examples 
show the 'intra-actions' between instruments and bodies. 
The automatograph is a historical device that raises certain 
epistemological concerns regarding the kind of claims that might be attached 
to the device regarding what the inscriptions that it produces contain. Are they 
the movements of the imagination? Are they evidence of unconscious urges or 
knowledge? How might we understand the implications of an unconscious that 
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might be inscribed as a text? The use and construction of devices like the 
automatograph can serve to articulate questions which link philosophy, 
psychology and arts practice and demonstrates how potential practices might 
be constructed around the conception and manufacture of instruments, 
protocols and ontological claims. 
Poetics as a method 
Finally, by establishing an analogy with 'poetics', the thesis suggests 
that applying poetics to instrumentation might serve to stress the creative 
potential for technology-based practices that represent or shape human 
experiences. As the poetic use of language produces and reinforces new 
subjectivities, so does the production of technological and medical products 
that represent the body. 
Poetry appears throughout the thesis. On the one hand it re-Unks 
instruments with the flexible meanings that they have been separated from 
through progressive reification. Take for example the evidence of Castle's 
historical observation that the thermometer was once, itself, capable of 
'feeUng', and the flexibility of the language of pulse feeUng discussed by 
Kuriyama."** The poetic also serves to Unk the physiological, instinctive and 
material body, with the collapse of action, meaning and poetic utterance found 
in Schleifer's accovints of poetry and Tourette's syndrome. 
'^ * Both accounts are discussed in chapter 3. 
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The thesis' final move is to develop a position in relation to Richard 
Rorty's conception of the poetic as a method for understanding, and inspiring, 
creative interventions in the use of body sensor technology. This synthesis 
provides an insight into the way in which a methodology from the arts might 
be seen to afford an alternative approach to understanding the development of 
technologies. While the scholarship that the thesis draws upon in order to 
observe what is problematic about, or potentially overlooked in the field of 
body instrumentation is from history, philosophy and medicine, the key to 
understanding how these observations might be acted up, stems from the way 
in which artists and poets have traditionally approached the world; they are 
always exploring what it affords as a medium for creative practices, in 
particular for the creation of experience. While the thesis, paradoxically, serves 
to justify the methods of the artistic disciplines to themselves, by drawing on 
scholarship that confirms constructedness and imaginative potential, it also 
argues that the methods of the arts can be seen as instrumentally valid and in 
fact, may offer a way to importantiy, avoid deterministic approaches to the 
construction of human experience through technologies. 
Summary 
This thesis began with a preface that discussed the beginnings of my 
research project, and the ideas and questions that had been foremost in my 
mind when I began making computer based artworks that visualised or were 
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controlled by biosignals. There are a few points in the thesis that reaUy 
summarise the transformation that has taken place in how I understand this 
activity; the lie detector as an instrument that operates through a performance, 
Daniel Moerman's tears at a movie and smiles at a puppy, and finally, the 
imaginary physiology of being slapped. 
What this research has made clear is that if creative practitioners are to 
make use of the potential of instruments it is imperative to remember that 
using these devices, like any form of representation, results in the constructive 
shaping of living entities. Instruments do not just give access to what is 'out 
there', but invite us to explore and invent alternate bodies. Rather than accept 
the devices that have been developed for other practices such as medicine or 
physiological science intact with predefined meanings of heat, breath, thought 
left intact, the thesis suggests, and assembles the materials to aid in an 
unpicking of what we understand by instrumentation, at the level of the 
ontology of the device, not at that of the representation that it creates. Just as 
the body is an instrument for the inner, 'suffused with meaning, thought, 
passion and will', our environments and technologies may also be thought of 
as intimately connected and expressive of knowledge, symbol and meaning. 
This is an opportunity that should no be overlooked by those of use working 
creatively, rather than scientifically, with these technologies. 
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Further work 
There are numerous avenues that offer future paths for the ongoing 
exploration of the topics of this thesis, as well as many aspects of the 
discussion that were not incorporated or extended as much as they could have 
been because of the limitations of time and space. In addition to this the 
prospect of applying the ideas and understanding of instrumentation 
developed in the thesis, as well as experimental projects with device Uke the 
automatograph, now increasingly - and with completion of this document, 
contribute to the continuation (transformed) of the author's own arts practice 
described in the preface. 
One research direction is to continue investigations of instrumental work 
in early psychophysiology, the experiments of investigators such as Wundt, 
Fechner, and Munsterberg, who all made instrumental investigations of 
perceptual experience. Fechner in particular proposed a certain philosophical 
perspective that might have been included in the early parts of the thesis. 
Investigations of spiritualism are also invoked in chapter 6, in the discussion of 
the placebo effect, this is a rich area of scholarship and the arguments made by 
the thesis regarding the imagination and its effects on the body might fmitfully 
be extended into this realm. 
Further work on the understanding of instrumental action, particularly as 
it links to the meaning effect also appears promising, as suggested by some 
preliminary investigations of the work of Peter Winch (Winch, 1958; Lerner & 
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Winch, 2002) and his discussions of magic and instrumental action in the 
context of anthropology, which promises much of interest as a route for 
further extension of the thesis' discussions of how instruments might be seen 
as symbolic but also instrumental, and the links between language and 
instruments. 
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Abstract 
The invalidity of the sick man's judgement concerning the reality of his own illness is an 
important theme in a recent history of disease. |...] "Health," says Leriche, "is life lived in 
the silence of the organs"... The state of health is one in which the subject and his body are 
one. Conversely, the awareness of the body consists in a feeling of limits, threats, obstacles 
to health. 
Georges Canguilhem, (1981, p.91) 
Rene l^riche's phenomenally based image of health serves to frame a concern regarding the 
integration of physiological sensor technologies into the consumer market. However, this 
analysis is not so concerned with the body in a state of illness, when normal life is 
interrupted, but at the point when physiological instrumentation is diffused into what Don 
Ihde refers to as the 'technological texture' (lhde:1979) of our day to day environment. It is 
this possibility that demands an enquiry into what may happen when instrumentation gives 
the body a voice. 
Introduction; what happens when the organs break their silence? 
Currendy physiological sensors are found mainly where the normal limits of the human 
body are tested or compromised: space or deep sea exploration, military, sports and 
medicine. However, there is an ever growing market in the western world for home 
consumer medical technologies, and here, the usual forces which appear to drive the 
diffusion of computer based technologies into consumer markets appear to be at work: 
miniaturization, falling costs, increase in processor power. These factors, in addition to the 
adoption of paradigms such as ubiquitous, affective and physiological computing, appear to 
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justify the very common expectation that there will be an increasing prevalence of these 
instruments in everyday life. In addition to the medical applications of these devices such as 
wearable heart, blood glucose, galvanic skin response monitors; there are also applications 
in the entertainment sectors as game controllers, emotion or brainwave responsive 
entertainment systems as well as sports and wellness applications. 
This paper is not concerned however, with specific technological products, but instead aims 
to consider the general effects of an integration of physiological sensors into the 
'technological atmosphere'. What effects will objective, medically significant information 
about the body have upon subjective perception of embodiment? How can we consider its 
integration into perception? Adopting a theme from Canguilem's reading of ].^riche it is 
hoped that we may explore a question which, while accompanied by much expectation, is 
surrounded with uncertainty. 
Incorporating technological information into the phenomenal world; 
how will organs speak? 
]^t us first turn to the question of how physiological instruments might allow organs to 
'speak'. The Philosophy of Technology provides some structures describing how 
technological data is incorporated into the phenomenal world. I will first comment upon the 
phenomenological method as it relates to our study and some of the attempts to characterize 
human-machine interaction. 
Ihde's analysis adopts Merlcau-Ponty's 'perceiving body-subject' - the human as an active 
perceiver. This definition of the technology user is a constructive model, as it makes 
possible a unitary rather than reductive analysis of the subject's interaction with 
physiological data. It also follows Canguilhem's analysis, defining illness as a state 
experienced by the 'sick man'(1989, p.90) rather than through physiological or medical 
definition. 
Some thinkers from the lineage of Phenomenology have considered technology as a 
negative force within the domain of lived experience, or 'lifeworld'. Following Heidegger's 
assertion that technology treats everything in the world as a 'standing reserve' - basically a 
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raw material to be used up, writers like Winner (1977) view technological activity as one of 
constant colonization, 'technology goes where it has not yet been'. Albert Borgmann's 
thought takes a particularly dystopian position when reviewing the effects of modern 
technology on the lifeworld. Using a 'device paradigm' - examining individual devices 
modifications upon human experience; Borgmann's work characterizes technology as 
'disemburdening', in that it creates devices that are a means to an end, removing active input 
from their user. He argues that as technology becomes invisible, technological devices 
'alienate' their uses from the lifeworld and its focal practices (Veerbeck, 2002). 
Applying 'disemburdenment' to physiological sensing might suggest that technological 
access to bodily information might supercede or interfere with somatic perception, resulting 
in a diminished reliance upon inherent sensory capacities. However, psychological studies 
have suggested that this is not the case, diabetic patients who use blood glucose monitors to 
regulate their food and insulin intake have been found to still 'rely on symptoms' and that 
'subjective cues win out over the procedures guided by abstract knowledge'. This shows 
that in day to day use, somatic information takes precedence over objective, instrumentally 
derived information about the body (Baum et al:2001, p.23). However, this precedence of 
one modality of information over another - somatic over instrumental - may be attributable 
to features of the interface. 
Ihde clarifies this interface difference with an analysis which takes a more specific approach 
to the incorporation of technology into phenomenal experience. In his earlier work he makes 
a distinction between hermeiteu/k and embodied tdMons with techiiology(]hde, 1979). 
Hermeiieufk relations axe. textual, semantic interactions. Here, as in the earlier example of 
blood-glucose monitors, information from the device is assimilated through cognitive 
engagement. As in the common conception of scientific instruments as producers of dials 
and graphs, technological devices that fit this category are read by the user. 
In contrast embodiment relations are the product of the incorporation of a technology into 
the activity of living. Heidegger's famous example of his father's hammer typifies this, 
where the tool is treated more like an extension of the user's body. The difference between 
these two forms of interaction allows the speculation that physiological devices which have 
the correct interfaces may integrate into somatic perceptions. 
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In fact, this integration may be a two way process. Commenting on a number of 
technological projects utilizing prosthetic, brain-computer and haptic feedback for 
rehabilitation and sensory enhancement, Andy Clark argues that the neural plasticity of the 
brain demonstrated by the success of these experiments shows how non-biologically derived 
sensor data is easily incorporated into active bodily schema. He points out that "The key to 
effective sensory substitution is goal-driven motor engagement" (2000, p.269), which allows 
the user's brain to test the boundaries and significance of the incoming data and their 
interaction with it. Initially, this appears not to apply to physiological processes which we 
might consider non motor-driven, but in fact the paradigm of biofeedback therapy has 
successfully demonstrated that physiological instruments can help users learn to actively and 
intentionally modify their own physiological functions. 
Ihdc also delimits the contents of perception of the body, according to the information 
sources that influence it. He refers to what we might consider the authentic or directly 
perceived body as Body One. In contrast Body Tnm is comprised of cognitive information, 
such as cultural and social knowledge and judgments, memory and expectation (Ihde, 2002). 
It is possible to shoehorn our definitions of embodiment relations into bodies one and two. 
Body One is where we might find the direct perception of embodiment relations, whereas 
Body Two would be the arena in which hermeutic relations took place and modified self 
perception based on cognitive data. The fact that this seems so messy a tactic is that our 
perceiving body-subject resists this division. The apparently direct perception of Body One 
is contested as it incorporates unmediated sensory data. 
This problem comes about because what we might imagine are distinct mental contents, 
such as abstract knowledge or somatic cues, are incorporated within perception. We can see 
this clearly in Wittgenstein's Duck/Rabbit illustration and other visual illusions which defy 
visual categorization or shift between different perceptual interpretations. These examples 
demonstrate that abstract knowledge influences how perceptual cues are interpreted at the 
moment of perception. Therefore as far as a delimitation of phenomenological embodied 
experience. Body One and Body Two can be useful to categorize incoming information, but 
not to prioritize its effects or even to separate them within subjective experience. 
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Assigning meaning to somatic information; significance and symptoms. 
Whether the organs have anything to say is dependent upon who is listening. Leriche draws 
a distinction between illness from the perspective of the doctor and that of the patient; 
"The idea must be accepted that the disease of the sick man is not the anatomical disease of 
the doctor. A stone in the atrophic gall bladder can fail to give symptoms for years and 
consequently create no disease, although there is a state of pathological anatomy... The 
difficulty must no longer be conjured away by simply saying that there arc silent and 
masked form of disease: these are nothing but mere words." (1981, p.94). 
As we see, the physician's definition of pathology is situated on a different part of the 
continuum of physiological normality to that of the experiencing man. The instrumentation 
of medical practice; both as a knowledge system, and a set of technologies which render 
visible the functions of the body, allow the physiologist to discover functional irregularities 
which have not yet, or may not ever, manifest themselves as the phenomenal experience of 
illness. These deviations from the norm are recognised "because today's practitioners are the 
heirs to a medical culture" which allows them to recognise the possible outcome of certain 
symptoms or abnormalities based upon historical knowledge and the fact that "at one time 
this experience gave rise to, summoned up, that knowledge" (ibid, p.95). 
In a study similar to that of the diabetes patients above, patients being treated for 
hypertension (physiologically classed as high blood pressure but not severe enough that it 
produces any symptoms) found 80% of patients reporting that "a variety of somatic cues 
such as heart palpitations, warm face, and headache" allowed them to tell if they had 
elevated blood pressure, even when they were aware that the disorder was asymptomatic. It 
appears therefore, that the condition of diagnosis leads patients to assign symptomatic 
significance to observed bodily events. 
The field of health psychology acknowledges the complications presented by the mixing of 
information and experience Body One and Body Two within perception. As a discipline 
Heath Psychology considers that "much of the decoding process takes place outside 
awareness" (Baum et al:2001, p.26) during the interpretation of somatic experience into 
symptoms. Research here makes a further division of somatic experiences similar to Ihde's 
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which can assist in an analysis of how health significant information is dealt with by 
patients, and makes a distinction between somatic sensations which have reference to 
patients' past illness experiences and somatic memory, and those which do not. 
Baum et al. (2001) explain that; 
"The knowledge base used to transform a somatic sensation into a symptom includes both 
semantic memories (e.g., memories of labels such as heart disease, cancer, and colds) and 
concrete, perceptual memories of personal somatic experiences (e.g., memory of painful 
sensations in specific parts of the body during specific illness episodes)". 
^X'hilst cognitive and abstract strategies for illness management are elicited by patients 
semantic knowledge of medical schema, "Perceptual memories of specific episodes... 
appear to generate an immediate, sensory link to appraisals of health status and treatment 
efficacy..." In addition to this, somatic cues which access memory "play a central role in the 
elicitation and maintenance of emotional reactions". (2001, p.23). 
This memory based somatic response can be linked to Clark's discussion of how 
technologies become integrated into active bodily schema through a process of motor 
engagement. Learned responses to bodily sensations linked to illness may operate in a 
similar fashion, allowing physiological sensor technologies with embodied interfaces to 
generate "immediate, sensory link(s)" which will influence emotional reactions and 
appraisals of health status in their users. 
Conclusion 
There are a number of implications proceeding from the ideas we have tested to define 
phenomenal interactions - interactions with technology and with health significant somatic 
experiences. Physiological instrumentation allows the detection of medically defined abnormalities which 
are not accessible to normal perception. In everyday use however, there is a possibility that 
medical instruments may diffuse physician's definitions of illness, and with them, the 
broader possibility of pathology, into phenomenal experiences of somatic events. Research 
with patients who are currently using technologies of these types suggests that embodied 
somatic information have far more affective power over users, which may also result in 
stress responses to information which is diagnostically loaded from a medical perspective. 
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but may never result in illness. 
However these technologies represent a potential interface of the user to somatic 
information that may be able bypass semantic medical schema and definitions through 
embodied interfaces. We can suppose that this will result in more affective and instinctive 
responses to objective body information from instruments. An effect such as this may allow 
patients to engage more easily in their own health management, for example to use 
medications correctly - as in the case of the diabetics discussed earUer. 
While this is only the opening of a conversation about the effects of these devices, we have 
seen how organs might speak through technologies, and begun to understand from a 
phenomenological standpoint how they might be interpreted. 
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